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Statutes
Utah Code Annotated, as amended:
Section 15-1-4
9,18,19,20,42
Interest on judgments.
Any judgment rendered on a lawful
contract shall conform thereto and shall bear
the interest agreed upon by the parties; which
shall be specified in the judgment; other
judgments shall bear interest at the rate of
12% per annum.
Section 15-4-3
Payments by Obligor.
The amount of value of any consideration
received by the obligee from one or more of
several obligors, or from one or more of joint
or of joint and several obligors, in whole or
in partial satisfaction of their obligations
shall be credited to the extent of the amount
received on the obligation of all co-obligors
to whom the obligor or obligors giving the
consideration did not stand in the relation of
a surety.

29

Section 15-4-4
Release of co-obligor - Reservation of Rights.
Subject to the provisions of §15-4-3, the
obligee's release or discharge of one or more
of several obligors, or of one or more of
joint or of joint and several obligors, shall
not discharge co-obligors against whom the
obligee in writing and as part of the same
transaction as
the release or discharge
expressly reserves his rights; and in the
absence of such a reservation of rights shall
discharge co-obligors only to the extent
provided in §15-4-5.

17,26

Section 15-4-5
Release of co-obligor - Effect of knowledge of
obligee.
If an obligee releasing or discharging an
obligor without express reservation of rights
against a co-obligor then knows or has reason
to know
that the obligor released or
discharged did not pay as much of the claim as

17,26

in

h*3 was oound by m a contract cr relation with
that co-obligor to pay, the obligee's claim
against that co-obligor shall be satisfied to
the amount which the obligee knew or nad
reason to know that the released or discharged
obligor was bound to such co-obligor to pay.
If an obligee so releasing or discharging
an obligor has not then such knowledge or
reason to know, the obligee's claim against
the co-obligor shall be satisfied to the
extent of the lesser of two amounts, namely:
(a) the amount of the fractional share of the
obligor released or discharged, or (b) the
amount that such obligor was bound by his
contract or relation with the co-obligor to
pay.
Section 38-9-1
Liability of person filing wrongful lien.
A person who claims an interest in, or a
lien or encumbrance against, real property,
who causes or has caused a document asserting
that claim to be recorded or filed in the
office of the county recorder, who knows or
has reason to know that the document is
forged, groundless, or contains a material
misstatement or false claim, is liable to the
owner or title-holder for $1,000 or for treble
actual damages, whichever is greater, and for
reasonable attorney
fees, and
costs as
provided in this chapter, if he willfully
refuses to release or correct such document of
rcord within 20 days from the date of written
request from the owner or beneficial titleholder of the real property. This chapter is
not intended to be applicable to mechanics' or
materialmen's 1 lens.
Section 48-1-12(2)
Nature of partner's liability.
All partners are liable:
(1) Jointly and severally for everything
chargeable to the partnership under Sections
48-1-10 and 48-1-11.
(2)
Jointly for all other debts and
obligations of the partnership; but any
partner may enter into a separate obligation
to perform a partnership contract.

IV

"action 43-1-30
General effect of dissolution on authority of
partner .
Except so far as may be necessary to wind
up
partnership
affairs
or
to
complete
transactions begun but not then finished,
dissolution terminates all authority of any
partner to act for the partnership.
(1) With rspect to the partners:
(a) when the dissolution is not by
the act , bankruptcy or death of a
partner; or
(b) when the dissolution is by such
act, bankruptcy
or death of a
partner in cases where Section 48-131 so requires.
(2) With respect to persons not partners
as declared in Section 48-1-32.
Section 57-1-3
Grant of fee simple presumed.
A fee simple title is presumed to be
intended to pass by a conveyance of real
estate, unless it appears from the conveyance
that a lesser estate was intended.
Section 78-12-22
Within eight years.
Within eight years an action upon a
judgment or decree of any court of the United
States or of any state or territory within the
United States, an action to enforce any
liability due or to become due, for failure to
provide support or maintenance for dependent
children.
Section 78-12-25
Within four years.
Within four years, (1) an action upon a
contract, obligation or liability not founded
upon an instrument in writing; also on an open
account for goods, wares and merchandise, and
for any article charged in a store account;
also on an open account for work, labor or
services rendered, or materials furnished;
provided, that action in all of the foregoing
cases may be commenced at any time within four
years after the last charge is made or the
last payment is received. (2) An action for
relief not otherwise provided for by law.

v

Section 73-12-26
Within three years*
Within three years:
(1)
An action for waste, or trespass
upon or injury to real property; except that
when waste or trespass is committed by means
of underground works upon any mining claim,
the cause of action does not accue until
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting such waste or trespass.
(2) An action for taking, detaining, or
injuring personal property, including actions
for specific recovery thereof; except that in
all cases where the subject of the action is
a domestic animal usually included in the term
"livestock ," which at the time of its loss has
a recorded mark or brand, if the animal
strayed or was stolen from the true owner
without the owner's fault, the cause does not
accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon
inquiry as to the possession of the animal by
the defendant.
(3) An action for relief on the ground
of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of
action in such case does not accrue until the
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake.
(4) An action for a liability created by
the statutes of this state, other than for a
penalty or forteiture under the laws of this
state, except where in special cases a
different limitation is prescribed by the
statutes of this state.
(5) An action to enforce
liability
imposed by §78-17-3, except that the cause of
action does not accrue until the aggrieved
party knows or reasonably should know of the
harm suffered.
Section 78-27-56
Attorney's fees - Award where action or
defense in bad faith.
In civil actions, where not otherwise
provided by statute or agreement , the court
may award reasonable attorney's fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that
the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in
good faith.

vi

Section 73-32-3
In immediate presence of court; summary action
- Without immediate presence; procedure.
When a contempt is committed in the
immediate view and presence of the court, or
judge at chambers, it may be punished
summarily, for which an order must be made,
reciting the facts as occurring in such
immediate view of contempt, and that he be
punished as prescribed in §78-32-10 hereof.
When the contempt is not committed in the
immediate view and presence of the court or
judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be
presented to the court or judge of the facts
constituting the contempt, or a statement of
the facts by the referees or arbitrators or
other judicial officers.

38,40

Section 78-32-10
Judgment.
Upon the answer and evidence taken the
court or judge must determine whether the
person proceeded against is guilty of the
contempt charged, and if it is adjudged that
he is guilty of the contempt, a fine may be
imposed upon him not exceeding $200, or he may
be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding
thirty days, or he may be both fined and
imprisoned; provided, however, that a justice
of the peace may punish for contempt by a fine
not to exceed $100 or by imprisonment for one
day, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

38,40,41

Section 78-32-11
Damages to party aggrieved.
If an actual loss or injury to a party in
an action or special proceeding prejudicial to
his rights therein, is caused by the contempt,
the court
in addition to the fine or
imprisonment imposed for the contempt or in
place thereof, may order the person proceeded
against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of
money sufficient to indemnify him and to
satisfy his costs and expenses; which order
and the acceptance of money under it is a bar
to an action by the aggrieved party for such
loss and injury.

40

vii

Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 4(b)
Process. Time of issuance and service.
If an action is commenced by the filing
of a complaint, summons must issue thereon
within three months from the date of such
filing. The summons must be served within one
year after the filing of the complaint or the
action will be deemed dismissed, provided that
in any action brought against two or more
defendants in which personal service has been
obtained upon one of them within the year, the
other or others may be served or appear at any
time before trial.
Rule 11

16

?1,37,38,39,40
other

Signing of pleadings, motions, and
papers , sanctions.
Every pleading, motion, and other paper
of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in
his individual name who is duly licensed to
practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's
address also shall be stated. A party who is
not represented by an attorney shall sign his
pleading, motion, or other paper and state his
address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.
The rule in equity that the averments of an
answer under oath must be overcome by the
testimony of two witnesses or of one witness
sustained by corroborating circumstances is
abolished. The signature of an attorney or
party constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading, motion, or other paper;
that to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.
If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is
signed promptly after the omission is called
to the attention of the pleader or movant. If
Vlll

a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed
in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or party or parties the
amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion,
or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
Rule 14

30
Third-Party Practice.
(a) When defendant may bring in third
party.
At any time after commencement of the
action
a defendant, as
a
third-party
plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint
to be served upon a person not a party to the
action who is or may be liable to him for all
or part of the plaintiff's claim against him.
The third-party plaintiff need not obtain
leave to make the service if he files the
third-party complaint not later than ten days
after
he
serves
his
original
answer.
Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon
notice to all parties to the action.
The
person served with the summons and third-party
complaint, hereinafter called the third-party
defendant, shall make his defenses to the
third-party plaintiff's claim as provided in
Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the
third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against
other third-party defendants as provided in
Rule 13. The third-party defendant may assert
against the plaintiff any defenses which the
third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's
claim.
The third-party defendant may also
assert any claim against the plaintiff arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim
against the third-party plaintiff.
The
plaintiff may assert any claim against the
third-party
defendant
arising
out
of
transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the plaintif's claim against the
third-party plaintiff, and the third-party
defendant thereupon shall assert his defenses
as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims
and cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. A
third-party defendant may proceed under this

IX

Rule against any person not a party to the
action who is or may be liable to him for all
or part of the claim made in the action
against the third-party defendant.
(b)

When plaintiff may bring in third party.
When a counterclaim is asserted against
a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be
brought in under circumstances which under
this rule would entitled a defendant to do so.
Rule 69(c)
Execution
and
proceedings
supplemental
thereto. When writ to be returned.
The writ of execution shall be made
returnable at any time within two months after
its receipt by the officer.
It shall be
returned to the court from which it issued,
and when it is returned the clerk must attach
it to the record.
Rule 69(e)(4)
(4) Purchaser refusing to pay.
Every bid shall be deemed an irrevocable
offer; and if the purchaser refuses to pay the
amount bid by him for the property struck off
to him at a sale under execution, the officer
may again sell the property at any time to the
highest bidder, and if any loss is occasioned
thereby, the party refusing
to pay, in
addition to being liable on such bid, is
guilty of a contempt of court and may be
punished accordingly.
When a purchaser
refuses to pay, the officer may also, in his
discretion, thereafter reject any other bid of
such person.
Rule 69(g)2
(2) Where
purchaser
fails
to
obtain
possession of property or is dispossessed
thereof or evicted therefrom.
Where, because of irregularities in the
proceedings concerning the sale, or because
the property sold was not subject to execution
and sale, or because of the reversal
or
discharge of the judgment, a purchaser of
property sold on execution, or his successor
in interest, fails to obtain the property or

x

is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom,
the court having jurisdiction thereof shall,
on motion of such party and after such notice
to the judgment creditor as the court may
prescribe,
enter
judgment
against
such
judgment creditor for the price paid by the
purchaser, together with interest. In the
alternative,
if
such
purchaser
or
his
successor
in interest, fails to recover
possession of any property or is dispossessed
thereof or evicted therefrom in consequence or
irregularity in the proceedings concerning the
sale, or because the property sold was not
subject to execution and sale, the court
having jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion
of such party and after such notice to the
judgment debtor as the court may prescribe,
revive the original judgment in the name of
the petitioner for the amount paid by such
purchaser at the sale, with interest thereon
from the time of payment at the same rate that
the original judgment bore; and the judgment
so revived shall have the same force and
effect as would an original judgment of the
date of the revival.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.
ONE GENERAL PARTNER AND THE PARTNERSHIP
WERE NOT SERVED, SO THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE
RENEWED THE JUDGMENT.
May a joint judgment against the limited partnerhip and three
general partners be renewed without serving the partnership trustee
and one of the general partners, where the partnership has assets
and judgment is not joint and several, but only "joint"?

II.
THE RENEWAL JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT CONFLICT
WITH THE UNAMENDED ORIGINAL JUDGMENT.
May a judgment be renewed

for more than the amount the

original judgment allowed, where the original judgment was never
amended, even by writs of execution, and the new judgment conflicts
with the first judgment?

Ill .
THE CREDITOR HAS TO EQUITABLY OFFSET AMOUNTS
RECEIVED, AND LEGALLY OFFSET AMOUNTS BID.
May a judgment be renewed for amounts the creditor has already
equitably received because of his judgment; or be renewed for
amounts the creditor legally bid at execution sale for all of the
right of one defendant, when that right turns out to be less than
the creditor hoped?
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•-, *hat

iver

-

* i_.i

;r m e ^o^rlsi*^ - 1-voeo

y

.,c- ,. __ ,. ;c ^o^e was

to aaie nereor x.. *.*." -HOU:-T
*l!eae or ^rav for

32,1-0.'-. '

:

-t

"he Ccnipjdi. " aia not

.

,

R ^06~~210.
ni

7-9)
~ne

t

r ]l . 1 1 1 t t ' n a t t o r n e ^ '

tiled

d lluti^n

",eaa . * as

J -1

,, ' h ^ t I • •"!

J'Jdqiiie',1

:>r amena 1 r.a

+

*•-

.A-

...

" '

ne i r a y ^ : *
:P

. -" * .

',

.

raerea:

1

\ct i o n <R [ . I I

, i'-^J.u,

'

Barber "s c o u n s e l

xii cue j u d g m e n t

JJ nes
t 1 >> ,

ad mi t t e d

granted

April

1

that the Plaintiffs have recovered
judgment against the Defendants in the (note)
amount of $15,000, plus accrued interest at
the rate of 12& from date hereof, until paid
in the amount of 32,180.88, attorney's fees in
the amount of $4,000, and court cost in the
amount of $31.30.
(Addendum Item 2, R 208210.)
The judgment did not provide for interest after the judgment, and
interest

after

Complaint.

the

judgment

(Addendum

Item

had
1.)

not

been

prayed

Objections

were

for

in

the

made by

the

Defendants who contested several items, including the attorney fee
award

(the Affidavit on fees was never sent to the Defendants,

Record in case 870128-CA 23; 5 7 ) .
The

Emporium

Limited

Partnership

eventually

filed

bankruptcy protection. (R pp.6; 4-17; 27-38, Addendum
The partnership is still in dissolution.

Item

for
4.)

The bankruptcy has not

been concluded because the partnership has judgments and claims to
collect against others. (Emporium v. Millenium Corp. Supreme Court
Case Nos. 20273; 20282, Summary Decision finally resulted in an
amended judgment of $158,835.83.)
Barbers never sought to lift the automatic stay in bankruptcy
against

the

Partnership

(R pp.6, 20, 28-9).

collection against the general partners.

They

attempted

They did not consider

themselves successful.
Barbers prepared several writs of execution (Record in Case
870128-CA. pp.148-9, 158-9, 209, 262-5). (Record incase 870128-CA
pp.58-9; 206-14; 241-9; 259-65; 282-5).

Defendants argued the

judgment should not allow accrual of interest after judgment. The
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(R 4, 5, 27, 62, 237-8). No summons was served on Mr. White.
Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss the Renewal Complaint was denied
(R

43-49).

Defendants

requested

permission

to

file

an

Interlocutory Appeal, but did not obtain permission to bring an
Interlocutory Appeal at that time. (R 50-61, Supreme Court Case No„
870232) .
Defendants Stocking and Malouf, the only Defendants who were
served, filed an Answer and Counterclaim. (R 62-65).
Plaintiffs amended

the Complaint

(R 66-70) without

Thereafter,
notice to

Defendants (R 70) and without prior court approval. (R 93-95, 106107).

The original Complaint for a new judgment became the First

Cause of Action (R 66).
attempted

The Second and Third Causes of Action

to join relatives and

lien holders of the general

partners in an attempt to partition property once partly owned by
one general partner which Plaintiffs had executed on and bid for,
but in which that general partner had no interest. (R 66-70, 7378, 108). Barbers also filed a lis pendens pertaining to certain
property.

(R 79).

The Defendants1 Motion to Strike the Amended Complaint on both
procedural and jurisdictional grounds (R 93-102; 106-112; Addendum
Item 9) prompted Plaintiffs to Move For Permission to Amend, after
the fact (R 103). Defendants' comprehensive arguments (R 105-112)
were denied without any analysis by the trial court. (R 113).
Thereafter, Defendants Amended their Answer and Counterclaim, and
added a Third Party Claim against the Plaintiffs* counsel. (R 114120) .
Just before this appeal

(R 260-2), Plaintiffs moved for
4
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The court also ruled that all previous orders of the court
pertaining

to the Complaint, Amended

Complaint, Counterclaim,

Amended Counterclaim, and Third Party Complaint were final and
appealable orders under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., (Addendum Item 7; TR
39, lines 15-17), and that there was no just reason for delay in
filing the Appeal•

The Rule 54(b) Order was signed December 27,

1988.
Notice of Appeal was filed November 2, 1988 (Addendum Item 8,
R 260-261) by Defendants Von K. Stocking and Raymond N. Malouf,
Jr.

Defendant Don A. White, Jr. appeared specially and solely to

the extent necessary to appeal the orders which may apply to him,
but he maintains that the court otherwise lacked jurisdiction over
him in this case because he was not served. (R 224-8; 237-240).
Defendants appealed the Partial Summary Judgment, the court's
Order

granting

sanctions, and

the

court's

dismissal

of

the

Counterclaim, Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. (R
260-1).

Defendants also appealed from the trial court's order of

June 18, 1987 (related to the First Cause of Action) denying the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (for failure to join the partnership
as a party; for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
because the Plaintiffs tried to have a new judgment renewed for
more than the original judgment; and for failure to state a legal
claim for relief because the Plaintiff should have satisfied all
or most of the judgment because of legal requirements or equitable
offsets.

(R 4-17; 27-38; 43-47).

The Memorandum Decision of

September 16, 1987 (R 113), denying Defendants' Motion to Strike
the Amended Complaint (R 93-112) is also claimed to be an error.

6

Appellants argued that material and disputed facts exist,
which are marshalled here in summary fashion.

Appellants request

the Partial Summary Judgment to be set aside, and the Plaintiffs1
case dismissed.

The factual and legal issues should be resolved

in accordance with arguments made by the Defendants opposing entry
of the judgment. (R 221-241; Addendum Item 12).

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I.
The

Partial

Summary

Judgment

exceeds

the

trial

court's

discretion.

The original judgment was not joint and several, but

only joint.

The law requires that for judgment to be obtained

jointly, all of the persons or entities who might be liable must
be made parties and be joined in the action.

One of the general

partners, Don A. White, Jr., was not separately served with the
Complaint and Summons. He has not appeared except to appeal. The
Emporium Partnership is in bankruptcy.

The Trustee was neither

named as a party nor was the Partnership separately served.
Defendants raised

these

issues and

alleged

the court

The

lacked

jurisdiction to renew the 1979 judgment.

II.
The original (1979) judgment is limited to the relief pleaded
for and requested by the prayer. Judgment was given after a Motion
for Judgment on the pleadings, was limited to these pleadings.
The

Complaint

was

to

enforce

performance

of

a

contractual

promissory note. The note provided for interest on the debt, but
Plaintiff failed to plead for post-judgment interest. The judgment
itself

fails

to

provide

for

interest

after

the

judgment.

Defendants never needed to appeal that issue, since interest was
not allowed to Barbers in the judgment.

This is not the type of

a judgment which is included within "other judgments" which will
bear interest at 12* per annum, referred to in U.C.A. §15-1-4.

8

This is a ]udgment based on a contract and U.C.A. §15-1-4 requires
that any ]udgment on a contract shall specify the interest in the
judgment. This one didn't. The judgment was never amended before
it expired.

A writ of execution does not amend the judgment.

III.
The creditor actually has possession of the former residence
of Mr. and Mrs. Von K. Stocking, and an equitable reduction in the
claim is required.

After the 1979 judgment, Stockings defaulted

in payments to First Federal Savings & Loan.

Barber's attorney

negotiated directly with Mr. Stocking (R 15-18) to buy the house
and take both Mr. and Mrs. Stocking's equity in the house to
satisfy part of the 1979 judgment.

Because of Barber's interest,

First Federal did not allow Stockings to cure the default. Barbers
purchased First Federal Savings & Loan's beneficial interest and
went ahead with the advertised trust deed sale. Plaintiffs now say
it was an "arms length" transaction, but Stockings are entitled to
an equitable offset for the value of their equity in the home.
Barbers have refused to give it. (R 179-184).

Barber's attorney

wrote letters (R 14) in which Plaintiffs expressed minimum and
maximum values.

The equity is easily calculated between about

$11,000 and $27,000.

However, not one dollar was allowed by

Barbers.
Barbers also noticed for sale and bid $20,000 at an execution
sale for all of the right, title and interest of Raymond N. Malouf,
Jr. in a residence his wife owns.

(R 172-178). Mr. Malouf had no

equity in the house because of prior mortgages and assignments of

9

mortgages.

This was pointed out to the Barbers before they had

their execution sale, but they bid anyway.

Legally, the Barbers

are obligated to credit the judgment by the amount of their bid.
(R 33-36) .

IV.
Even though this Complaint

is solely allowed

to renew a

judgment. Plaintiff tried to join relatives of Mr. Malouf, to
litigate

issues of priority

of mortgages and

property

(R 66-70), by amending the Complaint.

assignments on
The amendment to

the Complaint was made after the eight year statute of limitation
on the 1979 judgment ended. (R 66). The issues are res judicata
because of a prior order made April 24, 1987, in Case No. 17630.
(R 17630, pp. 379-381).

The court abused

its discretion in

allowing Plaintiffs to join persons not parties to the original
judgment, and against which the Plaintiff had no cause of action.
(R 94-99) . The 1979 judgment, if it gave the Barbers any potential
claim against the property, no longer allowed a claim after the
judgment expired. The judgment lien, if any, joining third parties
in the renewal action, lapsed with the lapsing of the judgment.
The judgment

lien did not gain legitimacy by the Plaintiffs1

exercise of an execution sale. Having the sale does not create an
interest where there was no interest. (R 172-8).

V.
Material issues of disputed fact were adequately set forth by
the Defendants herein, and were before the trial court. CR 163-184;

10

203-218). The court abused it discretion in denying Defendants the
right to have those facts decided in a trial.

VI.
The court gratuitously decided to find counsel for Defendants
in contempt for raising the same issues which still exist.
228-232).
8).

(R 219;

The court called this an Order for Sanctions. (R 246-

Whatever

it is called, there was neither a legal basis

(because there was no prior order which was violated, and no Rule
11 violation), nor a factual basis for sanctions.
Appellants have marshalled all the facts to support the trial
court by references to the record and related cases in the Case
Statement, Summary and Argument. However, the facts to support the
court's statements that these issues have been resolved already (R
219; TR 1-3) simply do not exist.

The record shows numerous

efforts to invite the trial court to fairly apply the law to the
case, but it misapprehended the true facts and incorrectly recalled
the pleadings.

11

ARGUMENT
I.
ONE GENERAL PARTNER AND THE PARTNERSHIP
WERE NOT SERVED, SO THE COURT
SHOULD NOT RENEW THE JUDGMENT
This case presents a due process question of whether
Emporium

Partnership

and

its general

the

partners are entitled

to

application of both common law and statutory requirements that a
creditor proceed against the partnership before proceeding against
general partners.

It also presents the due process question of

whether a renewal judgment can be entered against a partnership and
against a general partner who have not been made parties to the
action.
The Barbers sued to renew the 1979 judgment less than a month
before the eight year statute of limitations expired.

They did

not, however, serve one of the general partners and did not serve
the partnership.

There were three alleged general partners.

two of them were served.

Only

As these filed their appearances and

answers, they specifically denied that they were appearing for the
third, Don A. White, Jr.
several.

The 1979 judgment

is not joint and

The new Partial Summary Judgment specifically provides

only for joint

liability.

The distinction

arises from both statutory and common law.

is significant, and
Utah law, U.C.A. §48-

1-12(2) provides in this instance that general partners are liable
jointly, rather than jointly and severally.
A liability is said to be joint and several when the creditor
may sue one or more of the parties to such liability separately,
12

or all of them together at his option. Joint liability is used to
express a common liability incurred by two or more persons.

It is

one in which the obligors bind themselves jointly, but severally,
and which must therefore be prosecuted in a joint action against
them all; and is thus distinguished from a "joint and several"
obligation. (See Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition
1968, p. 972).

This rule is generally followed.

A judgment

entered against partners after service of process on less than all
of them will not be given the effect of personal judgment against
partners not actually served.

A judgment against a partner not

served is totally void. Dillard v. McKnight, 209 P.2d 387, 34 C.2d
209 (Cal. 1949); and L.C. Jones Trucking Company v. Superior Oil
Co. , 234 P.2d 802, 68 Wyo. 384 (Wyo. 1951) . Service on one general
partner may sometimes confer jurisdiction against the partnership
itself. Diamond Nat. Corp. v. Thunderbird Holding, Inc., 454 P.2d
13, 85 Nev. 271

(1969).

However, this partnership

is in

dissolution and Barbers did not try to serve it. (R 20).
This court has ruled that when suing jointly, all the persons
or entities who might be liable must be brought into the suit.
Palle v. Industrial Commission, 79 U. 47, 7 P.2d 284 (1932).

It

has also held that the requirements of Rule 4, Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure are jurisdictional. Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah
1986) . The Emporium Partnership was not subject to judgment where
summons was only served on individual general partners for two
reasons.

First, the 1979 judgment

was joint, not

joint and

several, so to renew the judgment, jurisdiction has to be obtained
13

over all defendants. This includes the partnership and all general
partners.

This partnership was in dissolution.

While all of the

potential defendants were named, service was only attempted on
Stocking and Malouf. The other alleged general partner, White, was
not served and jurisdiction was never obtained to enter a judgment
against him.

The defendants all needed to be sued in their

individual capacities, just as this court required in Madsen v.
Borthick, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, at 14 (Dec. 12, 1988).
The second reason the partnership is not subject to a judgment
is that the partnership was the beneficiary of the automatic stay
order required

by

11 U.S.C.

§362.

Plaintiffs have lifted the stay.
it was not lifted.

Suit

is precluded

until

Barbers admitted (R 20; 28-30)

The partnership's legal representative is the

bankruptcy trustee, who was never a party, and never served.

The

partnership's dissolution came because of the bankruptcy, U.C.A.
§48-1-28(5),

the

authority

of

any

partner

to

act

for

the

partnership has been dissolved, so a general partner could not be
served for the partnership.

See U.C.A. §48-1-30.

The trustee

alone could act for the partnership.
Recently

this

court

confirmed

the

importance

of

the

distinction between joint and joint and several liability. It also
made it clear that a partnership is an entity separate from its
partners.

In McCune & McCune v. Mt. Bell Telephone, 758 P.2d 914,

87 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, (Utah 1988) partners in a law firm were
jointly, rather than jointly and severally, liable for debts not
arising from tort or breach of trust. The court further concluded
14

that since the debt was contractual in origin, common law required
the partnership's assets be marshalled and exhausted, to the extent
any exist, before the partnership creditor could reach partner's
individual assets.

Id. at 11.

Where Barbers did not even serve

the Emporium Partnership, it was obviously not their intent to do
this.

If partnership debts must be satisfied

by partnership

assets, to the extent any exist, before a creditor can seek
satisfaction from the assets of a partner, judgment must also be
against the partnership.
The original judgment was entered against the general partners
and the Emporium Limited Partnership. The Emporium Partnership was
not served in this action.
to have assets.
assets.

The Defendant partnership is alleged

The court has never found that it does not have

The McCune decision should control this case.

the meaning of joint liability is raised.

In both,

By not serving the

partnership, Plaintiffs failed to obtain jurisdiction over the
partnership.

The McCune court said:

It is true that under general partnership law,
all partnership debts are joint debts of the
partners and that all partners are ultimately
liable for those debts. However, a creditor's
right to proceed against the individual
partners is conditioned on having first
proceeded against the partnership assets for
satisfaction of the debt, something Mountain
Bell did not do in this case.
Therefore,
Mountain Bell claims the right to do under
tariff precisely what it could not otherwise
do legally - pursue a partner's assets first.
Similarly, by not serving Don A. White or the partnership,
Barbers failed to cause the court to obtain jurisdiction over

15

either the partnership or all of the general partners who might be
secondarily liable.

Under any theory, the partnership itself is

not now a party, but should be. Unserved partners of the dissolved
partnership are not parties merely because they were partners.
Joint liability means a creditor cannot proceed against one
defendant without joining all defendants. (R 223-8; 237-240). The
court abused its discretion in allowing judgment to enter against
the two general partners who were served, since the other joint
obligors were not served. It abused it discretion again by allowing
any judgment to enter when the partnership itself was never made
a party.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) requires that a summons must
be served within one year of filing the complaint.

It has been

more than a year since the Renewal Complaint was filed.

Is it too

late to serve the partnership or Don A. White, Jr.? The Rule also
provides that where some defendants have been served, others may
be served or appear anytime before trial.
made its decision without allowing trial.

In this case, the court
Absence of an actual

trial is not fatal to the question of whether "trial" has occurred.
Moon Lake Electric Assoc, v. Ultrasystems Western Constructors,
Inc. , 99 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Dec. 1988). Therefore, the partnership
and the other general partner can no longer be served, and the
judgment, made final by the trial court, should be considered void
and unenforceable.

The

L.C. Jones Trucking Company court said:

16

Although
there are statutes authorizing
judgments against two or more joint debtors
upon service of summons on but one of them,
the general rule is that it is improper to
render judgment against all the obligors where
the court has not acquired jurisdiction over
some of them. A judgment so rendered is void
as against the parties over whom the court has
no jurisdiction. L. C. Jones Trucking Co. v.
Superior Oil Co. , 234 P.2d 802 (Wyo. 1951) , at
808.
Failure of Barbers to serve Don A. White should alternatively
be considered equivalent to the release of a co-obligor and the
results governed by U.C.A. §15-4-4 and §15-4-5.

Barber's claim

should thus be deemed satisfied to the amount Don White was bound
to pay.

Don White's share of the debt - at least one-third - (R

226; No. 17630, R 256) should be subtracted from the claim allowed.
If Plaintiffs

are allowed

not

to proceed

against

all

joint

obligors, they must still be required to first satisfy any debt
from partnership assets, to the extent these exist.
A joint
general

judgment against a limited partnership and three

partners

cannot

be

renewed

without

first

obtaining

jurisdiction over the partnership and all three of the general
partners, when the original judgment is joint, and not joint and
several.

If it is renewed, the partnership's assets must be

exhausted first.

If judgment is allowed to stand on appeal, it

should only be enforceable against the partnership if jurisdiction
has somehow been obtained.

If it is not satisfied, Plaintiffs

should seek a deficiency against the general partners, but only if
they can all still be sued.

17

II.
THE RENEWAL JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT CONFLICT
WITH THE UNAMENDED ORIGINAL JUDGMENT
This case presents the issue of whether a 1979 judgment, never
amended, can be materially modified to allow post-judgment interest
when a renewal judgment is requested in 1987. Within this issue
is the question of whether a judgment can accrue interest under
U.C.A. §15-1-4, where the judgment arises from a contract, but the
judgment failed to provide for the contract interest. Not only are
those facts true, but (1) the judgment allowed only a certain
amount, $2180, as the total judgment interest "until paid"; and (2)
that amount is all the Complaint asked for. The Complaint did not
allege the right to interest after the judgment. Even if §15-1-4
doesn't mean what it says, Barber's pleadings were defective.
The original judgment merged the promissory note contract into
the judgment. In renewing the judgment, Barbers are limited to the
judgment. They cannot refer to the terms of the note. It is too
late to amend the judgment.
Yergensen v. Ford, 15 U.2d 397, 402 P.2d 696 (1965) , held that
a prior note merged into the judgment, and no longer existed.
Gossner v. Dairymen Associates, Inc., 611 P.2d 713 (Utah 1980)
cites Yergensen, in a dissent by Justice Hall, to make res judicata
the assertion of claims which should have been raised in a prior
action. "Where the parties and issues are the same and there is
a judgment on the merits, all claims of right from the original
cause of action are extinguished and the right represented by the
judgment is substituted therefore." Ld_, at 718. Likewise, Barbers
are stuck with the limits of their judgment.
Barber's 1979
judgment was defective on its face, and they admitted (R 208) they
have to rely on U.C.A. §15-1-4 to get post-judgment interest. This
section should not save them. A new judgment cannot be improved
by referring to the note. While the note allowed interest after
judgment, the judgment itself did not provide for it. Barbers are
therefore not renewing, they are trying to increase the amount the
judgment allowed.
They and the trial court pretend the judgment
18

allows something it does not allow.
What does the statute say? U.C.A. §15-1-4 requires shall any
judgment based on a contract, such as a promissory note, specify
on its face the amount of interest that is allowed. (R 209, 210).
Only other judgments, those not based on contracts, may accrue
interest whether or not the judgment provides for interest.
Additionally, even if this judgment were not based on contract,
post-judgment interest should not be allowed because of the defects
in the prayer of the Complaint. The Record herein, pp. 208-9,
recites:
November 12, 1986, the Plaintiffs admitted in
pleadings filed in this court in Civil No.
17630, that the judgment was "not as clear" as
it should be, but they wanted to rely on a
State statute to have interest on this
judgment anyway. Mr. Daines said:
Although the judgment language is
not as clear as one would like,
Plaintiffs
believe
it
is
sufficiently clear that State law
provides that all judgments require
interest and that it does not need
to be restated in each judgment
which is filed by the court.
(Response to Motion, November 12,
1986, Civil No. 17630). (R 17630,
p. 267) .
That is an admission the judgment does not
support post-judgment interest.
Plaintiffs
made the same admission to the Court of
Appeals on page 7 of their Respondent's Brief
wherein they stated:
The
judgment recites that the
interest is at 12% but does not
specifically state that it continues
to accrue after rendition of the
judgment. Id_, page 7, Case No.
870128-CA.

Of course the Appeals Court did not address
the issue on the merits, but the admission
proves Defendants* point. Plaintiffs justify
the omission and their accrual of the interest
by relying on Dairy Distributors, Inc. v.
Local 976, 12 U. 2d 85, 396 P. 2d 47 (1964)
and Section 15-1-4 U.C.A. to argue the merits
of their claim. They also try to explain what
must have been intended by the inclusion of
the figure $2,180 for interest, and the
language "from the date hereof". They explain
that it must have meant from a period before
the judgment entered until the date of
judgment.
They specifically say "the date
hereof" must mean the date of the Complaint.
That's probably true, but the fact remains the
judgment is deficient.
It does not allow
accrual of post-judgment interest.
The
judgment has never been amended.
The only way to change the amount of money allowed by a
judgment is to amend the judgment.

Richards v. Siddoway, 24 U.2d

314, 471 P.2d 143 (1970). (R 210-11). However, amending a judgment
requires formal action. Certain steps must be followed. The time
within which a court may act to modify a judgment is limited. A
long list of Utah decisions dating from 1895 support the position
that the only basis for changing the amount of money allowed by a
judgment is for the judgment itself to be amended.

A longer time

is allowed for amending clerical errors than judicial errors.
Richards, supra, is often referred to for the distinction
between
original

judicial
judgment

and clerical errors.

The problem with the

in this case is not clerical: from wrongly

recording the judgment as made.

Although the defects in the

Complaint and judgment may not have been intended, the words in the
judgment are consistent with the Complaint.
a judicial error.

There was, at most,

This does not mean that the judge erred in
20

entering the judgment, but that there was error in the judgment
itself.

Richards held that a judicial error can only be cured by

a timely motion for a new trial, amended findings, appeal, or a new
action. The longest possible time limit for any of this would have
been a new action, based on the note, within six years of the date
on the note, or by May 11, 1984.
of those remedies.

It is now too late to pursue any

The error wholly belongs to the Barbers and

their counsel. The prayer did not ask for post-judgment interest.
The judgment does not provide for post-judgment interest.

Any

interpretation that it does would allow a judgment in excess of the
prayer .
The trial court's entry of various writs of execution did not
amount to an amendment of the original judgment. Judgments cannot
be amended by misquoting them.

Any writs of execution lasted up

to two months from issuance [Rule 69(c) 1 and certainly all would
have expired when the judgment expired anyway.

The Barber's sole

option for a renewal is to rely solely upon the language of the
1979 judgment, assuming they have jurisdiction and are entitled to
more money.
Defendants did bring up the issue of post-judgment interest
in Barber v. Emporium, 750 P.2d 202 (1988), when contesting the
enforceability of one of Barber's writs for more than the judgment
allowed.

The Supreme Court said raising the issue on the appeal

of that writ was untimely, because the motion to quash the writ had
been denied

more than 30 days before

the appeal was filed.

However, even by allowing the disputed writ, the trial court did
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not amend the judgment .
Trial courts do not have authority to unilaterally change a
judgment even if they want to prefer one party.

In Benson v.

Anderson, 14 Utah 334, 47 P. 142 (1896) this court said that
judicial

tribunals may not exercise revisionary power over a

judgment after it has passed away from the judge. There, an effort
to change a judgment only six months after it was entered was
considered too late.

In Frost, et al . v. District Court, et al . ,

96 Utah 106, 83 P.2d 737 (1938) this court also said " . . . after
the time for appeal has expired, the court has no power to modify
a judgment in a substantial or material respect.

This is well

settled law."
Thus, the original trial court has no right to amend the 1979
judgment.

It and the Barbers never attempted to do so.

interpreted it by their hopes; not its words.

Each

Just because the

Plaintiffs seek to renew that judgment does not give the trial
court any authority to modify the original judgment.

Even if

partial summary judgment of some kind were appropriate, the trial
court has abused its discretion in allowing the modifications.
There was no appeal, no motion for a new trial, no new action, and
no timely modification attempt.

Any renewal judgment is limited

like the 1979 judgment is limited.
The trial court obviously believed the issues presented by
Defendants had been decided already by the Appeals Court (TR 2,
lines 14-25; 26 lines 25-36).

In order for a matter to be res

judicata and Defendants' arguments either claim barred or issue
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barred, the parties or their privies, must be the same; the claim
alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or
must be one that could and should have been raised in the first
action; the issue in both cases must be identical and have been
fully, fairly and competently litigated in the first action; and
the judgment must be final.

Madsen v. Borthick, 97 Utah Adv. Rep.

13 (Dec. 12, 1988) at 14 and 16.
Did the post-judgment
Mo.

interest

issue meet the Madsen test?

Since the Plaintiffs did not allege post-judgment interest,

it was not presented.

Should

the Plaintiff have presented

Yes, if Plaintiffs wanted post-judgment

interest.

litigated when the 1979 judgment was entered?

it?

Was it fully

No, because it was

not presented to the court by the party who had an interest in
getting post-judgment interest.
Plaintiff at that time?

Yes.

Should it have been raised by the
The Plaintiffs who had the burden,

did not even try to amend the judgment to provide for post-judgment
interest.
Perhaps the Plaintiffs assumed they could have post-judgment
interest.

However, their

judgment on the pleadings.

judgment

resulted

from a motion for

Their pleadings, consisting of the

Complaint, did not ask for post-judgment

interest.

Rule 8, Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, requires the Plaintiff to demand all the
relief

to which

he deems himself

entitled.

An exhibit

to a

pleading cannot serve the purpose of supplying material averments
or be taken as part of the allegations of the pleading itself.
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983).
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The Plaintiff never

attempted to amend the pleadings and has never alleged they asked
for post-judgment interest.
The court did recognize, as early as September 1986, that it
was too late to change the judgment to a different amount. (R Case
No. 17630, p. 252).

That is when the court denied Defendants'

Motion to Quash a writ
misapprehended

of execution.

Defendants'

Motion

The court

objecting

to

completely
the

amount

Plaintiffs claim was due under their writ, as an effort by the
Defendants

to change

the amount

of

the

judgment.

All the

Defendants were trying to do was to cause the court to recognize
the limitations of the 1979 judgment, and restrict the Plaintiff
to the amount shown thereby. Somehow, the court and the Plaintiffs
erroneously believed that Defendants had a burden to change the
amount of the judgment.

The point is, the judgment never allowed

the amounts Plaintiffs claim for it in their writs.

Ill .
THE CREDITOR HAS TO EQUITABLY OFFSET AMOUNTS
RECEIVED, AND

LEGALLY OFFSET AMOUNTS BID

This case presents the question of whether the creditors'
unconditional bid for "all of the right and interest" of a debtor,
when the debtors' interest is worth less than the bid, must be
credited

on a judgment.

Also at issue is whether equitable

offsets, for property the creditor took because of his judgment,
must be applied to reduce the judgment.
Appellants first discuss the equitable offset Barbers should
be required to make for their acquisition of Mr . & Mrs. Stocking's
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property.

August 29, 1983, Barber's attorney wrote a letter

admitting that Mr. Stocking's property was worth between $45,000
and $60,000. (R 14) .

The letter attests the fact that Barbers

believed there was equity in that property which could offset at
least part of the judgment.
the

letter,

the

equity

$11,808.06 and $26,808.06.

Using the Barber's own admissions in
in

Stocking's

property

was

between

These figures represent a difference

between the high and low values admitted by their letter, and the
face amount of the 1979 judgment.

The letter said in pertinent

part :
Norm Barber and I have examined the Von
Stocking home and believe that its worth would
probably be somewhere in the range of $45,000
to $60,000.
Von Stocking's Affidavits (R 15-18; 179-184) explain that Barbers
bid $33,191.94 at the trust deed sale for this residence November
4, 1983. His wife owned half the equity. Barbers had no judgment
against Mrs. Stocking.

His affidavit further shows that Barber's

attorney talked with Mr. Stocking several times between October
31st and November 3, 1983, about the fact that the Barbers were
particularly

interested in getting the value of the difference

between the first mortgage to

First Federal and the actual value

of the house in order to reduce the judgment. (R 179-184; part of
Addendum Item 10).
An equitable offset is appropriate.

The difference between

$33,191.94 (the amount Barbers bid at the foreclosure sale - the
actual amount to pay off the first mortgage) , and the minimum value

25

for the house stated in Barber's letter of $45,000, amounts to
$11,808.06.

The difference between their bid of $33,191.94 and

$60,000, the Barber's highest estimate of its value, is $26,808.06.
Either amount makes a material difference to what was still owed.
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to either allow
an equitable offset or Defendants' right to trial on that issue.
Clearly a genuine issue of fact was presented.

Even as a matter

of law, Stockings should have recovered some credit. Von Stocking
relied on Mr. Daines' promises. First Federal refused to allow the
Stockings to cure the default.

"No credit" towards the judgment

means Barbers are unjustly enriched.

(Stockings filed suit against

Barbers for interfering with First Federal, etc., and that case is
also being appealed.)

The trial court did not make findings as a

matter of law or fact Stockings are not entitled to an offset.
This

issue

presents

another

alternative

to

foreclose

enforcement of a renewal judgment. Both U.C.A. §15-4-4 and §15-45 can be read with U.C.A. §57-1-32.

The latter statute allows

Barbers only three months after the Stocking residence was sold to
seek a deficiency judgment against Mr. Stocking. Barber's failure
to seek a deficiency judgment is a waiver against Von Stocking for
more money.
obligor.

It thus operates as a release of him as a joint

Because he is released, the judgment cannot be renewed

against the other joint obligors since Mr. Stocking could no longer
be joined as a party.
judgment

that

must

It may be argued that the deficiency

be required,

if any, only

applies

to a

deficiency to pay the debt for particular real property. However,
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this action, seeking additional funds from Mr. Stocking after the
trust deed sale, is an effort to collect more.
extend

to this situation, and stop

additional funds from Mr. Stocking.
be made a party,

Estoppel should

the Barbers from seeking

If Mr. Stocking can no longer

since the original judgment was only joint and

not joint and several , the Barbers should be considered to have
waived their right to seek a renewal judgment.
Now we want to discuss the legal offset.

December 3, 1986,

the Barbers advertised and sold at auction all the right, title and
interest Defendant Malouf had in residential real property.
73-78).

Mr. Malouf objected

(R

to the sale, not on procedural

grounds, but on the basis that it was pointless because he had no
equity.

(R 97; 107-109; 211-214). Nevertheless, Barbers persisted

and bid $20,000 at the sale. Rule 69(e)(4) U.R.C.P. provides that
failure of a purchaser to pay the bid is contempt of court.
Plaintiffs admit they made the bid, but want to be excused under
Rule 69(g)(2).

However, that rule only allows a purchaser to be

exempt from his bid if there are irregularities in the proceedings,
or the property sold was not subject to execution and sale. That
rule also applies only to third party purchasers, rather than
judgment creditor purchasers.
Barbers should be deemed

to have waived any defense the

property was not subject to execution sale, where they insisted on
the sale with full knowledge of claims to no right, title or
interest raised by Mr. Malouf.

Barbers bid anyway. Barbers have

not admitted, alleged, or proven specific irregularities in the
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sale.

They are not entitled

to be excused from performance of

their bid.
In Randall v. Valley Title, 681 P.2d 219

(Utah 1984) this

court required a creditor bidding at a sale to credit the bid to
the judgment and discharge the claim to the extent of the bid.

The

same principal applies here. The trial court abused its discretion
by not requiring the same result. This is particularly true where
the court actually told Barbers to give the credit in its April 24,
1987 Order in Case Mo. 17630. (R 213; R Case No. 17630 380).
Requiring

credit

for

the bid

principle of "caveat emptor".

merely

recognises

the

legal

This concept, as applied to a bid

at a sheriff's sales of personal property, was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in Basin Loans, Inc. v. Young, 764 P.2d 239 (Ct.
App. 1988).

The court affirmed that a horse trailer was purchased

subject to a valid prior lien, that the creditor at the execution
sale could have known about.

The court said:

A buyer at a sheriff's sale acquires only such
interest as the judgment debtor had in the
properties sold.
Romero v. State, 97 N.M.
569, 642 P.2d 172, 176 (1982).
It follows that if the interest of the debtor is encumbered by a
lien, the buyer takes subject to that lien.

This is consistent

with Kimball v. Salisbury, 19 Utah 161, 56 Pac. 973 (1899).

The

Rule of caveat emptor applies to purchases at judicial sales, and
the purchaser

of said

property

(takes)

it subject

infirmities of the proceedings of the sale."
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to all

the

The amount Barbers received, or could have received, or are
deemed to receive, or equitably received from the Defendants should
be credited

to the benefit

of all

the Defendants.

This

is

provided by Utah statute §15-4-3, U.C.A., which says:
The amount received by the obligee from one
. . . of several obligors, or from one or
more joint . . . obligors, in whole or in
partial satisfaction of their obligations,
shal 1 be credited to the extent of the amount
received on the obligation of all co-obligors.
(Emphasis added) .
Plaintiffs must credit the 1979 judgment for amounts they were
(1) equitably deemed to receive, and (2) legally deemed to receive
because of

(1) the trust deed sale, and

renewing the judgment.

(2) their bid, before

Jorgensen v. Aetna Casualty Co., 98 Utah

Adv. Rep. 32 (Dec. 29, 1988) expresses this principle, although
the Jorgensen opinion by Justice Zimmerman deals with debts owed
by joint and several debtors.

IV.
THE REST OF THE CASE SHOULD NOT PROCEED
AGAINST DEFENDANTS NOT PARTIES TO THE 1979 JUDGMENT
This Complaint was originally filed solely to renew the 1979
judgment.

The original judgment was only against the partnership

and the alleged
Complaint

three general partners.

to be amended

8 years and

The court allowed the

5 months after

the

1979

judgment (R 113) to assert claims against relatives of Mr. Malouf
and

persons having

mortgages against

any possible

interest

in

residential property he held or once owned, far in excess of any
possible equity.

On the merits, the court abused its discretion
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or lacked jurisdiction to join those Defendants because Plaintiffs
failed to state a claim against them.
Barbers

consistently

refused

(R 93-112, Addendum Item 9 ) .

to ever

credit

the

$20,000

they

themselves bid December 3, 1986, for this very property.
The so-called Second Cause of Action (R 66-70) in the Amended
Complaint attempts to invalidate an assignment of the beneficial
interest in a second trust deed on the property from Logan Savings
and

Loan dated

June 3,

1982, to a

legitimate creditor.

The

assignment was of a second mortgage made two years before Barber's
1979 judgment, for valid consideration, and it was recorded.

This

was five years three months before the Amended Complaint was filed.
Defendants alleged Barbers were time-barred by §78-12-22, §78-1225 and §78-12-26 U.C.A., the eight year, four year, and three year
statutes of limitations, respectively. (R 114-118).

Barbers also

attempted to attack the validity of a judgment against Mr.Malouf
dated

January

before

their

15, 1982, recorded
Amended

Complaint.

about

five years nine months

Defendants asserted

limitations defenses, and other defenses.

the same

For the arguments, see

Defendants' Motion and Memorandum to Strike (R 93-102) and Reply
in Support of Motion to Strike (R 106-112) dated August 24, 1987
and September 8, 1987. (Addendum Item 9 ) .
Procedurally, Rule 14, U.R.C.P., was not fulfilled
court or the Barbers in amending the Complaint.

by the

Barbers did not

allege the additional parties were liable for the 1979 judgment.
They cannot be liable for a renewal judgment.
Amended

Complaint

was offered

in July
30

1987

By the time the
(R 73) , the

1979

judgment had expired.

lApni

13. 1987. Addendum

Item 1 ) .

Only

Defendants to the March 27, 1987 Complaint could potentially be
liable for a renewed judgment.

The presence of additional parties

is not necessary to resolve renewal of the 1979 judgment. Barber 's
claim against Malouf's interest in property was not relevant to the
renewal

effort.

separate action.

At

most

Barbers

could

attempt

a

completely

The 1979 judgment lien on property ended at the

expiration of the 1979 judgment.

While Barbers might argue their

bid

them

at

the execution

sale

gave

possession

with

judgment.

Barber's Complaint claims they bought

$20,000.

others, they

some right

never credited

They gave no credit.

to argue for

their

bid

to the

something for

Barbers should be deemed to have

waived any claim against Malouf's property by their failure to
credit the bid.

They should be estopped from trying to litigate

ownership or title to the property.
With respect to the very issues that the Second and Third
Causes of Action seek to try, in the prior action. No. 17630, the
same trial court held that the prior execution against Defendant
Malouf had never been challenged, even though the Plaintiffs had
notice in excess

of three years.

It also held that the prior

execution had priority over any execution claims of the Plaintiffs
against the same relatives and lien holders that Plaintiffs sought
to add as Defendants in the Amended Complaint.

The matter is thus

res judicata, and the trial court should have upheld
rulings

in

granting

Defendants

Motion

to

Strike

its prior

the

Amended

Complaint. The prior ruling by this court, and the arguments which
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support

it, is contained

in the Appeal Record, Case No. 17630,

pages 355-6; 369-377; 379-381; particularly Findings of Fact 9 &
10, plus Conclusions of Law 7, 8, 9 & 10.

The order was signed

April 24, 1987, and should be considered res judicata as far as
counts 2 & 3 of the Amended Complaint are concerned.
The addition of Defendants named in the Amended Complaint was
illegal.

They

are

inappropriate

parties

to

Barber's

renewal

effort, and the trial court abused its discretion by allowing them
into the suit.

They should be dismissed, and the Barbers have no

cause of action.

The court abused its discretion by allowing the

Amended Complaint to be filed September 16, 1987. (R 113).

The

court made no legal or factual findings to justify itself.

V.
THE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT
PROHIBIT SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The review standard for an adverse summary judgment is whether
there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there
is not, whether
matter of law.

the moving party

is entitled

to judgment as a

This court should treat the Appellants' statements

and evidentiary materials as if a jury would receive them as the
only credible evidence, and the Supreme Court sustain the judgment
only if no issues of fact, which could affect the outcome, can be
discerned.
In Zions First National Bank v. Clark Chemical Corp., 762 P.2d
1090 (Utah 1988) , summary judgment was reversed using the abovestated standard in an opinion written by Chief Justice Hall.
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He

also wrote the majority opinion in Merrill v. Cache Valley Dairy
Association, 750 P.2d

539

(Utah

1987), where another summary

judgment by Judge Christoffersen was reversed. Even the dissenting
opinion does not quarrel with the review standard.
The review standard for legal issues does not require this
court to give any deference to the trial court's legal conclusions
given to support the grant of a summary judgment.

This court

should review those legal conclusions for correctness. Atlas Corp.
v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987).
When there are material issues of fact, is it proper for the
trial court to ignore them and offer no analysis or explanation?
Defendants think not. We are entitled to a response. The standard
set forth in Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982)
requires

the court

to evaluate all

evidence, and

reasonable

inferences fairly drawn from the evidence, in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment.
The trial court did not do this.
There were at least fourteen disputed facts supported by at
least two affidavits to the trial court which did not rationalize
them away. (R 163-184; 203-207; Addendum Items 10 and 11. See also
TR Oct. 3, 1988 pp.1-10).

The issues of material fact before the

trial court are numerous, (R 166-7; 204-7),

and at least include

these subjects:
1.
The Complaint sought to change and improve the 1979
judgment, rather than just renew it. The trial court
ruled that asking for interest on that judgment was not
a modification of the judgment. (R 43) . The court never
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made an analysis of that 1979 judgment, or its pleadings,
to justify its ruling.
There is a genuine factual
question of what the 1979 judgment allows.
2.
Defendants were entitled to have a credit for the
unconditional $20,000 bid made by the Plaintiffs on an
execution sale. (R 213) . The court had even required the
Barbers to enter a credit for their bid before issuing
subpoenas in the original action. April 24, 1987 the
trial court entered a Finding in Case No. 17630, which
stated :
(9.) Plaintiffs
have
not
filed
Partial
Satisfaction of Judgment required after the
December 3, 1986 sheriff's sale, where $20,000
was paid
by
the Plaintiffs
toward
the
judgment. (R 17630, p. 380).
The Conclusion of Law which followed that Finding was:
(7.) Plaintiffs are
partial satisfaction
of one Defendant's
December 3, 1986. (R

required to first enter
of judgment from the sale
interest in property on
17630, p. 380).

That never happened. (R 213-214). The court renewed the
1979 judgment without doing that. There is a legal and
factual question as to why the trial court's prior order
was not complied with. Defendants are entitled to legal
offsets for that bid. (R 211-214; 108-110) The argument
was ignored because the trial court mistakenly believed
changes to the 1979 judgment had been affirmed by the
Supreme Court and all Barbers were doing was renewing the
same judgment (TR 12, lines 2-5). A factual question
exists about what the Appeals Court really did.
The
trial court was inattentive to believe either offset or
interest issues had been settled in the appeal. (R 149151). CTR 1-10, esp. p.2, lines 14-25; 3-4).
3.
Defendants are entitled to an equitable offset for
their equity after Barber's purchase of the Stocking
property. The court made no statements justifying the
rejection of Stocking's affidavits or the Defendants'
argument.
The amount claimed to be fair is between
$11,808 and $26,808. (See Point III).
4.
Payment made December 31, 1982 by the Plaintiffs in
the amount of $866.47 was only credited by Barbers
against interest. The Defendants argued it should be
credited against principal.
The face amount of the
judgment only requires that Barbers receive $21,211.30.
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5.
The renewal Complaint sued for 341,751.43. The
court ignored the factual issues about the reason the
actual amount of the 1979 judgment is less. It did not
explain its allowance of a higher amount in legal or
factual terms. Yergensen v. Ford, supra, would not allow
a renewal judgment to look again to the note. So how did
the trial court amend the 1979 judgment? (R 30-31). The
contract had been replaced by the judgment. The trial
court never explained why the renewal judgment could add
terms not part of the original judgment.
6.
Without initially taking any evidence, the court
awarded "sanctions" against the Defendants. Attorney's
fees on the renewal judgment are disputed.
When
testimony was introduced on attorney's fees, Barber's
attorney ultimately said "This case is on a contingency
basis . . . We do not bill (Barbers) for our time. It
is on a one-third contingency basis of anything we
collect." TR 16, lines 20-23. The court abused its
discretion by ordering Defendants' attorney to pay $3,000
in fees for sanctions. The court never made timely, true
or adequate findings. (R 246-248) .
After repeated
efforts by Defendants (R 6-9; 29-30; 222-3) Barbers
finally admitted one item - that they were not entitled
to a joint and several judgment (R 222-3; TR 6, lines 1224) . There is a factual issue of what acts justify
sanct ions.
7.
The partnership's bankruptcy required lifting the
bankruptcy stay before proceeding with an action or
judgment. Why wasn't it lifted? How does the court get
jurisdiction over the partnership? This question mixes
law and fact. The fact remains that the stay was never
lifted, the partnership was never a party. The trial
court abused its discretion. It never attempted to find
facts to support summary judgment against parties never
served.
8.
The Counterclaim (R 63) and Affidavits (R 15-17;
172-84) show Barbers fraudulently and/or intentionally
breached promises made to the Stockings, by not allowing
an equitable credit. Did they really buy solely as
disinterested persons? How can the court find this (it
didn't) when Barbers don't dispute they bought First
Federal's beneficial interest?
Regardless of their
intent, they received Stocking's equity (including that
of Mrs. Stocking), but made no reduction in the debt.
What findings support this?
9.

Defendants counterclaimed, in part, to seek damages
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for a groundless lien against real property under U.C.A.
Section 38-9-1.
Whether the lien was justified is
another question for trial. (R 119, paragraph 6; 127-8;
170; 206, paragraph 14).
10. Joint liability issues existed (R 225-228), but were
resolved only after summary judgment was allowed.
The foregoing material issues of fact, or mixed questions of fact
and law, arise from what became of the First Cause of Action in
the Amended Complaint.

The minute factual questions were spelled

out for the court in the Record on pages 166-7 and 204-207. These
are shown by the Answer,
Summary Judgment.

Counterclaim, and Affidavits opposing

Questions of equitable credit to Mr. & Mrs.

Stocking; whether Barbers are required

to charge each general

partner a share of the debt; whether Barber's encumbrance of real
property is actionable, as U.C.A. §38-9-1 says it is, are also
applicable to resolving the Third Party Complaint. These disputed
factual issues between the parties are supported by the pleadings.
(R 216-218).
summary

The court abused its discretion by granting partial

judgment

to

"renew"

the

judgment

and

dismiss

the

Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint.
The Utah Supreme Court said in Bennion v. Amass, 22 U.2d 216,
500 P.2d 512 (1972) that summary judgment shall not enter if there
are disputed issues to warrant a trial. In the Motion for Summary
Judgment, Barbers failed to set forth a list of the facts which
they claim were undisputed.

Defendants listed the facts which

existed that were disputed. (R 164-167; 203-207). The court never
rationalized these away.

Its decision should be reversed.
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VI.
THERE WAS NEITHER A LEGAL NOR FACTUAL
BASIS TO SUPPORT A SANCTION ORDER
This case presents the question of whether Rule 11 sanctions
need

to

be

gratuitously

supported
ignored

by

proper

findings.

the record and

The

trail

the pleadings, and

court
imposed

sanctions without sufficient reason or correct analysis. The court
ordered attorney's fees in the sum of $3,000 in connection with its
August 22, 1988 Memorandum Decision. CR 219-220) .
form of Findings and
penalty.

(R

228)

Judgment

Yet,

initially referred

there

was

no competent

The proposed
to this as a
finding

that

Defendants violated Rule 11. Barbers filed no affidavit supporting
the amount of attorneys fees reasonably expended.

In fact, they

had no attorneys fees (TR 16) . Plaintiffs themselves suggested the
question of attorney's fees be deferred and not ruled on in the
Summary Judgment question.

(R 137).

The award does not satisfy

U.C.A. §78-27-56 which requires only reasonable attorney's fees.
Even assuming the other elements of that statute may have been
somehow met in the mind of the judge, the court did not make any
findings to support
court's analysis?
the August

that amount, or any amount.

Where

is the

If there was analysis, it should have been in

22, 1988 Memorandum

Decision.

The Decision

sufficient reasoning to justify what the court did.

lacks

If the court

was tired of hearing from Defendants, it should have pondered their
arguments and recalled that nowhere had it intelligently resolved
the issues.

In the Defendants' objections to the form of the

pleadings, those arguments are summarized again (R 229-232).
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The

proposed orders came after the fact and cannot be used to justify
the

court .

The

original

proposed

findings

were

retained

by

Plaintiffs. (TR 38, lines 19-23).
Mow
penalty.

the
The

court

has

final

re-styled

form

of

the

its contempt
judgment

decision

leaves

as a

in the word

"contempt", and adds language attempting to justify the Memorandum
Decision as if it were made under Rule 11. (R 247) . The August 22,
1988 Memorandum Decision
Sanctions. (R 219).

is clearly

not

talking about Rule 11

Besides, Rule 11 only allows sanctions if "the

pleading, motion or other papers are signed
Rule".

in violation of the

The court made no findings that any pleadings or other

papers violated the Rule.
The trial court found contempt too easily.
State v. Barlow, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, at 29

This court in
(Feb. 10, 1989)

stated :
We agree that the trial court committed error
in finding Appellant in contempt, because the
procedural requirements of Utah Code Ann. §7832-3 (1987) were not observed.
The trial court failed to justify its finding by making an order
complying with U.C.A. §78-32-3:
. . . reciting the facts as occurring . . .
adjudging that the person proceeded against is
thereby guilty of a contempt and that he be
punished as prescribed in §78-32-10 hereof.
The trial court was reversed because :
. . . no order appeared in the record reciting
the facts forming the basis for the finding of
contempt. . . .
In addition, U.C.A. §78-3210 (1987) limits the maximum find that may be
imposed on a contempt judgment to $200. IdN at
29.
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The court erred in believing all the issues had been sett led .
What about the other legal issues, including credit for the $20,000
bid; the Stocking equity; release of one partner by not seeking
additional money after

the trust deed sale; no service on the

dissolved partnership; no service on one general partner in a joint
judgment.

It is true that the Plaintiffs agree the judgment should

be joint rather than joint and several, in the end.
issues was before the Court of Appeals.
first judgment in 1979.

None of these

None were decided by the

All were brought before the trial court.

On only the joint v. joint and several
trial court and the Plaintiffs concede.
trial court said, had been resolved.

liability issue did the
All the other issues, the

That's just not true.

Even if sanctions are allowable, only reasonable attorney fees
can be allowed.
Rule

Even then this could only be proper under actual

11 violations.

punishment.

It would

not

be

proper

for

a

contempt

Either way, there are no facts to make the court's

findings or award reasonable or true.

The trial court may have

believed, as it states in its Memorandum Decision (R 219), that it
had made repeated findings in the past on the issues.

If that is

true, the Plaintiff and the court ought to be able to specifically
refer to some analysis. (R 229-232).

Plaintiffs and the court

failed to show how or where the 1979 judgment was ever amended. The
writs on the 1979 judgment have expired.

They did not change what

the judgment says. The trial court never explained why the court's
April 24, 1987 ruling, (in Case No.17630, R 17630 pp. 379-38),
which required the Plaintiffs to enter a Partial Satisfaction for
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their bid of $20,000, was not applicable before any new judgment
is entered. (R 213-214).
Appellants would

like to marshall

all the trial court's

evidence that supports what the trial court did, so the Supreme
Court could review it.
analysis.

However, the trial court never made any

It only made a statement that it had been made.

(R

219) . The truth is either that the trial court accepted statements
by the Plaintiffs about the court's prior conclusions which were
not true, or it misapprehended what was in the Record.
No specific violation of Rule 11 is referred to by the court.
There was no evidence of attorneys fee expenses actually incurred
by

Barbers.

Where

there

is insufficient

evidence

of the

reasonableness of attorney's fees, the award must be vacated.
Associated Industrial Development, Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486
(Utah 1984) .
If the court is to make a finding of contempt, it must follow
the procedures in U.C.A. §78-32-3 et seq. and support the claim
with an affidavit. Under §78-32-10, U.C.A. , Defendants are allowed
a hearing

on the

issues, and

§78-32-11 requires the hearing

determine actual loss or injury.

Contempt must be supported by a

recitation of facts or an affidavit. Penalties for contempt do not
include unsupported, or any, attorney's fees in facts like these.
An actual loss or injury must first be determined to be caused by
contempt before awarding contempt damages.
simply not met.

These standards were

There is no provision for an additional penalty

of attorney's fees for contempt. See Me11or v. Cook, 597 P.2d 882
40

(Utah 1979), and U.C.A. §78-32-10.

CONCLUSION
None of the issues argued here were resolved by the Appeals
Court Decision February 12, 1988.

(Case No. 870128-CA, 750 P.2d

202 (Utah 1988). We should hardly expect they would have been.
However, the trial court thought everything had been to this court
already. (TR pp. 1-3). The Appeals Court limited itself solely to
the question of the timeliness of an appeal of a writ in the 1979
judgment.

It did not address the merits of the questions raised

herein, but limited itself solely to the timeliness question of
appeals on a writ of execution.

It did not review the 1979

judgment to see whether post-judgment interest is allowed.
The factual issues before the trial court are genuine. (R 1667; 204-207).

Defendants are entitled to be heard by some court

that will really listen.

The legal issues before the trial court

demand that parts of this matter be dismissed, and that there be
a trial on the rest. The trial court never answered the questions
of, "what is the real amount the 1979 judgment; whether it had been
paid; whether there were equitable offsets available; and, whether
the Plaintiffs had to honor the bid they had made and the court had
previously told them to honor.

After that, it never got to the

question of the amount, if any, that could be renewed.

All of

these questions were before the trial court, as well as legal
questions about the jurisdiction of the court and its ability to
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enter a judgment at all.

If one was to be entered, McCune requires

the

pay

partnership

Defendants1

assets

claim

against

misrepresentation,
judgment.

first. The

and

the

even

Counterclaim

Barbers

fraud

in

for

seeking

contained

overreaching,
to

enforce

the

The court did not justify throwing these out.

All of those questions were before the trial court, and exist
before this court now.
decided

to enter

The court abused its discretion when it

judgment

against

the partnership

and

general

partners, where the partnership itself was in bankruptcy and had
assets and a trustee, but the partnership and one partner were not
served.
Alternatively, judgment could not be renewed against

joint

obligors where one obligor was released after negotiations with
Barber's attorney and Barbers failed to seek a deficiency judgment;
and another obligor was released because he was not served.
Failure to amend the prior judgment and statutes of limitation
problems are valid
beyond
Barbers

defenses to efforts to expand

the

judgment

its 1979 terms. Even if these issues did not all exist,
admit

their

sole

grounded on U.C.A. §15-1-4.

claim

to

post-judgment

That section should

interest

is

not help them

because the prayer in the Complaint did not ask for post-judgment
interest.

Even if it had, the judgment was based on a contract and

Section 15-1-4 was not complied with.
The damage done to the Defendants would have been far less if
the

trial

language.

court

had

only

renewed

the

1979

judgment's

The trial court did not limit itself to that.
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exact

It should

not even have gone that far, however, because the partnership had
assets and

Plaintiffs

elected

to only

go after

partners, ignoring the other two joint obligors.

two general

Now that it is

past time for their trial, the judgment should be dismissed.
Defendants seek attorney fees on appeal and ask that summary
judgment against them be vacated, based on the facts and law
presented here.
Dated this 10th day of March, 1989.

R'aymc^rid N. Malouf
Attorney for Defendants//and
Third Party Plaintiffs/Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of March, 1989,
four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants
Case No. 880410, were mailed postage prepaid to the following:
N. George Daines, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs, Third Party and
Counterclaim Defendants/Appellees
108 North Main, Suite 201
Logan, Utah 84321
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ADDENDUM
Item
1.

Original January

1979 Complaint from Cache County No.

17630. (R 17630, pp. 1-4).
2.

Original April 18, 1979 Judgment. (R 17630, pp. 40-41).

3.

Complaint to renew judgment, March 27, 1987. (R 25616,
pp . 1-3) .

4.

Motion to Dismiss Complaint, and Stocking Affidavit. (R
4-17; 27-38) .

5.

Memorandum Decision, Objections and Order. (R 43-49).

6.

Answer and Counterclaim by Stocking and Malouf. (R 6265) .

7.

Rule 54(b) Order, December 27, 1988.

8.

Notice of Appeal. (R 260-261).

9.

Motion to Strike Amended Complaint. (R 93-102; 106-112).

10.

Defendants'
summary

Response

to Memorandum, opposing

partial

judgment, and Affidavits of Stocking and

Malouf. (R 163-184).
11.

Defendants' response to Supplemental Memorandum, opposing
partial summary judgment. (R 203-218).

12.

Notice of Objections to proposed findings. (R 221-241).
case, but

it misapprehended

the

true

incorrectly recalled the pleadings.
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facts and

Tabl

y
B.H. HARRIS
HARRIS, PRESTON & GUTKE
Attorney for Plaintiffs
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone: 752-3551
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
—
NORMAN BARBER and hE~*:J BARBER,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

)
)

vs.

COMPLA

THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, and
VON K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE,
JR., and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR.,
gene ral partners,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

Civil

I N T

No.

)

Comes now the Plaintiffs an3 complain of the Defendants
and for cause of action alleges:
1.

That the Defendant, Emporium Partnership, is a

limited partnership under the Limited Partnership Act of Utah
and the named Defendants are the general partners of said
partnership.
2.

Said partnership is located in Cache County, Utah.
That on or about the 11th of November, 1977,

Plaintiffs loaned to the Defendants the sum of Fifteen Thousand
($15,000.00) Dollars.

Defendants executed the attached note

marked Exhibit "A" payable to Plaintiffs, and delivered the
same to Plaintiffs.
3.

That the Plaintiffs have made repeated demands

upon the Defendants for payment of said note and interest and the
Defendants have refused to pay any part or portion thereof.

That

the full amount of the said note of Fifteen Thousand ($15,000.00)
Dollars is due plus interest to date hereof in the amount of
Twenty-one Hundred Eiahty and 88/100 ($2,180.88) Dollars.

;;,,^J_7M*
H A * M M PRKSTON ft Q u T K E I
ATTOW N C V S - A T . I A *
It rCOKHAL AVS^uC
L.OOAM UTAH M S * |
•MOW* * « • 1 M 1

ID

.a *

A
%*

4.

That the said note provides for the payment of

reasonable attorney's fees in the event of collection and suit
and that the Plaintiffs allege that the sum of Four Thousand
($4,000.00) Dollars is reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded
the Plaintiffs for use and benefit of their attorney in bringing
this action.
Wherefore, Plaintiffs pray ludgment against the
Defendants for the principal sum of Fifteen Thousand ($15,000.00)
Dollars, interest thereon of Twenty-one Hundred Eiahty and 88/100
($2,180.88) to date hereof plus interest additional at the
rate of twelve (12) percent per annum until judgment plus court
costs herein expended and reasonable attorney's fees as may be
awarded by the Court.

BtORMAN BARBER

f

U.£.

L%" , L

HELEN BARBER

UAL

/,
B.H. HARRIS
HARRIS, PRESTON & GUTKE
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, UT 84321
STATE OF UTAH

)
)
County of cache )

ss.

NORMAN BARBER AND HELEN BARBER, first duly sworn deposes
and say:

That they hive read the above and foregoing complaint

and know the contents thereof and that the information contained
therein is true except any matters that are stated on information
and belief and as those matters, they believe them to be true.

bRMAN'BARBER
111

VIS PWCSTON * CUTKC

kO**M UTAM H i l l
•vmmrn. T I M H I

'' h

i^&LLLL~-JJL±Jll
HELEN BARBER

day of

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
January, 1979.
/

Notary Public
Commission Expires: 10/29/82
Residing at Logan, Utah
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EXHIBIT "A"

.„».-,-..„!
,,

yy

w/lttiaif'aiiu Helen Barber

_ . . . . « iv puy to m e order of

Hyrutn
in

ie sum of - F i f t e e n

Utoh, or at such other place as*the holder hereof may designate

Thousand Do! l a r s *
T/ump sum

Donor. ($15,000.00), payable as follows,

May 1 1 , 1978

1 before a n d after judgment, with interest on fhcr unpoid b i l o n c e thereof from date until pmd at the rate of
nterett p a y a b l e os followsi

tWelVfler

cent (

1 2

\ \

11th of each month
>*r\\

of this note with interest to date of poyment may be m a d e at any h m * w t h o u t penalty.

tolder deems itself insecure or if default be mode in payment o f

the whole or any port of any installment ot the time when or the ploce

j m e becomes due a n d p a y a b l e as aforesaid, then the entire u n p a i d balance, with interest a\
without notice of said election ot once become dee and

payoble.

r t f s J f l i p a y to the holder hereof reasonoble attorney's fees, l e g a l

nent, d e e t a n d , protest, notice of dishonor a n d extension of time

aforesoid. shall, at the election of the holder

In event of any such default or acceleration, the undersigned, jointly a n d
expenses and

without

notice

lawful collection costs in addition

ore

hereby

woived a n d

the

to oil other

undersigned

consent

iy security, or ony part thereof, with or without substitution.

N. Main

Emporium Partnership

sums duo

*^/Swh./t> rf&rv&^rp-

to

the

Tab 2

B. H. HARRIS
HARRIS, PRESTON & GUTKE
Attorney for Plaintiffs
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone: 752-3551

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
husband and wife.
Plaintiffs,
JUDGEMENT
vs.
Civil No. 17630
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, and
VON K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE,
JR., and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR.,
general partners,
Defendants.
oooOooo
THIS MATTER came on regularly for hearing before the Court
without a }ury on the Plaintiff's Motion for Judgement on the
Pleadings.

The affidavits and memorandum having been submitted

to the Court by the parties and the Court having entered its
Memorandum Decision on the 11th day of April, 1979, and based
thereon, the Court having made and filed herein its Findings of
Facts and Conclusions of Law and based thereon;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs
have recovered 3udgement against the Defendants in the amount due
on a promissory note in the amount of Fifteen Thousand (§15,000.00
Dollars plus accrued interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum
from date hereof until paid in the amount of Twenty-one Hundred
Eighty ($2,180.00) Dollars, attorney fees in the amount of
Four Thousand ($4,000.00) Dollcrs and court costs in the amount
HAWttlS PftCSTON * 6 U T K C
ATTOftMCVS AT LAW

of Thirty-one and 30/100 ($31.30) Dollars.
rn

-:D

'HOME 7 M

IMf
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*1
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-2DATED this

17

day of April, 1979«

/ /
DISTRICT 'jjUBGE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Judgement to Raymond N. Malouf of MALOUF & MALOUF,
Attorney for Defendants, 21 West Center, Logan, Utah 84321, this
day of April, 1979.

HARRIS PRESTON* CUTKK
31FIPCRALtVINUI
lOOAM UTAH t4S«l
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Tab 3

PFC.-T

l\/~r

••Mm?7
N. George Daines - 0803
DAINES & KANE
108 North Main, Suite 200
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone: (801) 753-4403

r.

«-n

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN
BARBER, husband and wife,
Plaintiff,
*

COMPLAINT TO RENEW
JUDGMENT

vs.
*

Civil No.

THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP,
and VON K. STOCKING,,
DON A. WHITE, JR,, and
RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR.,
general partners,
Defendants.
COME NOW

the Plaintiffs

and complain

of the Defendants as

follows:
1.

That Plaintiffs are residents of Cache County, Utah.

2.

That this court granted judgment

against the Defendants

in this jurisdiction on April 18, 1979, Civil No. 17630.
3.

That

Defendants

have

failed to fully pay and satisfy

said judgment.
4.

That Defendants have made one

$866.47 on

December 31,

1984 toward

4. That there are sums

due and

judgment as follows:

payment in

the amount of

the interest on said judg-

owing to

Plaintiff on said

Jumfier

^S^fb^f
MAR 2 7 1387

0 1

^

8£THS.AU£N,Cteik
* » — ( p — Deputy

$15,000.00

Principal,

$ 2,180.00

Accrued interest to date of judgment, from
November 11, 1977, at the rate of 12% per
annum,

$

Accrued costs to date of judgment,

31.30

$ 4,000.00

Attorneys fees,

$

Costs accrued in enforcing judgment,

330.70

$ 20,209.43

Interest from date of judgment to March 25,
1987,

$ 41,751.43
plus interest

Total Amount Due

thereon at

12% from

the 25th day of March, 1987,

until collected.
5.

That said judgment is due to expire

due to

the statute

of limitations on judgments.
6.

That

a new

this complaint

to

judgment should be granted as prayed for in
replace

and/or

renew

the

judgment

due to

expire.
7.

That

due to

Defendants non-payment

Plaintiffs have incurred further

of the amount due,

attorneys fees

in the bringing

of this action and should be awarded reasonable attorneys fees to
be determined by the court in addition to

the amounts previously

complained of.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against the Defendant as
follows:
A.

To renew previous

judgment entered

forth below:
$15,000.00

Principal,

in the

amounts set

$ 2,180.00

Accrued interest to date of judgment, from
November 11, 1977, at the rate of 12% per
annum,

$

Accrued costs to date of judgment,

31.30

$ 4,000.00

Attorneys fees,

$

Costs accrued in enforcing judgment,

330.70

$ 20,209.43

Interest from date of- judgment to March 25,
1987,

$ 41,751.43
2.

For

Total Amount Due

reasonable attorneys

fees to

be determined by the

court incurred in the filing and prosecution of this action.
3.

For costs and such other and further relief as the court

deems equitable.
DATED this 27th day of March, 1987.
DAINES & KANE
A

/

S

J
'

/

N. George Dairies
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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Tab 4

rj.;is r.\v\.

Raymond N. Malouf/dh (68:EMBAMTD.RDP1
MALOUP LAW OFFICES
Attorney for Defendants
150 East 200 North #D
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone: 752-9380
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE

NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
husband and wife,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, and
VON K. STOCKING, DON A WHITE, JR.,
and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR.,
Defendants

MOTION TO DISMISS
AND TO STRIKE

Civil No. 25616

Comes now Defendant Raymond N. Malouf, Jr. and moves to
dismiss the Complaint because the Court lacks jurisdiction to
grant the relief requested for the following reasons:(1) the
Court lacks jurisdiction over the person of the Defendant
Partnership;(2) the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject
matter;(3) the Complaint fails to state a legal claim for relief;
and (4) the Complaint fails to join an indispensible party.
Defendant further moves to strike certain of the items in
the second paragraph (4) and paragraphs 6 and 7 in the Complaint
for alleging immaterial, impertinent, scandalous and fraudulent
matters.
This Motion is based upon the Complaint filed herein ,and
this Motion together with Defendant's Memorandum A in support
thereof.
DATED this JO

Number<

APR 2 01337
SUHSAUBI, Clerk

'n—' y*

vwto

day of April, 1987

Raymond N. Malouf/dh (68:EMBAMMTD.RDP)
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
Attorney for Defendants
150 East 200 North #D
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone: 752-9380
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE

NORMAN BARBER and
HELEN BARBER, husband
and wife,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO DISMISS
AND TO STRIKE

THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, and VON K.
STOCKING, DON A. WHITE,
JR., and RAYMOND N.
MALOUF JR.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 25616

Defendant Raymond N. Malouf, Jr. has filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint based on the fact that this Court lacks
jurisdiction to grant the relief requested because the Court: (1)
lacks jurisdiction over the person of the Defendant Partnership;
(2) the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit; (3) the Complaint fails to state a legal claim for relief;
and (4) the Complaint fails to join an indispensible party.
In addition, Defendant has moved that certain of the claims
in the second paragraph (4) and in paragraphs 6 and 7 in the
Complaint be stricken for alleging immaterial, impertinent,
scandalous and fraudulent matters.
FACTS
The only undisputed fact is that a judgment was rendered in
Civil No. 17630 on April 18, 1979.

Almost every other allegation

Number ,:-3-*%*>( fa - J>
'u-'p > : 13S7
KVTH*

flllPW P.lftffc

in the Complaint will be contested if a response is required.
For purposes of this Motion, it is sufficient to say that the
present Complaint most definitely is not a legal effort to renew
the prior judgment, but instead is an attempt to obtain an
entirely different judgment, and is beyond the scope of the prior
judgment. Thus, this motion. Relevant facts for each point will
be referred to hereafter.
ARGUMENT
I
THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF THE PARTNERSHIP, AND THE COMPLAINT
FAILS TO JOIN AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY
Plaintiff attempted to serve the Defendant Emporium Partnership by serving one of the partners, to wit: the undersigned.
The Partnership no longer continues to operate its normal
business and jurisdiction over the partnership cannot be obtained
by serving the undersigned for the following reasons:
1.
The Defendant Partnership is in bankruptcy, No. 7901412, converted to Chapter 7 bankruptcy May 22, 1982 in the
District of Utah.
2.
The trustee of the Emporium Partnership is James Z.
Davis, attorney at law, 1020 First Security Bank Bldg, 2404
Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84401.
3.
The fact of bankruptcy of the Defendant Partnership is
sufficient to cause the dissolution of the partnership, and the
Partnership has either ceased or is in a stage of dissolution.
4.
The bankruptcy of the partnership is sufficient to give
rise to the protection and requirements of 11 USC §362, which is
an automatic stay against any continuance or furtherance or
initiation of any action against the partnership, including this
action.
5.
Plaintiffs have not obtained relief from the automatic

2
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stay, which they must do, before proceeding against the Partnership or any of its assets.
6.
The trustee in bankruptcy has not been named as a party
in this action, so process is insufficient. Since the trustee is
not named, he obviously has not been served, so there is no
jurisdiction over the Partnership in any event.
Inasmuch as Plaintiff has failed to even allege a cause of
action that would result in jurisdiction over the Partnership,
the Complaint should be dismissed.
II
THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION
OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE SUIT,
AND CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE COMPLAINT
SHOULD BE STRICKEN
The original action was for suit on a note signed by Von
Stocking and Don White. The statute of limitations on that note
expired, according to Section 78-12-23 U.C.A., 6 years after the
note, more than 2 years ago.
Plaintiff seeks to renew its
judgment barely before the expiration of the 8 year statute of
limitation provided in §78-12-22.
Such an effort is strictly
limited to the judgment itself. In the renewal action, the prior
note has become merged wtfojhi the judgment and ceases to exist.
The present action, then, is no longer an action founded on
contract. See Yergensen v. Ford, 16 U.2d 397, 402 P2d 696 (1965)
and Gossner v. Dairymen Assoc. 611 P2d 7lft (Utah, 1980). The
judgment, as entered, limits the relief the Plaintiff can seek to
renew in this action to the award actually made and enforceable
in the prior action.
The relief Plaintiff is seeking in this
action is in excess of what was allowed by the prior judgment.
The Court lacks jurisdiction to grant any relief in excess of
what the prior judgment actually allows.
The prior judgment does not allow interest, except for
$2,180 from the date of the judgment until that judgment is paid.
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That language limits the amount of interest that can be collected
or sued on in this action. The language in the prior judgment is
not a mere failure to record the judgment as entered, inasmuch as
it is consistent with the findings of fact, conclusions of law
and even the prayer in the prior Complaint. The pleadings were
all prepared by the Plaintiff.
They do not amount to a mere
error to be reformed. To get any more, the judgment would have
to be worded differently than it is. The standard for changing
words in a judgment is set forth in Richards v. Siddowav, 24 U.2d
314, 471 P2d 143 (1970). The only way to change the amount of
money allowed by a judgment is for the judgment to be amended.
The error in the prior judgment is at most a judicial error in
rendering the judgment. Judicial errors can only be cured by a
timely motion for a new trial, amended findings, appeal or a new
action.
The prior judgment is clear in limiting the interest to the
amount specified from the "date hereof until paid." The Court
does not have the power to modify the judgment, even to make
technical changes, since the time for appeal expired and that
item was not appealed. See Benson v. Anderson, 14 U. 334, 47 P
142 (1896) and Frost et. al. v. District Court, et. al. , 96 U.
106, 83 P2d 737 (1938):
"... After the time for appeal has expired, the
Court has no power to modify a judgment in a
substantial or material respect.
This is wellsettled law."
Allowance of the present suit would of course amount to an
amendment of the judgment, which is not allowed.
The present
suit, seeking more than the prior suit, should be dismissed.
In other parts of the second paragraph numbered (4) of the
Complaint, Plaintiff seeks another item clearly not included in
the prior award: $330.70 in costs incurred in enforcing the prior
judgment. Those costs were not allowed by the prior judgment, and
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the prior judgment has expired. It also illegally seeks interest
after March 25, 1987, which is an additional attempt to expand
the prior judgment. Since the prior judgment already specified
the dollar amount of interest that could be collected, and since
Plaintiff alleges the prior judgment is unpaid, the new action
cannot seek to expand the prior judgment for more money.
Paragraph (6) asks a new judgment not according to the prior
judgment, but as Plaintiff has reworded it. This clause cannot
stand.
Finally, paragraph (7) in this new action seeks for
attorneys fees in bringing this complaint. That is not allowed
by the prior judgment anywhere.
The underlying note has long
since expired, and there is no currently enforceable note or
other agreement for attorneys fees, so there is no basis to seek
additional attorneys fees. Accordingly, paragraph 7 must also be
stricken.
Ill
THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A LEGAL CLAIM
FOR RELIEF
1
Plaintiffs claim is limited to the relief actually allowed
by the prior judgment. Its claim for relief is far in excess of
the limits of the prior judgment. Inasmuch as this new complaint
seeks funds not allowed by the underlying judgment, it must be
dismissed for failure to state a legal claim.
In addition to failing to state a legal claim for matters
beyond the prior judgment, the prior judgment has been paid,
witi^the possible exception of $344.83, and, it should be dismissed on the merits. The Complaint alleges in the first paragraph numbered (4) that the (only) payment was $866.47 made
December 31, 1984.
In fact, on December 3, 1986 Plaintiffs
appeared and actually bid the amount of $20,000 plus costs for
the right and interest of the undersigned in certain real
property, which Plaintiffs caused to be advertised in advance of
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sale.
This Court refused to quash that execution when the
undersigned showed he had no interest.
The sale took place.
That proceeding was in connection with Civil No. 17630. Plaintiffs have so far wholly refused to enter a partial Satisfaction
of Judgment for that additional amount, and must before bringing
this present action.
The $20,000 paid by the undersigned, plus $866.47, which is
shown at page 254 in the Record of Civil No. 17630 to have
actually been credited December 31, 1982, makes a total of
$20,866.47, plus ail the costs of the Sheriff's sale, which
should show as a satisfaction of the judgment against the
undersigned.
The point being made here is that there can be no legal
claim for relief when the judgment itself has been paid.
If
there is still any question as to whether the undersigned has
paid all that is required of him on the judgment, reference to
page 256 of Civil No. 17630 shows a letter from counsel for
Plaintiff in this same action, dated October 3, 1986, 2 months
before the execution sale wherein it is plain that the Plaintiffs
claimed only one-third of the amount they claim due on the
judgment from this Defendant. They specified that amount to be
about $12,500. Thus, the Plaintiffs have been overpaid from this
Defendant.
Payments of $20,866.47 less $12,500 is $8,366.47
(plus costs) beyond the $12,500 the Plaintiffs wanted from him.
Attached hereto in support of this Motion is a copy of the
certificate of sale evidencing the payment of $20,000 which has
not been satisfied on the prior judgment.
The total original judgment was $21,211.30, as can be seen
from page 40 of the record in Civil No. 17630. That is only
$344.83 more than what this Defendant alone has paid on the
judgment. The most, therefore, that Plaintiffs could seek for a
legal cause of action would be $344.83. Far more than that

6

amount was collected from Defendant Von Stocking, or Plaintiffs
waived the right to collect anymore from Mr. Stocking when, after
November 4, 1983 they failed within 90 days to seek a deficiency
judgment after a trxistee's sale of property in which the Plaintiffs were beneficiary of a trust deed which secured any and all
indebtedness of any kind whatsoever from Mr. Stocking to the
Plaintiffs.
August 29, 1983 by letter written from the attorney for
Plaintiffs, within nine weeks before the trust deed sale, counsel
for Plaintiffs agreed that the Von Stocking property was worth
between $45,000 and $60,000. The letter also attests to the fact
that at least some of the equity, of Von Stocking should go to
offset the judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs herein. A copy of
the letter, together with an affidavit of Von Stocking is
attached. The equity by Plaintiffs1 own admission in the letter,
is between $11,808.06 and $26,808.06.
Mr. Stocking's affidavit states the Plaintiffs went forward
with the purchase of the trust deed sale and purchase of the
beneficial interest in it to secure Plaintiffs1 position in the
prior judgment.
Because the entire underlying debt has been paid, it would
appear that Plaintiffs have failed to state a legal claim for
which relief can be granted and the entire Complaint should be
stricken on the merits as impertinent and fraudulent.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons specified, the Court lacks jurisdiction to
proceed on this case and must dismiss the action for lack of
jurisdiction over the partnership as well as Jack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Plaintiffs have failed to include an
indispensable party and have failed to obtain relief from the
automatic stay in bankruptcy, without which they cannot pursue
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any of their allegations herein. The Complaint should be dismissed until relief from the stay has been obtained. Further,
the Complaint actually fails to state a legal claim for which
relief can be granted.
It claims far and beyond what the
underlying judgment permits.
The underlying judgment has not
been amended and cannot be amended now. Moreover, it appears as
if the underlying judgment has more than been paid. Therefore,
there is no cause of action to proceed on.
The matters in the Complaint are in excess of the underlying
claim and are clearly immaterial, impertinent, scandalous and
fraudulent in view of the pleadings and affidavits. Moreover,
since the judgment has been paid, the entire Complaint should be
stricken as being impertinent.
DATED this 20th day of
A$&il^l9B7

</^oi nuM.W0"IH&

Raymond /N. Malouf

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 20th day of April, 1987, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Dismiss and Motion to Dismiss was mailed postage prepaid to
the following:
N. George Daines, Esq.
DAINES & KANE
Attorneys at Law
108 North Main
Logan, Utah 84321
Secretary
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LAW OFFICES

DAlNESJiKANE
12t NORTH MAIN

Mr. Raymond Malouf
25 August 1983
Page Two

LOGAN UTAH §4321
(M1)TO-4403
N O f OMOE DAINES
KEVIN E KANE

29 August 198

definitive arrangements to take care of your obligation in
this situation. Mr. Barber is insistent that you do so.
Sincerely,

Mr. Raymond Malouf
150 East 200 North #D
Logan, Utah 84321
Re:

DAINES & KANE

Barber v. Emporium

Dear Ray:
Norm Barber^ana I have examinedrlre^^yon
Stocking home and Relieve that its worth wouldNprobably
be somewhere in the range of $45-60,000.00. Wejbelieve
to determine its "walue accurately, a professiopfel appraisal
should be done. InVcJiscussing various appjA^sers , Norm
Barber and I felt «-*>«>,«-»ii*> hgftflpprs1sH*'vnn1riprobably
be Tom Singleton, but perhaps, if you have someone else in
mind, we would accept an appraisal upon advance clearance
of the individual involved.
It would be my suggestion that you prepare that
appraisal at your expense and submit it to us for our review.
Upon reviewing that we may well be able to consummate some
kind of an arrangement regarding your liability to Norm Barber.
Anticipating that this is going to take several weeks
to determine what the appraisal of that home is and the
likelihood that the home is insufficient to pay the full
amount of the judgment. If think it is advisable that we
continue with the Supplemental Order that was started
VTTT
this wct*k - Please consider this formal notice, pursuant
to our arrangement, that you should be prepared and at court
the next motion and order day to continue answering questions
regarding this supplemental proceedings. You should also
be advised that we have served a notice to appear on your wife,
your father and also Carl Malouf, to determine more concerning
the arrangements between yourself and these individuals.
I also anticipate preparation and perhaps filing of a lawsuit
Involving j-r-*iidul *»*">*• mmrcyanoe agninnt some of these parties.
I fees strongly that you should come forward now and make some

Attorney at Lew
le
cc Norm Barber

Raymond N. Malouf/dh (68:EMBAAFV.RDP)
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
Attorney for Defendants
150 East 200 North #D
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone: 752-9380
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE

NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
husband and wife,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF VON STOCKING

vs.
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP,
and VON K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE,
JR., and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 25616

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss
COUNTY OF CACHE )
Comes now Von K. Stocking and being first duly sworn deposes
and states the following of his own personal knowledge:
1.
That he is a Defendant in the above named action.
2.
That; he was a Defendant in Civil No. 17630.
3.
That he owned the property described in book 189 page
458 in a Trust Deed given to First Federal Savings & Loan on
March 18, 1976.
4.
That the afore-described property was a home with a
basement apartment worth far in excess of $33,191.94 that
Plaintiffs Norman and Helen Barber paid First Federal for in
Jtheir purchase of the beneficial rights on or about November 3,
1983.
5.

That he knows Norman and Helen Barber bid $33,191.94 at

the trust deed sale on this property on Ngyftfrbpr 4, 1983.
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6.
That he .is familiar with the representations from
Plaintiffs made by letter dated August 29, 1983 where Barbers
alleged that the property was worth between $45,000 and $60,000,
and knows that, for the date of the sale, such values were
conservative,
7.
On November 2nd and 3rd, 1983 he was involved in
several conversations initiated by George Dalnes, attorney for
Plaintiffs who asked him to agree to let the Barbers take over
this property aforementioned by paying First Federal, and
applying between $12,000 and $15,000 against the prior judgment
to his credit, plus giving Von Stocking an additional $3,000.
8.
That Mr. Daines continued these conversations while
the undersigned was trying to cure the default with First Federal
and until the morning of the trust deed sale on November 4, 1983.
9.
That there was no doubt that the Barbers wanted to take
over this property in order to collect from me on the judgment
they had against the Emporium, the undersigned, Don and Ray.
10. That he relied on the representations by Mr. Daines on
behalf of Plaintiffs that he would credit the prior judgment, and
believed he had kept his word, which the undersigned has very
good notes on, because Plaintiffs took no further action to
collect from the undersigned until the prior judgment almost
expired.
11. That Mr. Daines represented that he wanted each of the
individual Defendants in the prior judgment to pay only the
percentage of the prior judgment equal to their percentage of the
Emporium Partnership.
12. That if Mr. Daines did not intend to go through with
what he promised on behalf of his clients, the Plaintiffs should
be required to honor his promises since Plaintiffs in fact
proceeded to take over the property, and the undersigned relied
on these representations by their attorney.
In fact, Mr. Daines
was fraudulent in his representations, but this fraud, of not
crediting the prior Barber judgment, did not become apparent
until
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February 7, 1987 when Mr. Daines again served Mr. Stocking's wife
with a Motion and Order for Mr. Stocking to appear in Supplemental proceedings on the prior judgment.
DATED this J3
day of April, 1987.

Vnn
K. Stocking
Stnckina
Von K.

/

Von K. Stocking having been duly sworn on oath deposes and
states that he is the affiant and that he has read the foregoing
Affidavit, knows the contents thereof and believes the same to be
true and as to items stated on information and belief, the same
are believed to be true.

y^^/^/^r^y
Von K. Stocking
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this

'

fttrkc
13
day

of April,

1987.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Commission Expires:

Residing at:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ^0
day of April, 1987, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Von Stocking was
mailed postage prepaid to the following:
N. George Daines, Esq.
108 North Main
Logan, UT 84321

Secretary
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Raymond N. Malouf/md
MALOUF LAW OFFICE
Attorney for Defendants
ISO East 200 North #D
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone: 752-9380

C;
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, and
VON K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE,
JR., and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR.
Defendants.

ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FOR VON K.
STOCKING AND JOINDER IN MOTION

Civil No. 25616

Comes now Von K. Stocking by and through his attorney
Raymond N. Malouf and enters his appearance in this matter and
joins with the Motion dated April 20, 1987.
Entry of this
appearance was approved by the Court in chambers Monday, May 4,
1987.
The Motion to Dismiss and to Strike was initially made on
behalf of Defendant Raymond N. Malouf. It was supported with the
Affidavit of Von K. Stocking.
Mr. Stocking now joins in the
Motion and requests the Court grant the relief requested therein.
DATED this 8th day of May, 1987.

\c^bsipuikH&Mk
W

Raymond If. Malouf
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of May, 1987, a
and correct copy of the foregoing Entry of Appearance for Vo
Stocking and Joinder in Motion was mailed postage prepaid to
following:
N. George Daines, Esq.
DAINES & KANE
Attorneys at Law
108 North Main Street
Logan, Utah 84321
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RECEIVED
Raymond N. Malouf/md
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
Attorney for Defendants
150 Bast 200 North #D
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone: 752-9380
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OP UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE

NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
husband and wife,
Plaintiff,
vs.

REPLY, IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS1 MOTION TO
DISMISS AND TO STRIKE

THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP,
and VON K. STOCKING, DON A. WHITE,
JR., and RAYMOND N. MALOUF, JR.,
Defendants.

Civil No. 25616

Come now the Defendants appearing herein and reply, in
support of the Motion to Dismiss and to Strike, and answer the
Plaintiff's Response as follows:

30

JO

The first point made in the Motion to Dismiss and to
Strike was that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the person of
the partnership.
Unrefuted are the facts that Plaintiffs have
neither properly served the partnership itself, nor properly
named the partnership a party. The Complaint fails to join an
indispensable party, the Trustee of the Emporium Partnership's
bankruptcy.
In their response, Plaintiffs admit the critical elements of
this first argument:: (1) that the Emporium Partnership is in
fiinkruptcy; (2) that the effect of the bankruptcy is an automatic
££ay against the continuance and furtherance of any action
against the partnership; and, (3) the st^y has not been lifted,
aintiffs seek to collect, assess or recover a claim which arose
fore the partnership's bankruptcy, contrary to 11 U.S.C.
152(a)(6). Plaintiffs further acknowledged that since they have

not obtained a lifting of the automatic stay, the limitations of
the automatic stay are fully enforceable against any action
against the Partnership. They said it was okay if the Complaint
against the partnership is dismissed.
Plaintiffs seek to distinguish this action as one not
requiring a lifting of the automatic stay to proceed against the
other Defendants. However they cite no authority for this claim.
While generally the automatic stay is not a bar to proceeding
against a surety, co-debtor or guarantor who is not in bankruptcy, there are circumstances in which the automatic stay against a
partnership will bar proceedings against other defendants. This
is the case where the debtor partnership must be sued with the
other Defendants. The original judgment in Civil No. 17630 was
not obtained against: the other three Defendants as sureties, codebtors or guarantors, but solely on the basis of their status
as alleged general partners. Their liability only exists if they
are general partners. If the partnership is not a party then the
partners cannot be sued. Liability is limited to the provisions
of Section 48-1-12(2), U.C.A.
These Defexidants can only be
liable jointly for the debt, which is and was only a partnership
debt. The Plaintiffs never alleged the partners were liable as
sureties, co-debtors or guarantors, but merely as partners. The
original judgment is not entered jointly and severally.
It
cannot be entered jointly and severally because its terms did not
provide for joint and several liability, the Complaint did not
allege joint and several liability, and Section 48-1-12(1) limits
joint and several liability to certain kinds of partnership debt
arising from wrongful acts of a partner or a partner's breach of
trust, neither of which were alleged in the first action. If
there is no obligation of the partnership, by definition the
partners cannot be liable.
Accordingly, the partners can only be liable jointly. By
definition, to sue someone jointly, the partnership and all the
members thereof must be made parties. See Palle v. Industrial
Commission, 79 U.47, 7 P2d 284 (1932). Inasmuch as the partner2

ship has not been, and cannot be, presently made a party, the
Complaint must be dismissed until such time as the Plaintiffs
obtain a lifting of the automatic stay and join the Trustee in
the suit. Until that time, allowance of this action violates the
automatic stay and the Court has no jurisdiction to proceed. If
the Plaintiffs cannot prove a judgment against the partnership,
they are not entitled to a renewal against the general partners.
Only if the original judgment had been for joint and several
liability could Plaintiffs proceed against some of the Defendants. Since liability is only joint, all must be joined, or the
suit cannot proceed against any. To do that, the automatic stay
must be lifted first.. Section 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(6) has been held
in at least one instance to prohibit a creditor from asserting a
claim against a surety, co-debtor or guarantor of a debt. See Re
Smith (1981, BC DC Conn.) 14 BR 956, 8 BCD 417, 5 CBC2d 545.
Even though Defendants herein are not sureties, co-debtors or
guarantors, this is an instance where the automatic stay properly
may not, under Utah law, be violated to permit Plaintiffs to
proceed against Defendants without proceeding against the
partnership, which Plaintiffs admit could be dismissed because of
the automatic stay.
Defendants have shown sufficient reason to require the
action to be dismissed entirely because Plaintiffs have not
obtained permission to proceed against the partnership.
In
addition, Plaintiffs have entirely failed to state a cause of
action for a partnership debt, which must be done to get a
renewal of this judgment.
II
Defendants s second argument to the Court was that it lacked
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, and that
certain elements of the Complaint should be stricken. Plaintiffs
fail to refer to a specific earlier decisic^p of this or any other
Court supporting their response. Plaintiffs1 attempt to justify
some of the relief prayed for in the Complaint by alleging the
1
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costs and attorney Jfee provision of the original note to the
partnership survived to be ruled on again in a renewal action.
In the State of Utah this is completely false. Plaintiffs failed
to offer any authority to overcome Defendants1 point the statute
of limitations has run on the note itself, or to refute the Utah
decisions of Yergensen and Gossner which squarely hold the note
has become merged with the judgment and ceases to exist. Plaintiffs say there are numerous courts holding to the contrary, but
fail to refer to a single one. Clearly that is not the law in
the State of Utah. Thus, paragraph 7 of the Complaint must be
stricken.
The prior judgment only allows a specific dollar amount of
interest until the judgment is paid. The judgment has not been
paid.
On the very face of it, the judgment does not accrue
interest.
This drafting failure in the judgment is not correctable now, as has been adequately briefed in Defendants1
Memorandum.
First, the relief actually allowed is consistent
with the prayer in the Complaint. Second, the error, if it is an
error, is not curable under the holdings of Richards, Benson and
Frost, all of which were argued, without rebuttal by Plaintiffs.
There has never been an earlier decision by this Court
allowing interest to accrue on the previous judgment in the
manner in which the Plaintiffs seek to accrue it in paragraph 6.
Plaintiffs seek to correct the deficiency in the prior judgment
illegally. Although they claim their judgment is a renewal, it
actually is an attempt at an entirely additional cause of action
going far beyond the relief allowed in the first judgment.
Plaintiffs misrepresent the facts when they pretend there is an
earlier decision by the Court allowing interest to accrue as they
have prayed in this Complaint. They refer to no such decision,
gttid none exists.
The very fact that instead of seeking to renew the prior
judgment, Plaintiffs have attempted to sta^e a separate cause of
action, is a basis to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety.

4

Defendants are not limited to merely raising the defense that
Plaintiffs ask more than they are entitled to.
In previous decisions by this Court in Civil No. 17630, the
issue of interest accruing beyond that allowed by the face of the
judgment has not been ruled on. What was ruled on, September 12,
1986, was that the Court would not allow the Defendants to change
the judgment to a different amount. The Court never did say what
interest existed, and did not change the limitations of the
judgment. At the time Plaintiffs were not threatening to collect
any more than the judgment's face allowed.
Defendants1 Motion
was to remove the attorney fees awarded under the prior judgment,
as one of those items which they were allowed to do when the
Court made its decision May 21, 1979 that the questions of
attorney fees and enforceability of a judgment by limited
partners who were also creditors, went not to questions of the
amount of the judgment or entry of a judgment, but to questions
of enforcement and priorities. The Court specifically said that
the Defendants could, without prejudice, take any appropriate
action when the judgment was sought to be enforced. From time to
time as Plaintiffs have attempted to enforce the judgment,
Defendants have taken sufficient appropriate action to deny
Plaintiffs any illegal recovery.
Later, on November 20, 1986,
the Court said that its previous decision on September 12, 1986
already covered the elements of a latter Motion to Quash writs of
execution. It did not. Neither decision allowed the Plaintiffs
to accrue interest beyond the amount limited by the judgment.
Plaintiffs have failed to show any authority justifying
their facetious claims of an earlier decision or numerous Courts
holding against the position of the Defendants. The Court does in
fact lack jurisdiction over the subject matter of much of this
Renewal Complaint, because the Complaint seeks an entirely new
cause of action. Since it does not limit the requested relief to
an extension of the prior judgment, it should be dismissed in its
entirety.
Paragraphs 4, 6 and 7, as specified in the Motion,
must be stricken.
5
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Ill
The third item shown by Defendants in their Memorandum is
that the Complaint failed to state a legal claim for relief.
This has already been partly discussed here by the showing that
the relief prayed for goes beyond the judgment which previously
existed. Plaintiffs try to argue out of the rest of the issues
by saying they are not obligated to credit the judgment with
their December 3, 1986 bid. The Complaint fails to state a legal
claim for relief by completely ignoring the requirement that
Plaintiffs must credit the $20,000 bid December 3, 1986.
Plaintiffs somehow think they are not required to credit this
until they have possession of the property.
They offer no
credible authority for this proposition. Possession has nothing
to do with the fact: of the bid. To argue under Rule 69(g)(2)
that there might be a way for the Court to back them out of the
bid is ridiculous. There is no possibility there can be an event
to apply those provisions, for the reason that all of the
interest of the Defendant Ray Malouf was bid for, without any
guarantee that there in fact was an interest. To suggest there
could be an irregularity in the sale is without merit.
Any
irregularity could only go to the benefit of Defendants.
In
fact, that there was no equity or interest to be sold was one of
the arguments' in the Motion to Quash the writ of execution filed
August 22, 1986 in Civil No. 17630. In withstanding Defendants1
argument, Plaintiffs themselves said "
whatever that
Interest is can be sold by the Plaintiff for satisfaction of the
judgment. The interest is sold without warranty . . .
No one
is warranting that the interest is substantial and that it
exists." ( R 234, 235) Defendants already attached a copy of the
bid, and Plaintiffs cannot deny it was made. Just so there will
be no doubt about whether that must be credited, Defendants point
first of all to the Court's ruling September 12, 1986.
It
required Plaintiffs to show partial satisfactions of all appropriate amounts.
Second, the Utah decision of Randall v.
Valley Title, 681 P2d 219 (Utah, 1984) held that a creditor

bidding at a sale cannot bid all or part of the amount of Its
Interest and then fail to pay cash or discharge its claims to the
extent of the bid.
Plaintiffs err in thinking they can wait until after the
redemption period to see whether they feel like crediting the
amount of their bid. It is contrary to all authority. The Court
must require Plaintiffs to credit the amount of the bid, (plus
the costs they bid) against the prior judgment before allowing
this action. Until they do so, this action should be dismissed.
Once the proper partial satisfaction of judgment has been
entered, Defendants1 Memorandum has shown why the remaining
amount on the judgment is $344.83, or less. Defendants explained
why credit should also be allowed to the extent of equity in the
former Stocking home obtained by Plaintiffs November 4, 1983.
Attached to the Motion was a copy of Plaintiffs1 letter acknowledging the value of said home. Completely unrefuted is the
Defendants' point that Plaintiffs only had an interest in bidding
on Von Stocking's home as a result of their judgment against Von
Stocking in Civil No. 17630. No possible other explanation is
offered as to why they were even interested in that sale.
Plaintiffs persist in saying their appearance at the Stocking
Trust Deed sale was completely irrelevant to this judgment. That
completely misrepresents what happened.
Plaintiffs have not
refuted Mr. Stocking's affidavit.
In the prior action, the
Plaintiffs said they " . . . simply went to the Trustee's Sale
and purchased the property for the amount owing on the first
mortgage. There was no credit to Mr. Von Stocking or to this
judgment in the matter of that purchase." (Record 229) Those
words are a lie. The attached copy of an Assignment of Trust
Deed proves that on the day before the sale, Plaintiffs obtained
the entire beneficial interest of the Trust Deed, and then only
bid the first mortgage deficiency on the* very next day. That
enabled them to ^onna Stocking's equity share in the home, and
allowed avoiding a homestead claim.
Mr. Stocking's affidavit
explains that Plaintiffs' attorney was calling him to arrange for

the amount of credit that would be allowed against Civil No.
17630 if the Plaintiffs obtained Mr. Stocking's house. They did
obtain the house and Mr. Stocking relied upon the promises.
Plaintiffs were initiating conversations directly with Von
Stocking while in the very act of dirtying their hands by the
purchase of the beneficial interest in Stocking's prior Trust
Deed.
They should be equitably estopped from denying the home
equity as credit on this judgment.
The Plaintiffs in fact
remained silent in excess of three years and made no efforts to
collect another dime from Mr. Stocking.
It appeared to Mr.
Stocking that Plaintiffs indeed considered his part of the debt
paid as a result of taking over his house. In saying no equity is
owed Mr. Stocking over this, Plaintiffs are lying. They have
failed to come clean with the Court. It is perjury to represent
that they "simply went to the sale". What they did was bid as
the sole beneficiaries of the Trust Deed, a position into which
they had inserted themselves one day before the sale, solely for
an advantage in collecting on this judgment.
The very fact that Plaintiffs1 bid at the Stocking Trust
Deed sale November 4, 1983 as sole beneficiaries, is an
additional reason this lawsuit must be dismissed. When Barbers
bid at the Trust Deed sale November 4th the sum of $33,191.94,
they not only breached their agreement upon which Mr. Stocking
relied which was made with him directly as per his affidavit, but
they bid as the beneficial holder of the Trust Deed.
As the owner of the trust deed's beneficial interest at the
time of the trust deed sale on November 4, 1987, Plaintiffs had
the benefit of that trust deed to secure all of their judgment
against Von Stocking.
Plaintiffs themselves now claim this
judgment was fully payable by Mr. Stocking. Plaintiffs not only
failed to bid what the house was worth, but also did not thereafter seek a deficiency judgment against4 Mr. Stocking.
Under
Section 57-1-32, U.C.A. they should have done so within three
months, and since they did not, they cannot sue Von Stocking for
any more. Plaintiffs would be hard pressed to argue that they

became the beneficial owners of that trust deed for any other
reason than to obtain security on their judgment against Mr.
Stocking in Civil No. 17630.
They haven't offered any other
explanation.
Having failed to seek and obtain a deficiency
judgment, they have effectively released Mr. Stocking from any
exposure or liability for the renewal judgment. Since he cannot
be sued, and since all the Defendants are only joint obligators,
the suit must be dismissed. Under the provisions of Section 154-4 of the Utah Code, the release of Mr. Stocking for failure to
seek a deficiency judgment effectively acts as a release against
the other Defendants, since they can only be liable jointly.
CONCLUSION
The whole thrust of Plaintiff's arguments and the renewal
action is to try to chastise Defendants for continually refusing
to accept more responsibility, as they put it, for this judgment.
ha a matter of fact, this Court itself excused them from responsibility on May 21, 1979 wht*n in Civil No. 17630 the Court said
Defendants could take any appropriate action when the judgment
was sought to be enforced.
Because the prior judgment only exists from a partnership
debt, the partners of the partnership cannot be sued unless the
partnership is joined.
Since the automatic stay has not been
lifted, the suit cannot proceed until it has been. Meanwhile, it
and should be dismissed.
The renewal Complaint does not seek a renewal of the
judgment. Instead Plaintiffs have tried to rewrite the judgment
and cure its defects. They seek a new judgment entirely, not a
renewal. They cannot do this.
Plaintiffs have failed to credit amounts they bid on the
judgment. They have fraudulently misrepresented to the Court the
true amount of the debt. Plaintiffs have further fraudulently
misrepresented their responsibilities to allow equity in Von
Stocking's house to apply on the judgment.
That Deed was
assigned to them to specifically provide security for this debt.
They have forfeited their right to any further recovery against

Von Stocking by not seeking a deficiency judgment on the Trust
Deed.
Plaintiffs have failed to cite any cases supporting their
arguments and have failed to refute the statutes, cases, and
affidavit submitted by the Defendants.
The relief requested by the- Plaintiffs to dismiss the
complaint with prejudice, should be granted. The provisions in
the Complaint which seek for relief beyond the former judgment
should be absolutely stricken.
DATED this 8th day of May, 1987.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of May, 1987, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Reply, In Support Of Defendants1 Motion To Dismiss And To Strike was mailed postage prepaid
to the following:
N. George Daines, Esq.
108 North Main, Suite 200
Logan, UT 84321
Secretary

FOR VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged.
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN hereby asigns to NORM BARBER
AND HELEN BARBER without warranties or representations of any kind and without
recourse, all the beneficial interest and rights accrued or to accrue under
that certain Deed of Trust, together with the indebtedness secured thereby,
which Deed of Trust is dated March 16, 1976, was executed by Von K» Stocking
and Donna L. H. Stocking, as Trustor, for First Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Logan as Beneficiary, way recorded on March 18, 1976, as Entry No.
391882, in Book 189, Pages 458 - 61 of the records of the County Recorder of
Cache County, Utah and covers real property situated in said county described
as followst
Part of Lot 2, Block 22, Plat
described as followst

M

D " Logan City Survey

'&$£

Beginning at a point 27 rods South and 10 rods Wust
of the Northeast corner of said Lot 2, and running
thence West 5 rods; thence South 8 rods 8 feet and
2 inches, more or less, to the North line of Third
South Street; t.hence East 5 rods; thence North 8
rods 8 feet and 2 inches, more or less, to the place
of beginning, being situated in the North half of
Section 3, Township 11 North, Range 1 East of the
Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
DATED this

3rd day of November, 1983.

FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN
Attest:

"Fred R. Hunsaker, President

On the 3rd day cf November 1983, personally appeared before me
Fred R. Hunsaker, President and Gordon W. Haws, Secretary of First Federal
Savings and Loan Association of Logan, the signers of the foregoing
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same for
and on behalf of the said corporation.

^XOA^^TYX
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Notary Public
Commission Expires
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH

NORMAN BARBER and HELEN
BARBER, husband and wifef
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,

Civil No.

v.

25616

THE EMPORIUM PARTNERHSIP,
and VON K. STOCKING, DON A.
WHITE, JR., and RAYMOND N.
MALOUF, JR.,
Defendants

The plaintiffs have filed a complaint to re-new a judgment.
The judgment being granted in Civil No. 17630 on April 18, 1979.
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of
jurisdiction in failing to join an indespensible party and failing
to state a legal claim.
Plaintiffs are not seeking to bring any new suit on any
other claim except to re-new a judgment already granted.

An

existing bankruptcy may stay proceedings that is working toward
a judgment, but it does not estop the plaintiffs from re-newing
a judgment already received prior to any bankruptcy proceedings.
From a review of the pleadings it does not appear that there
is any modification or change in the relief sought except the renewal of the judgment.

There is included in the renewal coutinuing

of interest on the judgment.

This is not a modification.

The

question the Court mciy have would be the suggested attorney's fees.

AI
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Barber v. Emporium et al
Civil No. 25616
Page Two

Therefore, defendants motion to dismiss is denied and
counsel for plaintiff to prepare the appropriate order.
Defendants have 10 days within the filing of said order to answer
the complaint.
Dated this

18th

day of May, 19 87.
BY THE COURT:

Veftfo^thi^toffersen
District'Judge

N. George naiaesis" - £€8 No. Malt^'Suite 200 - Logan, Utah 84321
Raymond N, MUftif --"WO-East*2pfi:Nor;» Suite D - Logan, Utah 84321

<l&'^

'•vjteaaesi

AA

n m ^ 9(in

Raymond N. Malouf/md
MALOUP LAN OFFICES
Attorney for Defendant
150 Bast 200 North, Suite D
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 752-9380
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
husband and wife, et. al.
Plaintiffs,
vs.

1
1

NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS
TO PROPOSED FORM OF
ORDER AND REQUEST FOR
NOTICE

THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et. al.
Defendants.

1

Case No. 25616

Come now the Defendants and serve notice under Rule of
Practice 2.9(b) that they object to the form of the Order offered
by Plaintiff after the Court's May 18, 1987 Memorandum Decision.
Defendants further request Notice of the actual filing date and
Order filed after the Court has considered these objections. The
objections are as follows:
1.
In the first paragraph Plaintiffs omit the Court's
findings that an existing bankruptcy may stay a proceeding
working toward a judgment. That very language conflicts with the
proposed language for the first Finding.
Because there is an
existing bankruptcy by the Emporium Partnership, an undisputed
fact, it shtiuld stay these proceedings against the Emporium
Partnership entirely. The old judgment expired. This action is
working toward judgment. Not to stay these proceedings violates
provisions of 11 U.S.C. Section 362(a)(1) and (2). This is
because this attempt to renew a judgment is the continuation and
employment of process in a judicial proceeding against the Debtor
that was commenced or could have been commenced before the
bankruptcy.
It is to try to recover a disputed claim against
the Emporium Partnership that arose before the bankruptcy.
Neither the Plaintiff nor the Court referred to any legal
authority for any exception to this automatic stay provision.
The Defendants have pointed out why the stay not only applies to
the Emporium Partnership, but also to the General Partners who

AX

are only liable if the Partnership is liable.
It is critical
that the Order recite the fact that an existing bankruptcy stay
may stay proceedings working toward a judgment, as these proceedings are, and that the other Findings and the Order be consistent
therewith.
2.
The second paragraph does not state as a separate idea
the Court's finding that, included in the renewal effort was an
effort to get continuing interest on the judgment. The proposed
form of the Order Implies that the prior judgment allowed
continuing interest. Since it did not, no more import should be
given to this than the Court stated in its Memorandum Decision.
Continuing interest was something the prior judgment did not
allow. Therefore, the Memorandum Decision and the form of the
Order should admit that the renewal effort represents a modification of the prior judgment. If the form of the Order is entered
as proposed, the Court should be required to amend its Memorandum
Decision before requiring Defendants to file their answer.
3.
The third paragraph of the Order should not recite that
the Court will consider awarding attorney fees, but that the
Court will consider whether it has any jurisdiction to award
these in the renewal action. Since attorney fees after judgment
are not part of the prior judgment, the Court should state in the
Order that it lacks jurisdiction to award attorney fees in this
renewal action.
Because in the Memorandum Decision the Court
said it questioned this, the Complaint should be dismissed at
least as to that portion.
Dated this 1st day of J\tfie7~l>87.
Raymond
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 1st day of June, 1987 a true
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Objections To
Proposed Form Of Order, re Civil No. 25616, postage prepaid to
the following:
N. George Daines, Esq.
108 North Main, Suite 200

to9an
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otah 843J1
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNT? OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN
BARBER, husband and w i f e ,

Plaintiffs

MEMORANDUM DECISION

v.
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP,
and VON K. STOCKING, DON A.
WHITE, JR., and RAYMOND A.
MALOUF, JR.,

Civil No.

25616

Defendants

The Court made its memorandum decision regarding the questions
raised in this

matter.

The defendants have objected to the

proposed order based on that memorandum decision.
The Court has compared its memorandum decision with the order
and sees no reason to change the order.
Therefore, the same will be signed as of this date.
Dated this

18th

day of June, 19 87.
BY, THE COURT: ,

ersen

N. Gfeorge Daines - 108 J o , fllain, Sufte £ 0 0 , - Logan, Utah 84321
», ,
^ <C7-/A „ / <
Raymond N.' Malouf - X5Dj£aaL.ioa Berth,; Suite D - Logan, Utah 8432r riD5r ^ ' ~ ^ ' " — L "
•:?s 18th d*yof..June
19 -87< f }
ZM 3. ALLEN, Clerk
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N. George Daines - 0803
Daines & Kane
108 North Main, Suite 200
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone:
(801) 753-4403

•iZ
CACr...

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE

NORMAN BARBER and HELEN
BARBER, husband and wife,

*
*

Plaintiffs,

*

ORDER

*

Civil No. 25616

vs.
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP,
and VON K. STOCKING, DON A.
WHITE, JR., and RAYMOND N.
MALOUF, JR.,
Defendants.

The Defendant
on

the

grounds

indispensable

*
*

having filed
of

party

a Motion to Dismiss this action

jurisdiction
and/or

or

failing

failing

to

join

an

to state a legal claim and

Plaintiff having responded to said Motion,
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court

enters its

Order based

upon its

Memorandum Decision of May 18, 1987, as follows:
1.
already

Plaintiffs
received

are

prior

not estopped from renewing a judgment
to

any

bankruptcy

proceeding

bv

an

existing bankruptcy stay.
2.

There is no modification or chancre in the relief sought

except the renewal of the judgment including continuing interest.
This is not a modification.
3.

There is a reguest for additional attorney's fees and as

to those, the Court will consider subsequently whether additional
attorney's fees

should be awarded but that d o e ^ riot constitute a

3 5^/(1?"

valid basis for a Motion to Dismiss.
BASED THEREUPON, the Court
Motion to

Dismiss is

hereby

denied and

Orders

that Defendant's

Defendants have

ten (10) days

from the date of filing of this Order to answer the Complaint.
DATED this / ff day of (Jtoy^ 1987.
BY THE iCOURT:

District qourt
MAILING CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of May, 1987, I mailed
a true and correct cop/ of the foregoing ORDER to the following:
Raymond N. Malouf
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, UT 843 21
Secretary
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Raymond N. Malouf/md
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
Attorney for Defendant
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephones (801) 752-9380
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
husband and wife, et. al.
Plaintiffs,

vs.

]
:1
:
1

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
Civil No. 25616

THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et. al. :
Defendants.
Cone now Defendants Von K. Stocking and Raymond N. Malouf,
Jr., the only Defendants who are parties to this action, and
reserving the right to answer for Don A* White, Jr., if and when
he becomes a party, answer the allegations of the Complaint as
follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
The Complaint fails to state a claim against Defendants upon
which relief can be granted.
SECOND DEFENSE
The Court* lacks jurisdiction over the Defendant partnership,
which is in dissolution and has filed bankruptcy, and Plaintiff
has failed to remove the effect of the automatic stay under 11 U.
S. C. Section 362, and has not attempted to name the bankruptcy
^Trustee or serve him as a party, all of which is necessary to
>btain jurisdiction over the partnership, and the other Defendants, who may only be liable if the partnership is liable.

i

THIRD DEFENSE
The court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of this
jsuit, which is for an amount in excess of the judgment which
^Plaintiff seeks to renew. The excess Complaint is barred by the
six-year statute of limitations. Section 78-12-23 U. C. A., so

FOURTH DEFENSE
The renewal judgment seeks an award in excess of the prior
judgment by seeking to modify the prior judgment to include
interest which is specifically not included in the prior judgment.
The Complaint further seeks $330.70 in costs allegedly
incurred in ineffective attempts to enforce the alleged prior
judgment, which costs were not allowed by the prior judgment, and
are illegal. The Complaint further illegally seeks attorneys
fees for renewing the judgment, which is not allowed by the prior
judgment•
FIFTH DEFENSE
The Complaint fraudulently fails to admit the 320,000 plus
coats they bid at the Sheriff's sale held by Plaintiffs on this
judgment, which amount Plaintiffs have fraudulently failed to
credit against their alleged claim.
SIXTH DEFENSE
The Complaint fraudulently fails to give any credit on the
prior judgment for equity in real property Plaintiff realized by
taking an assignment of the beneficial interest in real property
owned by Von K. Stocking, then proceeding to a trust deed sale,
after which Plaintiffs failed to seek a deficiency judgment, and
Plaintiffs failed to credit any amount towards the prior judgment
when Mr. Stocking's property had, by Plaintiffs' own admission,
equity between 311,000 and 327,000.
The failure to seek a
deficiency judgment was a waiver of receiving any more from Von
K. Stocking and all other Defendants, and Plaintiffs are estopped
from this action.
SEVENTH DEFENSE
The judgment has more than been paid, inasmuch as the
original judgment was 321,211.30, and the Plaintiffs have already
realized the equity in Von K. Stocking's home, plus 320,000, plus
costs of the foreclosure sale, plus 3866.47 on the judgment, and

Defendants are entitled to a refund of the excess, plus interest,
plus costs and attorney fees, plus punitive damages.
EIGHTH DEFENSE
Answering the
specific allegations
in the Complaint,
Defendants lack information to admit the allegations in the first
paragraph and deny the same.
Defendants further deny that the
judgment entered April 18, 1979 is the one this Complaint is
attempting to renew and deny each and every allegation in
paragraphs 2, 3, 4 (1st), 4 (2nd), 5 and 7 of the Complaint.
NINTH DEFENSE
Plaintiffs have waived or compromised their claim against
each of the answering Defendants, either by specific agreement to
release, operation of law, or laches.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that the Complaint be dismissed
with prejudice and the Plaintiffs take nothing thereby.
COUNTERCLAIM
For cause of action against the Plaintiffs, Defendants
incorporate by reference as if fully set forth all of the
allegations and responses in the answer and further allege:
1.
The prior and underlying judgment has either been paid
or Plaintiffs and/or their Counsel are required to credit the
judgment as paid and more than paid, and Plaintiffs and/or their
Counsel have fraudulently refused to credit equity in Von K.
Stocking's home and fraudulently and illegally failed to credit
$20,000, plus costs of sale in a Sheriff's sale, which together
with the $866.47 more than pays the prior judgment and for which
actions the Defendants are entitled to damages in the amount of
the excess payment, interest, costs and attorney fees, plus
punitive damages.
2.
Plaintiffs and/or
their Counsel have maliciously,
wrongfully and intentionally or with gross negligence, pursued
their alleged claim and have now attempted to renew their alleged

judgment which action was done wrongfully and contrary to law,
and with a malicious intent to disrupt the lives and property of
the Defendants, and for which the Defendants are entitled to
damages in the amount of at least $75,000 each.
3.
Plaintiffs and/or their Counsel have intentionally
abused the legal process in attempting to expand the terms of the
prior judgment to collect money in excess of what was allowed,
for which Defendants are entitled to their actual damages,
interest and attorney fees, plus punitive damages in the additional amount of at least 360,000 each.
4.
Plaintiffs and/or their
Counsel
fraudulently and
intentionally breached their agreements with the Defendants as to
the application and amount of credit to be allowed on the prior
judgment for the equity of Mr. & Mrs. Von K. Stocking (Mrs.
Stocking not ever being a party herein) in real property, and
also as to the percentage of the alleged judgment to be paid from
each Defendant, for which the Defendants are entitled to actual
damages, interest and attorney fees, plus punitive damages in the
additional amount of at least $90,000 each.
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for judgment against the Plaintiffs in an amount of the excess payments on the prior judgment,
plus interest, plus punitive damages in the amount of $225,000
each, plus costs of this suit and legal costs, and such other and
further relief as is allowable under the law.
DATED this t*3 day of July, 1987.

aymona N. Malouf
Raymo
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the £T^ay
of July, 1987 a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
regarding Civil No. 25616, postage prepaid to the following:
N. George Daines, Esq.
DAINES & KANE
108 North Main, Suite 200
Logan, Utah 84321
(
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Raymond N. Malouf/bh (#2067)
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
Attorneys for Defendants
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone (801) 752-9380
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CACHE COUNTY, UTAH
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN
BARBER, husband and wife,
RULE 54(b) ORDER
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP,
et al.,
Case No. 25616
Defendants and
Third Party Plaintiffs,
N. GEORGE DAINES and
DAINES & KANE,
Third Party and
Counterclaim Defendants.
COMES NOW the Court and enters this Order, effective October
4, 1988, affirming

that on that date this Court ruled

that the

Order entered October 4, 1988, and all previous Orders of the Court
pertaining

to

the

Complaint,

Amended

Complaint,

Counterclaim,

Amended Counterclaim and the Third Party Complaint were final and
appealable orders under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., and there is no just
reason

for

delay

in

allowing

the

Defendants

and

Third

Party

Appellants who are parties in this action to bring their appeal.
Dated this

day of December, 1988.
VeMOY OtftoTOFFBSON
District Court Judge
1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the J.
day of December, 1988, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing RULE 54(b) ORDER, Case No.
25616
was mailed postage prepaid to the following:
N. George Daines
DAINES & KANE
108 North Main, Suite 200
Logan, Utah 84321

•^//*4:,
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Raytoond~N. Mal-ouf "
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Tab 8

Raymond N. Malouf/md (#2065)
Attorney for Defendants
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone (801) 752-9380

.

J

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

NORMAN BARBER and HELEN
BARBER, husband and wife.
Plaintiffs,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP,
et al • ,
Defendants and
Third Party Plaintiffs,

Case No, 25616

vs.
N. GEORGE DAINES and
DAINES & KANE,
Third Party and
Counterclaim Defendants.
Notice is hereoy given that Defendants Von K. Stocking and
Raymond N. Malouf hereby appeal to the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah from the Orders entered in this action on or about October
4, 1988, in this First District Court
by Judge VeNoy
Christoffersen, which Orders were declared by the Judge October 4,
1988, to be a Final and Appealable Partial Summary Judgment, and
also appeal from all related, underlying or preceding orders and
issues related thereto, preserved by the Court or the parties and
now ripe for appeal, including those issues raised by Defendants1
Petition for Permission to Appeal, filed July 9, 1987 (Supreme
Court No. 870232) the issues of which Interlocutory Order are now
final and appealable.
Defendant Don A. White, Jr. appears specially, solely to the
extent necessary to appeal the Orders which apply to him, and he

denies that the Court has jurisdiction over him in this case
because he was not served.
Dated this 2nd day of November, 1988

<2jfffr/yM.

Faymtfr
Raym/n^f
N. M £ l o u f
>ttc£r
Attorney for
Appellants/Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby c e r t i f y

that

on

the

2'"' day of November, 1988, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal, Civil No.
25616, was mailed, postage prepaid to the following:
N. George Daines, Esq.
DAINES & KANE
Attorney for Plaintiffs
108 North Main, Suite 200
Logan, Utah 84321

^ t ^ o 0&3/L
Secretary
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Tab 9

ymond N. Malouf/md (Bar No. 2067)
LOUF LAW OFFICES
torney for Defendants
0 East 200 North, Suite D
>gan, Utah 84321
dephone: (801) 752-9380
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH
>RMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
isband and wife, et. al.
Plaintiffs,

MOTION TO STRIKE
AMENDED COMPLAINT

IE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et• al
Defendants*

Cache County
Civil No. 25616

COME NOW Defendants, with the exception of Logan Savings and
>an who is not
rike the

represented

by

the

undersigned,

and

Amended Complaint because the Complaint: (1) Violates

ie Rule for amending a complaint; (2) is an improper
d

additional

parties;

(3)

is

grant and

irred by statutes cf

which is

attempt to

unrelated to the Complaint as

led; (4) asks for relief which the Court
ction to

move to

does not

have juris-

not allowed by the rules; (5) is

limitations; and

(6) improperly

asks for

xtition.
This Motion is supported by Defendants Memorandum in Support
Motion to Strike, filed concurrently herewith.
DATED this

day of August, 1987.

idgLlLsM&ti
Raym

N. Malouf
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the PV^day of August, 1987
"rect copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prep
ie following:
N. George Daines, Esq.
DAINES & KANE
Attorneys at Law
108 North Main, Suite 201
Logan, Utah 84321

rue

so

>

Secretary
C\

Raymond N. Malouf/md (Bar No. 2067)
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
Attorney for Defendants
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, Utah 34321
Telephones (301) 752-9380
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
husband and wife, et• al.
Plaintiffs,
vs.

DEFENDANTS ' MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO STRIKE

THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et• al.
Defendants.

Cache County
Civil No. 25616

In support

of Defendants1

forth the following

reasons

Motion to Strike, Defendants set

why

the

Court

should

strike the

Amended Complaint.
FACTS
1.

Defendants

claim to
at 3:01

have

the Complaint.

already

filed an Answer and Counter-

When the Answer was filed July 23, 1987

p.nu, the Plaintiffs had not filed an Amended Complaint.

2.

The Complaint seeks to renew

judgment has

expired.

lien against

any

Complaint seeks
any of the

of

Plaintiff for

to add
all or

judgment.

The prior

The Plaintiffs have no present right to a
the

additional

a

Defendants1

property.

additional parties,
parties
part of

are

or

The Amended

but does not allege

may

be

liable

to the

the Plaintiffs* claim against the

Defendants.
3.
cause of

The Amended Complaint
action.

the Plaintiffs

are

only

adds

a

second

and third

It alleges matters wholly unrelated to whether
entitled

to

a

judgment

on

the Complaint

itself.
4.

Plaintiffs have

neither admitted .nop alleged there^waq
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either an irregularity in
or that

the sheriff's

sale December

3, 1986#

the property allegedly sold was not subject to execution

and sale.
5.
and Loan

More than four years
executed and

interest in a

trust

additional Defendants

have expired

recorded an
deed

to

since Logan Savings

assignment of its beneficial

Raymond

Plaintiffs seek

N.

Malouf,

to add.

one

of the

No action other

than the Amended Complaint has been taken against the assignment.
6.

Plaintiffs have never acknowledged

offset the

their obligation to

prior judgment, now expired, with the amount of their

bid at a sheriff's sale.

They thus, cannot own

any part

of the

property they want to partition.
ARGUMENT
I
NO RULES PERMIT FILING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs

did

not

file

the

Defendants' responsive pleading
23, 1987.

The

consent of

Complaint

before

for the Complaint was filed July

Plaintiffs have

file an Amended Complaint.

Amended

not obtained

Plaintiffs

leave of Court to

have

not

obtained the

the adverse parties to file an Amended Complaint, nor

can they obtain the same.
filing of

an Amended

therefore

lacks

Rule 15(a) U.R.C.P. does not allow the

Complaint in this circumstance.

jurisdiction

to

consider

the

The Court

same,

and the

Amended Complaint should be stricken.

II
THERE IS NO JURISDICTION TO ALLOW THE
ADDITION OF ADDITIONAL PARTIES
Rule

14.

Utah

Rules

of Civil Procedure, governs the cir-

cumstances in which either the Plaintiffs or Defendants may bring
in

additional

parties.

parties have not been

The

conditions for adding additional

alleged or
2

satisfied by

Plaintiffs.

The

Plaintiffs have

not alleged

that any

of the additional parties

are or may be liable for all or part of Plaintiffs' claim against
the Defendants.

In

fact, there is no way any of the additional

Defendants could be liable for the
action, because
dants.

The

unrelated

the prior
Amended

matters

against someone
There is

no basis

in the Law to

the first

cause of

judgment was not against those Defen-

Complaint

in

else

claim in

an

illegally

3eeks

to

bring in

effort to prematurely satisfy a claim

for

which

Plaintiffs

have

no judgment.

or justification in the Rules of Procedure or

permit Plaintiffs

to proceed

against parties who

may have some title or interest in real property, when the Plaintiffs do not even have a judgment on which they can execute.
Court

lacks

jurisdiction

to

permit

The

Plaintiffs to amend their

pleadings to add the additional parties for the purposes alleged.
The Amended

Complaint should

be striken as to the third parties

Plaintiffs seek to join, and as to all claims made.

Ill
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT EXCEEDS THE
SCOPE OF THE COMPLAINT
The Amended Complaint seeks to

add

two

causes

of action.

One cause of action is for a declaration of ownership of property
disputably partly owned by an original Defendant.

Plaintiffs bid

on the interest of that Defendant after the prior judgment, which
is now expired.
the same

The other

property.

cause of

Both causes

action is

for partition of

of action are unrelated to the

Complaint which seeks to

decide whether

to a

The Amended Complaint is inappropriate.

renewal judgment.

Plaintiffs should
enforcement

net

efforts

enforcement efforts
that way.

The

be
onto

allowed
a

claim

are completely

underlying judgment

to
to

Plaintiffs are entitled
piggy-back
renew

separate and

the outdated

a judgment.

The

should be kept

expired, and with it all of

Plaintiffs' rights to take any action against the property of the

Defendants in that action. Plaintiffs will only be able to take
action against property of the Defendants if and when they obtain
a renewal judgment.

IV
THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION DOES
NOT STATE A CLAIM
The second cause of action^for determination of the Plaintiffs* interest in the property they executed on December 3, 1986,
is alleged by the Plaintiffs to be brought under Rule 69(g)(2)
U.R.C.P. Thus, any relief under the second cause of action is
dependant on an irregularity of the sale or on the fact the
property was not subject to execution and sale.
Plaintiffs have
alleged neither an irregularity in the sale nor that the property
executed on was not subject to execution and sale.
Since they
have not alleged these things, and since these things in fact do
not appear to be the case,
the Court has no jurisdiction to
grant the relief under Rule 69(g)(2) U.R.C.P.
In Randall v.
Valley Title 681 P2d 219 (Utah, 1984), the Utah Supreme Court
required a creditor bidding at a sale to credit his judgment and
discharge the claim to the extent of the bid.
Plaintiffs have
not even done that. The only way Plaintiffs can have the benefit
of Rule 69 is to allege there was an irregularity in the sale or
the property was not subject to execution and sale. If they
could successfully prove either of those things, then they could
be excused from having to credit the prior judgment. Since they
have not credited the judgment, however, they are not entitled to
any claim of ownership in the property. They are not entitled to
the relief asked for in the second cause of action, and it should
be stricken.
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V
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT IS BARRED
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
78-12-25, U.C.A., provides a four

Section

bringing actions of the type

alleged

causes

second

of

action.

The

in

the

year

second

bar to

and third

cause of action attempts to

invalidate the assignment of the beneficial

interest in

deed from Logan Savings and Loan dated June 3, 1982.

a trust

It has been

more than five years since the assignment was given and recorded.
Plaintiffs

cannot

now

claim

such

assignment

was

invalid.

Plaintiffs also appear to be attacking the judgment of Raymond N.
Malouf against Raymond N. Malouf,
1982.

The judgment

years ago.
not been

whichi* dated

January 15,

was docketed in Cache County more than four

The amount of the judgment speaks for itself.

satisfied, and

not a valid claim.
it,

Jr.

their

Plaintiffs allege

Regardless of what

Amended

Complaint

contesting these two matters.

is

no reasons why it is

Plaintiffs chose
dependant

They

It has

on

are barred

to call

successfully

from doing this

not only by §78-12-25, but also by §78-12-26.
VI
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO
PARTITION ARGUMENTS
Plaintiffs

have

repeatedly

refused

judgment or acknowledge they are obligated
at a

December 3, 1986 execution sale.

action they claim they own part
have paid

nothing.

Such an

brought separately, and only
prior

judgment.

Defendants

mediately release the lis
basis

for

partition.
should

also

the

Court

of the

to

to pay

the

the prior

what they bid

Now in the third cause of
property for

which they

action, if brought at all, must be
after Plaintiffs
hereby

pendens.

have credited the

request Plaintiffs to imPlaintiffs

have

shown no

to have jurisdiction over proceedings for

The Court should strike the Amended
order

credit

lis

pendens

removed.

Counterclaim and
The lis pendens

Plaintiffs admit they filed in paragraph 4 of the third
action in the Amended Complaint is groundless.
5

cause of

CONCLUSION
The

Amended

Complaint.
Both
them.

are

Complaint

two

causes

of action to the

Neither cause of action is related
improper.

The

to the Complaint.

Court lacks jurisdiction to consider

Statutes of limitation bar the bringing

The Rules

which would

have not been followed.
tiffs

adds

seek

to

bring

applicable Rule.

permit an
in

are

The

not

lacks

brought

to be filed

which the Plainin pursuant to any

jurisdiction

to

allow these

The Amended Complaint is a veiled attempt to

execute on a claim for which
judgment.

Amended Complaint

The additional parties

Th€> Court

additional parties.

of these actions.

lis

groundless and false.

pendens

the Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs

do not
admit

have

not

even have a

they

filed is

established any

rights in the property, have not credited what they bid, and have
no right to proceed with a partition hearing.

For

all of these

reasons the Amended Complaint should be stricken.
Dated this

day of August, 1987.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby

certify that on the -lH day of August, 1987 a true

and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Strike,

Civil

No. 25616, was mailed, postage prepaid to the

following:
N. George Daines, Esq.
DAINES & KANE
Attorneys at Law
108 North Main, Suite 201
Logan, Utah 84321
Secretary

99

N. George Daines - 0803
DAINES & KANE
108 North Main, Suite 200
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone: (801) 753-4403
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN
BARBER, husband and wife,

*
*

RESPONSE TO
AUGUST 24, 1987, MOTION
TO STRIKE AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP,
and VON K. STOCKING, DON A.
WHITE, JR., and RAYMOND A.
MALOUF, JR.,
Defendants.

*
*

Civil No. 25616

*

COME NOW the Plaintiffs, by their attorneys, Daines

& Kane,

and respond to Defendants1 Motion to Strike as follows:
1.

Motion

to

Amend:

Concurrently

with this Response,

Plaintiffs have filed & Motion to Amend their original Complaint.
Evidently, Mr.

Malouf filed

Plaintiffs filed the

a responsive

Amended

pleading the same day

Complaint.

Plaintiffs

were not

aware of a respqnsive pleading at the time they filed the Amended
Complaint.

That problem should be remedied by

Plaintiffs making

a formal Motion to Amend Complaint.
2.

Objections

to

Amended

Complaint:

Defendants to the Amended Complaint are

The objections of

answered specifically as

follows:
(a) Matters

are

Unrelated:

Second and Third Causes of

Action

relate

to

very

specifically

Mr. Malouf alleges the,1
are

whether

unrelated
or

not

100

yet thely 13? '*2
Defendantp^^

^

sc: oo
53 S§ ^

Malouf, White and Stocking are to
the Judgment

owing.

receive a

credit against

Mr. Malouf seems to want it both ways.

He agrees Plaintiffs do not own any part of the subject home
and

alternatively

credited.
both.

that

the

Clearly, one

amount of their bid should be

or the

other is

correct, but not

The Second and Third Causes of Action are related in

that they will answer that question.
(b)

Compliance with Rule 14: Rule

allows third

parties to

be brought

the filing of a counterclaim which
this

case.

Defendants1
Counterclaim
Amended

More

14(b) specifically

in by a Plaintiff upon
Defendants have

specifically,

the

Fifth

done in

Defense

Answer

and

the

second

raise

the

very

issues to be resolved by the

the

involvement

Complaint

and

paragraph

of

of

of
the

additional

Defendants.
(c)

Failure to State a Claim;

allow for the Court to determine
the

Plaintiffs

and

whether

Presumably, Defendants
defense

as

they

the interest
there

will set

have

done

Clearly, the Utah Rules

is

that up

an

purchased by
irregularity.

as an affirmative

at the Fifth Defense of their

Answer.
(d)

Statute of Limitations:

Neither Section 78-12-25

nor 78-12-26 are applicable to Plaintiffs1 Causes of Action.
The former deals
latter

with

with

completely

contracts

not

unrelated

in

writing

topics.

and the

Plaintiffs are

simply unable to respond intelligently unless Defendants can
indicate the section they rely upon.

^

(e) Right

to

Partition;

bring a partition action
upon the

other Causes

There is no obligation to

separately,

of Action.

it

No cases or authorities

whatsoever are cited by the Defendants.
are entitled
determined

to partition
valid,

which

based on
is

follows regularly

the

Clearly, Plaintiffs

their bid,
subject

of

if that is
the Amended

Complaint.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that Defendants' Motion to Strike
be denied and

that

Plaintiffs'

Motion

to

Amend

Complaint be

granted•
DATED t h i s

l

iih

day of September, 1987.
^

DAINES & KANE

/

/

_

_

.,, —^-z,- Daines
Attorney for Plaintiffs
MAILING CERTIFICATION
I hereby

certify that on the '/ /7'day of September, 1987, I

mailed a true and
AUGUST

24,

correct

1987, MOTION

copy
TO

of

the

STRIKE

foregoing

AMENDED

following:

Raymond N. Malouf
Malouf Law Offices
150 East 200 North, Suite 200
Logan, UT 84321

Secretary

J

RESPONSE TO

COMPLAINT to the

Raymond N. Malouf/md (Bar No. 2067)
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
Attorney for Defendants
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 752-9380
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
husband and wife, et. al.
Plaintiffs,
vs.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
AUGUST 24, 1987 MOTION
TO STRIKE AMENDED
COMPLAINT

THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et. al
Defendants.

Civil No. 25616

Defendants renew their Motion of August: 24, 1987 to Strike
the Amended Complaint.

The Plaintiffs' response failed to set

forth any valid reason to allow the amended Complaint.
dants nevertheless reply to Plaintiffs

1

Defen-

response as follows:

THE ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM PRECEDED
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT BY FOUR DAYS
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) requires leave prior to
filing

an

amended

amended

complaint.

pleading.

It prohibits

the

filing

of

the

Plaintiffs excuse themselves by saying the

amended Complaint was filed the same day the responsive pleading
was filed. The Court file says otherwise.

On Thursday, July 23,

1987, at 3:01 p.m., the Answer and Counterclaim was filed.

On

Monday, July 27, 1987, at 9:59 a.m., the Amended Complaint was
filed - without a mailing certificate.
The

formal

motion

to amend

the Complaint

does not solve

Plaintiffs1 problem. The motion does not have any memorandum or
xplanation of how justice is served by permitting the amendment
jg^f

the Complaint.
R.C.P.

it cannot be filed under Rule 15(a)

The motion Plaintiffs1

^ule 14(b) U.R.C.P.
gs.

Thus,

It applies

filed purportedly is based on

That rule does not apply to amended pleadto third party practice.

Reading that Rule

1
.4 rv/%

leads

to

the

conclusion

that

Plaintiffs

may

only

bring

in

additional parties if the additional parties might be liable to
the Plaintiffs as a result of Defendants' Counterclaim.

Again,

Plaintiffs did not accompany their motion with a memorandum or
any explanation showing how the additional third parties might be
liable to the
the

motion

Plaintiffs for the Defendants' Counterclaim. Thus,

to

amend

the

Complaint

cannot

be

allowed

merely

because Plaintiffs filed a motion under Rule 14(b) U.R.C.P.
There is no showing of how the Plaintiffs could think that
the proposed third parties are liable to the Plaintiffs because
of Defendants' Counterclaim.
the Counterclaim.

Nowhere in the Reply is a defense set forth or

reference made

that

liable

Plaintiffs

to

the

Plaintiffs replied July 28, 1987 to

the additional
because

proposed
of

the

third

parties are

Counterclaim.

The

Counterclaim was filed together with the Answer July 23, 1987.
reading of the Counterclaim

A

fails to show any other basis for

Plaintiffs to add the additional third parties as defendants in
this action, notwithstanding Plaintiffs response referring to the
Fifth defense, which is treated later.
The Amended

Complaint

should be dismissed with prejudice,

and the Motion to amend the Complaint should be denied.
II
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT IS UNRELATED
The original Complaint seeks to renew a judgment.

None of

the proposed additional third party defendants were defendants in
the prior case.
not

against

The judgment was not against them, and it was

specific

property.

Plaintiffs

have not even at-

tempted to show how the additional parties are or may be liable
for the Plaintiffs1 claim.
Plaintiffs

have

admitted

both

that

they

bid

$20,000.00

against the interest of Defendant Raymond N. Malouf in certain
property, and that the Plaintiffs have not offset their judgment
by that amount.
Counterclaim

filed

That
July

is the fifth defense- in the Answer and
23, 1987. The second paragraph
2

m7

in the

Counterclaim alleges that the Plaintiffs wrongfully pursued the
prior judgment and wrongfully are trying to renew it.

Neither of

these pleadings require the addition of the proposed third party
defendants or the amending of the Complaint

to resolve.

14(b) U.R.C.P. does not allow third parties

to be brought in,

unless those third parties can be shown to be liable.

Rule

The claims

in the first cause of action and the Counterclaim related to it
are unrelated to the? proposed amendments to the Complaint.
proposed

third

party

Defendants

misapply and misrepresent

are

not

liable.

The

Plaintiffs

the pleadings and the rules in att-

empting to expand their complaint.

The amended Complaint and its

attempt to add third party defendants should be stricken.
Ill
A BID IS A BID IS A BID
Keep in mind that the Complaint is only for the renewal of
the alleged judgment.
ownership

or

joint

The Amended Complaint seeks to establish
ownership

in

property

which

Plaintiffs

allegedly executed on in connection with their original judgment.
Even though the Plaintiffs have not credited the judgment by one
cent for their bid, this amendment to the Complaint is a piggyback effort to improve their position after the execution on the
underlying judgment.

It has no place in a proceeding to deter-

mine whether the Plaintiffs can even renew their judgment.
Plaintiffs have thus far been unwilling to admit that there
is an irregularity in the original sale or that the property was
not subject to execution.

In the underlying action, this Court

allowed the Plaintiffs, in a disputed motion on the very point,
to go forward with their execution sale.
to have proceeded ax their own risk.

They must be presumed

Who are they to say now

that the Defendant owned no equity in the property?

The only

possible "problem" to Plaintiffs with their bid is whether they
paid more than they wish they had paid. Just because Defendants
may have turned out to have no equity after all is not a reason
the

sale

was

irregular

or

that
3

the

property

not

subject

to

execution and sale.

Plaintiffs pretend that Rule 69(g)(2) U.R.

C. P. allows them to bring
Amended Complaint.

the second

It really does not.

cause of action in the
That rule is specifical-

ly set up to give the third party purchaser at a sale either a
judgment against the creditor or a judgment against the debtor,
is he does not end up with possession of the property bid for.
It

does

not

deal

with

the

question

of

what

happens

if

the

Plaintiffs themselves bid for property, or bid for it but don't
pay for it.

Plaintiffs have not gone so far as to allege they

bid for something that did not exist.

(Since they insisted on

the sale, that would help Defendants abuse of process case). They
have

not

alleged

that

execution and sale.

the

property

sold

is

not

subject

After all, they caused it to be sold.

have not alleged irregularity in the proceedings.

to

They

They have not

denied their bid, and they have not paid it.
Rule 69(e)(4) U.R.C.P. says that every bid is an irrevocable
offer.

Failure of the purchaser to pay is contempt of the Court.

Yet, Plaintiffs have refused to pay or enter the credit.
Plaintiffs say Defendants "want it both ways".

Defendants a

long time ago tried to show the Plaintiffs that Defendants had no
equity

in the home.

This Court refused the proof and ordered

that Plaintiffs could proceed with the sale.

Accordingly, all of

the right title and the interest of the Defendants to the home
was sold, and the Plaintiffs bid $20,000.00, plus the cost of the
sale for it.

It is the Plaintiffs who chose to proceed and bid

to buy whatever

they bought.

If that interest ends up being

nothing, that does not reduce their liability for payment.

The

sale

the

was

offered

without

guaranty

to

the buyer, but

Plaintiffs are trying to come back and get a guaranty.

now

Under the

circumstances, the E>efendants are entitled to have it both ways
because Plaintiffs elected to proceed with the sale. They are not
entitled to one.
IV
THERE IS NO CLAIM
4

109

Nothing

is clear

from Plaintiffs' response about why

the

Rules allegedly allow the Court consider the Amended Complaint.
To the contrary, an analysis of the pleadings and the Rules shows
Plaintiffs

have

wholly

ignored

all

the

requirements.

The

interest in the home purchased by the Plaintiffs for $20,000 were
conditions

set by Plaintiff

turns out to be nothing.

all

the interest

Defendants

owned

Plaintiffs made a bad investment for

which they have no claim on the Defendants.
There is nothing in connection with the Complaint to renew
the prior judgment that shows that the Court can re-examine the
question

of

what

was purchased ,by the Plaintiffs.

The

cnly

question is how long will it take the Court to order the Plaintiffs to credit the judgment with the amount of their bid plus
costs of the sale, regardless of what it is Plaintiff bought.
V
THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD IS OVER
On the merits, Plaintiffs1
Even

if

the

Court

were

to

Amended Complaint should

consider

the

merits,

the

fail.

Amended

Complaint is barred.
First,
otherwise
years.

§78-12-25

provided

requires

for

by

that

law

actions

should

be

for

brought

relief
within

not
four

Plaintiffs have failed to show how their claim could be

considered after four years.

In their memorandum Defendants set

forth the fact that the beneficial

interest

in the trust deed

assigned from Logan Savings and Loan June 3, 1982, might be what
the

Plaintiffs1

action.

attack

is

all

about

in

the

second

cause

of

The beneficial interest in that trust deed was assigned

June 3, 1982 for valid consideration and has never been attacked.
The Amended Complaint is brought more than five years after that
assignment.
Second,

Plaintiffs

appear

to

be

attacking

a

judgment

obtained January 15, 1982, by naming the additional third party
defendants.

The only possibility for attack of that judgment is

if the Plaintiffs

think that judgment should not even exist.
5

Section 78-12-26
years.

limits actions

for fraud or mistake

to three

Since the judgment was obtained January 15, 1982 and has

not been attacked, the Amended Complaint is at least two and onehalf years late.
If neither of these claims are the basis for including the
proposed third parties, then the Amended Complaint fails to state
a claim.

It should be stricken.
VI
WHAT PARTITION?

Plaintiffs argued in their Response that (they) Plaintiffs
do not own any part of the subject home.

Now the third cause of

action seeks to partition that home without having first credited
their bid!
business

Both procedures (partition and bid crediting) have no

in

the

Complaint

- which

was

and

should

only

be a

Complaint to renew a judgment.
If the Plaintiffs had an ownership interest in the property,
then they certainly might have the right to bring an action for
partition.

However, they have never admitted they have an owner-

ship interest in property, and were not even willing to credit
their old judgment, as required by the Rules, prior to claiming
an ownership.

Accordingly, it cannot be said they have anything

to partition.

It is interesting that the Plaintiffs filed a lis

pendens, which Defendants demanded be removed, but have yet to
credit their bid against the prior judgment.

Plaintiffs appear

to lack faith in the validity of their claim.
Plaintiffs failed to show any connection between a partition
and their efforts to renew a judgment.

The judgment has not been

renewed. If Plaintiffs are to file a partition claim at all.

It

must

is

be

renewed
judgment.

in

some

other

proceeding.

it

only

becomes

effective

Even
the

if

the

judgment

date

of

the

renewal

It does not obtain the date of the prior judgment.

The alleged partition could not be included in any new j\idgment
because execution ws under the old judgment.

6

Since there is not

111

a renewed judgment, there is no reason to allow Plaintiffs
request for partition.
WHEREFORE, Defendants renew their Motion to Strike the
Amended Complaint fo^ all of the foregoing reasons.
DATED this
£ day of September, 1987.

d N. Malouf
Raymond

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the <t3^ day of September, 1987 a
true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage
prepaid to the following:
N. George Daines, Esq.
DAINES & KANE
Attorneys at Law
108 North Main, Suite 201
Logan, Utah 84321

. ,
M

^ ^

^n
W s

jj=rJff' ^ —

112

}

Tab 10

•J JJL -;

Raymond N, Malouf - 2067
Attorney for Defendants and
Third Party Plaintiffs
MALOUF LAW OFFICE
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 752-9380
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THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN
BARBER, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
RESPONSIVE MEMORANDUM
FROM DEFENDANTS, OPPOSING
MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP,
et al• ,
Defendants and
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
N. GEORGE DAINES and
DAINES & KANE,
Third Party and
Counterclaim Defendants.

Civil No. 25616

Defendants oppose all the Motions and 3Ubmit Affidavits of Von
K. Stocking and Raymond N. Malouf, together with this Memorandum.
Even though Plaintiffs seek to renew a judgment entered in
April 1979, they acknowledge the Amended Complaint adds additional
Defendants and additional claims than were part of the prior
judgment.

The prior judgment renewal allegations in the first

cause of action make an illegal attempt

i

to expand

\JL1

1188

the 'prior

judgment.

The motion for partial summary

judgment on the first

cause of action is not separable from the motion for a partial
summary

judgment

Complaint.

on

the

Amended

Counterclaim

and

Third

Party

The Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint,

however, bear directly on Plaintiffs* allegations in the second and
third causes of action.
about summary

judgment

In these motions Plaintiffs say nothing
for that part of the Amended Complaint.

They obviously want to put off dealing with their burden of proof
in the second and third causes of action because of disputed facts.
However, the disputed facts also exist in the part of the case they
want

reviewed

now.

The whole case and

all the pleadings are

subject to review by the Court in connection with the Motions.
FACTUAL DISPUTES REMAIN
Defendants oppose all of the Motions for Summary Judgment, and
oppose the Motion for Sanctions.
there

are

factual

disputes

about

The Court has previously held
some

of

these

same

issues.

Defendants assert that if the equities and facts in this case are
to be resolved summarily, however, justice demands a dismissal of
the Amended Complaint and a hearing on the damages payable to the
Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs, plus the award of sanctions
against the Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs1 Motions are not unlike the motions made on behalf
of the Plaintiffs and Third Party Defendants herein in a related
case.

Von K. Stocking and Donna Stocking are Plaintiffs against

the Barbers, Mr. D a m e s and his law firm, and First Federal Savings
& Loan, in Civil No. 22183. There this Court has ruled conflicting
2

Barbers1

and

D a m e s ' efforts to dismiss the allegations of Mr. Stocking.

The

factual

matters must

be

instant case has several
22183.

heard, and

has

rejected

issues which are related

to Civil No.

Summary Judgment is inappropriate here, too.

The content

of the same conversations between Mr. Daines and Mr. Stocking are
important factual matters which must be heard in determining not
only

(1) the liability of Mr. Daines and the Barbers for their

wrongful interference with advantageous economic relationships and
f

contractual

relationship

(in

No.

22183),

but

also

(2)

the

application of equity from Mr. and Mrs. Stocking's home as a credit
against the prior judgment here.

The amount of that credit must

be determined, amont other things, before a renewal judgment can
be considered.
Another fact issue is the credit to be applied against the
prior judgment resulting from Plaintiffs* bid of $20,000 plus costs
for property on Decemoer 3, 1986. Plaintiffs say no credit is due.
However, this Court
Plaintiffs

were

ruled

earlier

obligated

judgment for the amount bid.

to enter

on April

24, 1987 that

a partial

satisfaction

the
of

Plaintiffs have refused to do this.

Plaintiffs say nothing needs to be credited and base this on a
tortured interpretation of Rule 69(g)(2).
resolution

of

sale

irregularities.

That requires a factual

Yet, Plaintiffs

have not

alleged irregularities in the sale nor have they alleged that the
property was not subject to execution.

Until they do one or the

other of these things and prove facts to support the allegation,
there is no possibility for not crediting 1 he bid.

3
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Legally they

must now credit the bid against the prior judgment before seeking
to renew.

Defendants briefed that issue to the Court August 24,

1987, and September 8, 1987.
Thus, at least the question of those two credits remain
factual

issuers.

In

addition,

the

excesses

requested

by

as
the

Plaintiff in the first: cause of action remain as questions of fact.
Another fact issue is whether the prior judgment was a judgment
based on a contract which provided for interest (Defendants say it
was) and whether

U.C.A. Sec. 15-1-4 says that a judgment on a

contract must specify the interest if interest is to accrue after
the entry of the judgment.

Defendants say it says this, and that

the prior judgment needs to be amended to comply.

Defendants note

that the issue of whether a writ of execution can amend a judgment
has not been ruled on by the Appeals Court.

It is a judgment; not

a writ, that Plaintiffs must renew if they are to succeed.
Issues of fact related to the foregoing include:
(1)

wh€ither the Plaintiffs or their attorney agreed

to discharge

Von K. Stocking

judgment

he

if

did

not

from

file

liability

bankruptcy

or

for

the

if

the

Plaintiffs, in fact, took over the equity in the home he
and his wife owned in Logan;
(2)

what was the amount of equity in Von's home on

December 4, 1983, that should be credited to the prior
judgment;
(3)

whether

Mr.

Stocking

acted

or

relied

on

representations made by the Plaintiffs or their attorney;
4
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(4)
their

whether the property bid on by Plaintiffs and

counsel

December

3,

1986*

was subject

to the

judicial sale they caused to happen;
(5)

whether the same sale had irregularities;

(6)

whether

the

Court

earlier

required

the

Plaintiffs to enter a partial satisfaction of judgment
for that $20,000 bid, and what facts, if any, justify
Plaintiffs not having done so yet;
(7)

what the actual language of the prior judgment

of April 1979 says and whether that language is being
exaggerated

and

added

to

in

Plaintiffs'

Amended

Complaint ;
(8)

whether Plaintiffs can get attorney fees, costs

and after-accruing interest on the prior judgment without
amending the prior judgment; and
(9)

whether

a

writ

of

execution

on

the

prior

judgment, if for more than the judgment stated on its
face, can amend

the amount

that can be awarded

on a

renewal judgment when the prior judgment has expired.
(10) whether the prior judgment is a lien now that
it has expired.
ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT
It is not always required that a party offer affidavits in
opposition
summary
submits

to motions

judgment •
no

for summary

Where

documents

in

a party

judgment
opposed

opposition,

5

in order

to avoid

to summary

judgment

summary
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judgment

can

nevertheless only be granted

if the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.

That is the purpose of Rule 56, and

Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proof in establishing as
a matter of law they are entitled

to judgment or even partial

summary judgment.
Defendants have submitted responsive affidavits from Von K.
Stocking

and

Raymond

N. Malouf.

evidence

and

all

evidence

in the light most favorable to the party opposing the

reasonable

motion for summary judgment.
(UT 1982).
should

The Court

inferences

must

fairly

evaluate all

drawn

from

the

(Bowen v. River ton City, 656 P2d 434

The Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and Sanctions

be

denied

based

on

the

pleadings

and

the

Affidavits

submitted herewith.
The Plaintiffs have failed to set forth the facts they claim
are undisputed which support their Motions for Summary Judgment.
All

of

the material

facts are disputed, as well as

the facts

implied and directly raised by the affirmative defenses in :he
Answer and Counterclaim, Amended Answer and Counterclaim, and Third
Party Complaint.
Barber

are

residency

The Affidavits of Mr. D a m e s and Mr. and Mrs.

disputed
of

the

by

Defendants*

Barbers.

The

Affidavits, except

allegation

in

all

as

to

three

of

Plaintiffs' Affidavits, that they caused a lis pendens to be fiLed
against real property even after the prior judgment expired, is
damming

to

their

case

and

supports

Defendants1

position

that

sanctions should be awarded against the Plaintiffs and Third Party
Defendants.

6

ira

The

legal

cind

factual

question

of

Partnership and individuals also exists.
been served.
alleged

jurisdiction

over

the

The Partnership has not

The Court cannot have jurisdiction, even only on the

general

partners,

unless

the

underlying

debtor,

the

Partnership, is properly also a party.
The Motions by Plaintiff and Third Party Defendants should be
denied.

They would make the facts appear other than they are and

avoid entirely the tactual questions which are at the center of
this

effort

particulars.

to

expand

original

judgment

in

many

illegal

Plaintiffs1 convoluted analysis and expansion of :he

Appeals Court decision
on the prior

the

(rendered on the enforceability of a writ

judgment, and which did

not address the judgment

itself), is full of fantasy and embellished with fiction.

The

effect of the Appeals Court ruling on the prior judgment only goes
to the timeliness ot appeal of a writ of execution.

Since that

judgment has expired, the underlying writ has expired and a ruling
on the writ has no oearing which controls the present case.

To

grant two partial summary judgment motions, all material facts and
the

law

in this case have

to be addressed.

Inasmuch

as

the

Plaintiffs have acknowledged there are new factual and new legal
issues being brought forward for decision, summary judgment is not
appropriate.
In an effort to pretend there is one less factual dispute.
Plaintiffs acknowledge the weakness of their second cause of action
and the correctness of Defendants' Counterclaim by abandoning to
the Court the question of whether their 320,000 bid amount is due

7
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as a credit on the prior judgment.

The Court already ruled that

the bid should have been entered as a partial satisfaction.
only

irregularity

alleged

by

Defendants

in

that

sale

The
(and

irregularities are needed to justify use of Rule 69(g)(2)) was the
underlying writ which has been appealed.

Irregularities in that

sale have not been alleged by Defendants.

Yet, Plaintiffs rely on

an argument

that Defendants made allegations of irregularities*

This is an attempt

to argue pleadings not actually made by the

Defendants to meet Plaintiffs1 own burden to prove no credit is
due.

The second cause of action is intertwined with Plaintiffs1

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and the issues directly or
indirectly related thereto should oe interpreted favorably to the
Defendants

in ruling

on

the motions.

The Motion

for

Partial

Summary Judgment should be denied, and the second and third causes
of action ought to be dismissed.
The Court has not analyzed what is owed to satisfy the prior
judgment.

It has merely allowed the deputy clerk to rubber stamp

and seal the writ proposed by Plaintiffs.
knowing decision process.

That is not a thinking,

Where the rubber stamp is affixed to a

writ in excess of the judgment, the writ is
on

renewal

actions.

A

factual

question

void and not binding
to

be

specifically

addressed by the Court includes a comparison of the prior judgment
with prior writs, to make sure only the prior judgment is part of
the action.
The filing of an illegal

lis pendens

is indeed actionable

under U.C.A. Sections 38-9-1 to 4.

8
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Res

judicata

does

not

apply

in

this

case

because

the

Plaintiffs have sought to include many more Defendants than were
part of the original action, and the matters actually disputed in
this case differ from those heard by the Appeals Court in the prior
action.
WHEREFORE, Defendants

pray

that

the

Motions

for

Partial

Summary Judgment be denied, the Motion for Sanctions be denied and
that the Court consider granting sanctions against Plaintiffs.
DATED this — °

day of June, 1988.

/

//,.,
/

Raymond N. Malouf

»f
/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify

that

I caused

to be mailed, first class

postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing RESPONSIVE MEMORANDUM FROM
DEFENDANTS, OPPOSING MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, this
JL^Jr day of *yrftWl 1988, to:
N. George Daines
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Daines & Kane
108 North Main, Suite 200
Logan, Utah 84321

Secretary

9
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r: J: U r •'' r
Raymond N. Malouf - 2067
Attorney for Defendants and
Third Party Plaintiffs
MALOUF LAW OFFICE
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone; (801) 752-9380

. ] JLL ~j

']' \\: ^5

CACHh . .,/. ,;-;j;

THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN
BARBER, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
AFFIDAVIT OF
RAYMOND N. MALOUF

VS.
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP,
et al •,
Defendants and
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
N. GEORGE DAINES and
DAINES & KANE,
Third Party and
Counterclaim Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE

)
) ss.
)

COMES NOW, Raymond
following
Summary

in opposition
Judgment

Civil No. 25616

and

N. Malouf, and deposes and states the
to the Plaintiffs' Motions

in opposition

to Plaintiffs'

for Partial
Motion

for

Sanctions:
1.

I am counsel for Defendants and Third Party Plaintiffs
,;LKr-. r'\ I;-A~ ^ ^

herein.

1

•;;; i nsc

^rCf'

J)

2.

I

disputed

know

there

are

several

factual

issues

which

between the Plaintiffs, the Defendants, and

are

the Third

Party Defendants which include, but are not limited to those shown
by the Affidavit of Von K. Stocking.
3.

I am not the legally authorised agent to receive process

on behalf

of

The Emporium

Partnership

jurisdiction of this Court against

ard

have

contested

the Partnership

the

because the

Partnership's legal representative is the bankruptcy trustee, James
Z. Davis.
4.

I know the prior judgment was not against anyone except

myself, Von K. Stocking, Don White, and The Emporium Partnership,
and that it was not against any of the other Defendants. The prior
judgment in No. r?63C was entered more than eight (8) years ago.
5.

Among additional fact issues to be resolved is how much

should have been credited on the prior judgment because Plaintiffs
bid 320,000 December
certain property.

3, 1986

(plus costs), for my

interest

in

Plaintiffs have failed and retused to enter a

partial satisfaction to the extent of the 520,000 bid plus the
costs.

On April 24, 1987, I know the Court entered

quashing subpoenas against some of the Defendants.

its Order

In its Findings

of Facts and Conclusions of Law, the Court held that the Plaintiffs
were required to enter a partial satisfaction because of their bid
at the sale on December 3, 1986, but the Plaintiffs have not done
so.
6.

Even though the Court found that Plaintiffs should have

acknowledged their obligation to reduce the prior judgment by the
2
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amount of the bid, they did not, and so there are no facts to
support any Plaitiff interest in the property, and so Plaintiffs,
as a matter of fact, should not be trying to act on that property
while they try to renew the old judgment.

Factually it is a claim

for beyond the original judgment.
7.

It

is untrue

the Court

has

jurisdiction

under

Rule

69(g)(2), U.R.C.P. because the Plaintiffs, who claim the benefit
of

that

Rule,

have

neither

alleged

nor

shown

there

was

an

irregularity in the sale, and have not alleged that the property
was not subject
alleged

to execution.

I Know the Defendants have not

irregular it 12s in the sale.

The Defendants have only

alleged that the property was not subject to execution and have
asked for damages for that in the amended counterclaim, paragraphs
2 and 6.

The Plaintiffs have not admitted the property was not

subject to execution8.

The fact of Plaintiff's bid December 3, 1988, supports

the factual finding that credit must be made to Defendants for the
320,000 plus costs bid by Plaintiffs.
9.

Even though the Plaintiffs insist they don't have to make

said credit, the Court has said they should have done so and the
Defendants have said they must. There is a question of fact before
the Court as to the date and amount of credit for that bid to the
prior judgment, resulting in a factual question of how much, if
any. remains to be paid on a possible renewal judgment.
10.

October 3, 1986, the Plaintiffs wrote a letter to me

saying they wanted $12,500 which was what they

said was my share

3
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of the debt. Onl/ two months later they bid the 320,000 which tney
have refused to credit on the judgment.
paid to Defendants, and

The excess bid should be

it was asked for in paragraph 2 of the

amended counterclaim.
11.

Based

on

the

foregoing

representations

from

Plaintiffs representations, I believe $7,500 was paid in excess

the
of

any amount that should legally or equitably be required from me.
I should not even have been a party to the renewal Complaint.
12.

I know that Plaintiffs and Third Party Defendants have

not yet paid anything to the Defendants that is or may be required
by the Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint.
13.

I am familiar with the Affidavit of Von K. Stocking and

know that I was not part of the negotiations between Mr. Stocking
and Mr. Daines and did not know that Mr. Daines and the Barbers nad
acquired

the

beneficial

interest

in

Mr.

and

Mrs.

Stocking's

property during the course of those visits with Von K. Stocking.
The promises made to and negotiations witt* Mr. Stocking were not
made through me but were initiated and conducted in secret by the
Third Party Defendants.

I know Mr. Stocking relied on the promises

and statements made by Mr. Daines.
14.

I know

the original

Complaint

in No. 17630 was

for

enforcement of a promissory note or contract.
15.

I know the original Complaint in No. 17630 did not ask

for interest on the judgment until it was paid, and I know neither
the Complaint, ncr the Judgment which followel the complaint, were
ever amended .

4
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16.

I know that the Judgment was on a contract and that the

interest which Plaintiffs seek

to add to that

specified

The

in

acknowledged

the
that

Judgment.
the

language

of

interest accrues after the judgment.

judgment was not

Plaintiffs
the

themselves

judgment

does

not

have
3ay

I know that the decision of

the Utah Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of Plaintiff's
tortured argument for reading extra words into the judgment.
did

Mor

it address the question of amending

the judgment to permit

interest to accrue contrary to its terms.

It merely held that the

Defendants did not appeal the Court's allowance of execution writs
soon enough.

It did not address the question of interest accruing

after judgment on a contract where the judgment didn't specify the
rate of interest that proper pleadings might have allowed it to.
17.

I know the original

judgment did not provide for the

Plaintiffs to recover attorney fees incurred in trying to collect
the judgment, and did not allow a Complaint to renew judgment to
seek additional attorney fees.
18.
best

At the time all pleadings in this case were filed, to the

of my knowledge, information and

belief

after

reasonable

inquiry, such pleadings were well grounded in fact and warranted
by

existing

law

or

a good

faith

argument

for

the extension,

modification or reversal of existing law, and were not interposed
for improper purposes or unnecessary delay.

and

19.

The factual questions about crediting the $20/000 bid,

the

Plaintiffs'

Trust

Deed

5

Foreclosure

Sale

against
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Mr.

Stocking's home are both disputed.

Both these factual disputes

exist in addition to the question of interest accruing after entry
of the prior judgment.

The question of interest accruing on the

prior judgment still is a factual question.

At worst, the holding

of the appeals court on this point only goes to the question of
whether a writ of execution was timely appealed from.
address the substance of the writ.

It did not

The renewal judgment cannot

seek to renew writs of execution on the oil judgment, but must be
limited to the actual prior judgment.

The actual prior judgment

does not support the relief requested by trie Plaintiffs.

Section

15-1-4, U.C.A. does not support it either because this judgment is
a judgment on a contract, not some other judgment.

Only judgments

other than on contracts may accrue interest after entry whether or
not the judgment provides it. The Defendants seek and are entitled
to the strict reading of the statute.
20.

PlaintLffs alleged

they made a demand

for changes to

Defendants' pleadings, and demanded that Defendants accept their
interpretation of the breadth of the appeals court decision, on
Thursday.

June

undersigned's

16,

1988.

schedule

or

Without

any

availability,

consideration
they

insisted

for
on

the
an

affirmative written response by 1:00 p.m four days later, or by
Monday, June 20.

As a matter of fact, I was gone Thursday and

Friday and knew nothing of their demand.

Nevertheless, at 12:10

p.m., June 20, L988, Plaintiffs hand delivered all the motions
which are presently before the Court. Their actions show that they
did not believe their demand meant anything, and that response to
6

the demand was not seriously intended.
21.

I have read the foregoing Affidavit and know the contents

to be true and correct of my own personal knowledge.
DATED this Jjj 1/ day of June, 1988.

^^O^jyesq^J^R and SWORN TO before me this ~xiK day of June, 1988.
/

/BARBARA L . \
\
rf /
HAn ON > ^ ,
263
J-wi,
Stewart I iiHDr " 1 '

^ ( . t . ^ i \ i r i , rA <H<X'vJVift-«P*
Notary P u b l i c ,-,
Residinqin:
K,0<^ H e ^ M \ 1>T~

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, first class
postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing^AFFIDAVIT OF RAYMOND N.
MALOUF,, this J ^ U a y of at±f*e-> 1988, to:JJQ_
N. George Daines
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Daines & Kane
108 North Main, Suite 200
Logan, Utah 84321

DO 1-"VJ C._jiO VU&Gr^
Secretary

t
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.JUL -I r.Vy&
Raymond N. Malouf - 2067
Attorney for Defendants and
Third Party Plaintiffs
MALOUF LAW OFFICE
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, Utah
84321
Telephone:
(801) 752-9380

'* /Jlu ---•'•
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THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH

NORMAN BARBER and HELEN
BARBER, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
AFFIDAVIT OF
VON K. STOCKING

VS.
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP,
et a l . ,
Defendants and
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
N. GEORGE DAINES and
DAINES & KANE,
Third Party and
Counterclaim Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
)

COUNTY OF CACHE
COMES
deposes

NOW,

and

Civil No. 25616

Von

states

K.

Stocking,

and

being

the

following

facts,

in

first

duly

opposition

sworn,
to

the

Plaintiffs1 Motions for Partial Summary Judgment:
1.
Together

I am a Defendant
with

my

and

wife, Donna

Counterclaimant

Stocking, I am

in this action.

a Plaintiff

in an
'^

1
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action against the Plaintiffs herein, the Third Party Defendants
and against First Federal Savings u Loan, which action is also
filed in this Court as Civil No. 22183.

I was also a Defendant in

Civil No. 17630, which this present action is partly seeking to
renew and partly seeking to expand.
2.

I know that one of the questions of fact in this present

action is how much money should be credited on the prior judgment,
No. 17630, so that the Court will know how much, if any, the
Plaintiffs can legally renew.
3.

I know that in Civil No. 22183, in October of 1987, this

Court said that there was a dispute of facts about whether the
Plaintiffs and the Third Party Defendants herein interfered with
my rights in the home First Federal was foreclosing on, and to
which the Plaintiffs purchased the beneficial interest in.

I know

Plaintiffs bought that interest because of the judgment in Civil
No. 17630.
4.

Because of the interference in my rights to that home,

I know that the Plaintiffs and the Third Party Defendants, together
with First Federal Savings & Loan, took my equity in the home
without giving credit on the judgment, contrary to discussions had
with me.

I know that they refused and failed to apply any of that

equity to partially satisfy the judgment in No. 17630, even though
I relied on their promises to allow between 312,000 and $15,000 as
a credit against the very judgment which the Plaintiffs now seek
to renew.

I know the Plaintiffs here only bid $33,191.94 at the

Trust Deed sale of my former residence November 4, 1983, even
2
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though they wrote us a letter August 29, 1963 where they themselves
said the property was worth between 345,000 and $60,000.
5.

Even though I was represented by an attorney at the time,

Mr. George Daines called me directly to discuss how much equity to
apply against th€s judgment in No. 17630, and he called me several
times about this between October 31 and November 3, 1983, while I
was trying to decide on curing my default or agreeing to the offers
made for the Barbers by Mr. Daines.
6.

That in the course of those conversations, Mr. Daines did

not tell me that the Barbers were buying the beneficial interest
in that property, which allowed them to take advantage of me, and
now appears to be their justification for not crediting anything
on the prior judgment.
7.

That besides the promises to apply money on the judgment,

Mr. Daines told me that

if everything

fell apart and a sale

occurred, his clients would still have no problem in releasing me
from the judgment. 1 relied on his promises. Mr. Daines also told
me that his clients only wanted to collect against Defendants to
the judgment the same percentage of the judgment as each of the
three alleged general partners owned in The Emporium Partnership.
In discussing the amount of the judgment to be offset, I relied on
his representations for this also.
8.

Also in our discussions Mr. Daines said he was worried

I would file for bankruptcy to stop the Trust Deed Sale by First
Federal, and that he and his clients did not want me to do that and
would discharge me from any debt owed to the Barbers if the sale
3
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was allowed to proceed.
9.

Mr. D a m e s also told me that he had 100* authority to

represent or settle on behalf of the Plaintiffs.
10.

These conversations were initiated by Mr. Daines.

In

them he expressed a great deal of animosity toward my attorney, and
encouraged me to exclude him from the negotiations we were having.
11.

I know

the residence

Plaintiffs here was worth at

I had

that

was

lost

to

the

least the $60,000 they admitted it

might be worth.
12.

That

I know that The Emporium Partnership

is still in

bankruptcy and that so far as I know the trustee in bankruptcy,
James Z. Davis, is the only official agent of the Partnership, but
has

not

been

named

as

a

party

or

served

on

behalf

of

the

Partnership.
13.

I know at the time I was served and even at present I am

not the agent

for

the Partnership, but

the Partnership

was in

dissolution.
14.
Interest

That I knew the original ]udgment only allowed for the
that the Complaint

asked for, which was less than the

contract allowed.
15.

I know the original

which Don White and
original

note

or

I signed

contract

]udgment was on a promissory note
to the Plaintiffs, and

expired

before

the

I know the

prior

judgment

expired.
16.

I know the prior judgment did not allow for attorney fees

in collecting on the judgment or for attorney Fees

4
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judgment.
17.

I know the original judgment did not recite that interest

would be 12% from the date of the judgment until the judgment was
paid, but

it said

other

language which

is different

than

:he

contract provided and is different than what the complaint or che
amended complaint here is seeking.
18.

I know

the

original

judgment

was

only

against

The

Emporium Partnership and myself, Don White, and Ray Malouf, and was
not against any other Defendants which the Plaintiffs are trying
to add to this action.
19.

I know that just as there are questions of fact in Civil

No. 22183 about interference with my rights by the Plaintiffs and
the Third Party Defendants, that there are similar questions of
fact in this action.
20.

The Plaintiffs have had the benefit of all of the equity

in my former residence, and the equity of my wife for which no
consideration

was given, plus

the

incomes and

property since they took on November 4, 1983.

rents

from

the

I should be entitled

to have this Court rule on the amount of that equity and cause the
same to be entered as a credit against the former judgment to see
whether there is anything left for the Plaintiffs to sue for to
renew a judgment.

I should also be excluded as a Defendant from

the renewal judgment because of the monies received from me by the
Plaintiffs.
21.

I have read the foregoing Affidavit and know the same to

be true and correct.

5
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DATED this 9*°l day of June, 1988.

Von K. Stocking

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this *

day of June, 1988

s~

My Commission emigres:
/

\j**Oi

(•

) '' f

'

Notary Public/
Residingin: r

-/

'
>/V,^

/

^ L

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, first class
postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF VON K.
STOCKING, this ^ ± U day of Jt*ne, 1988, to: Stir
N. George Daines
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Daines & Kane
108 North Main, Suite 200
Logan, Utah 84321

AAAI I ^ O V N

Secretary
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Raymond N. Malouf/md (#2067) (134 :EMPBARRE.$Mp) "_ .
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
Attorneys for Defendants; Third Party Plaintiffs
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, Utah 34321
Telephone (801) 752-9380
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et al .
Defendants /
Third Party Plaintiffs,

DEFENDANTS1 RESPONSE TO
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM,
OPPOSING PENDING MOTIONS
Civil No. 25616

vs.
N. GEORGE DAINES and DANES & KANE,
Third Party Counter-Claim Defendants.
Two major material issues of fact remain as a bar to the
renewal of any judgment against the Defendants. First, the parties
disagree about whether the original judgment allows post judgment
interest to accrue. This factual question is raised by Defendants1
fourth defense in the original answer and counterclaim. Second,
the parties dispute the amount of credit against a renewal judgment
- whatever its amount - that must be given for payment, equitable
offsets and a bid by the Plaintiffs. This factual issue is raised
by the fifth, sixth, and seventh defenses in the original Answer
and Counterclaim. That these material issues of fact, plus others,
rjreraain is established by the affidavits executed June 29 and June
c^O, 1988, and previous pleadings and affidavits from Defendants.
a
Even though Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on the first so(tailed cause of action, they have still not listed the undisputed
facts that Rule 2.8(d) requires be listed. Accordingly, Defendants

Rtfherewith

set forth the disputed material facts apparent from the
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cause of action:
1.
The Complaint seeks not to "renew" but to
change and improve the judgment made April 18,
1979 in CiviJ No. 17630. The First Cause of
Action is not just an effort to "ruboer stamp"
or extend the prior judgment.
It is an
attempt to amend it.
2.
The Defendants are entitled to have most
of the prior judgment satisfied from the
payments,
uncredited
bid
made
by
the
Plaintiff, and equitable offsets acquired by
the Plaintiffs in Mr. and Mrs. Von Stocking's
real property.
3.
The Defendants are entitled to more
credit than 3866.47. That December 31, 1984
payment
should
be credited
against
the
principal amount of the judgment and not to
the interest that the Plaintiffs accrued after
the judgment. Defendants are also entitled to
an equitable offset from the judgment for the
Stocking property of between 311,000 and
$27,000 (approximately) and to credit for the
amount Plaintiffs bid at a sheriff's sale,
Decemoer 3, 1986, in the amount of 320,000,
plus costs.
4.
The most Plaintiffs are entitled to under
their prior judgment was $21,211.30. There is
no authority or right in that judgment for
costs accrued in attempting to enforce that
judgment to be added to the renewal claim.
Yet, Plaintiffs have sued for $41,751.43.
5.
The amcunts claimed by the renewal
complaint in excess of $21,211.30 are not
allowed, because action on the contract is
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barred by the statute of limitations, §78-1223 U.C.A. (third defense), and the holding in
Yergensen v« Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402 Pac 2d
696 (1965):

The note or contract is replaced

by the judgment

terms, and the judgment did

not include all the terms in the contract.
6.

A new judgment in a form asked for by the

Plaintiffs would

not be a renewal

limiting the judgment
original

judgment,

judgment,

to the language of the

and

the

firs*: cause

of

action should not replace the actual judgment
from Civil Mo. 17630.
7.

Attorney's fees on renewing the judgment

are not allowed by contract or by the prior
judgment in this case.
8.

The filing for bankruptcy protection by

the

Emporium

after

the

Partnership,

judgment

November,

in Civil

No.

1979,

17630

was

granted April 18, 1979, in fact bars renewing
that

judgment

Bankruptcy

without

Court.

That

permission

of

the

permission

has not

been granted.
9.

The

amount

Plaintiffs1

of

failure

their claim

to reduce

by the $20,000

the
(plus

costs) bid December 3, 1986, is alleged to be
a

fraudulent

act

against

Defendants, for which
they

are

entitled

the court

and

the

the Plaintiffs assert

to

actual

and

punitive

damages.
10.

Plaintiffs'

equitable
Stocking's
fraudulent

offset

failure
for

property
act

to

the
is

for which

provide

equity

alleged

any

in
to

the

be

a

the Defendants are

entitled to actual and punitive damages.
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11.

Given the original judgment, the original

complaint and the original findings of fact,
to accrue

interest after April

18, 1979, on

the judgment sought to be renewed is in fact
a

modification

material and

of

the

illegal.

judgment

which

Plaintiffs

1

is

action

does not just renew a judgment, but really is
an effort to modify it by asking for amounts
in excess of what can be due from the face of
the judgment.
give

Defendants claim the failure to

equitable

offsets and

credit

for

bids

made was not; only fraudulent but also illegal
and malicious and that it disrupted the lives
and property of the Defendants, for which the
Defendants are entitled to actual and punitive
damages.
12.

Defendants have alleged, and supported by

their affidavits, a basis for their claim that
Plaintiffs

and/or

fraudulently
promises

and

made

their

counsel

intentionally

to

Defendants

equitable credit

to be allowed

once

to

belonging

Mr.

and

both

breached

as

to

the

for property
Mrs.

Von

K.

Stocking .
13.

Plaintiffs

promises
claim

and/or

about

their

counsel

the percentage

(whatever

of

made

the total

it is) to be paid from each

Defendant, which promises were relied on by
the

Defendants

Plaintiffs,
entitled
14.

for

to

were

which

actual

Defendants

Plaintiffs or

and

and

have

breached

the

by

the

Defendants

are

punitive
alleged

their counsel

damages.
that

the

encumbered

real

property of the Defendants or caused documents
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asserting claims against real property to be
filed or recorded, when in fact these claims
were groundless and for which the Defendants
are entitled to treble actual damages or
31,000, whichever is greater, as well as
attorney's fees and costs as allowed by
U.C.A. §38-9-1.
The foregoing material issues of fact all arise from the First
Cause of Action, Answer and Counterclaim,* items 12, 13, and 14 are
also applicable to the Third Party Complaint (along with others).
They are disputed factual issues between the parties.
Their
existence forecloses granting summary judgment.
Most of the foregoing disputed fact issues are plainly
apparent from the pleaaings and affidavits, and need no argument.
However, Defendants argue the more important ones and respond as
follows to the Plaintiffs1 Memorandum.

EFFECT OF COURT OF APPEALS RULING
The Court of Appeals ruled that Defendants' appeal of issues
raised in Civil No. 17630 was not timely. The ruling did not
address the merits of any other issue.
It particularly did not
discuss methods of modification of judgments, and did not discuss
crediting amounts Plaintiffs bid or equitable offsets.
Because
the court ruled only on the timeliness question, it did not examine
the relationship between the language of the judgment, the
complaint it was based upon, or the application of §15-1-4 U.C.A.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was February 12, 1988.
The Amended Answer and Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint were
signed September 23, 1987.
The Court of Appeals1 decision does
not address the issues raised by the current case.
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WHAT EXACTLY DOES THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT PROVIDE?
The May 18, 1987 Memorandum Decision by this court that "There
is included in the renewal, continuing interest on the judgment.
This is not a modification." can be explained. The Court assumed
that the original judgment allowed interest to accrue.
It is
important to examine the original judgment to realise it did not
provide for the accrual of interest after the judgment. The fact
that it did not was not a mere oversight. That the judgment did
not provide for accrual of interest after the judgment date is not
cured by U.C.A. §15-1-4.
November 12, 1986, the Plaintiffs admitted in pleadings filed
in this court in Civil No. 17630, that the judgment was "not as
clear" as it should be, but they wanted to rely on state statute
to have interest on this judgment anyway. Mr. Daines said:
Although the judgment language is not as clear
as one would like, Plaintiffs believe it is
sufficiently clear that State law provides
that all judgments require interest and that
it does not need to be restated in each
judgment which is filed by the court,
(Response to Motion, November 12, 1986, Civil
No. 17630).
That is an adnussion the judgment does not support post
judgment interest. Plaintiffs made the same admission to the Court
of Appeals on. page '7 of their Respondent's Brief wherein they
stated:
The judgment recites that the interest is at
12* but does not specifically state that it
continues to accrue after rendition of the
•judgment . (Id . page 7, emphasis added.)
Of caufee the Appeals Court did not address the issue on the
merits, but the admission proves Defendants1 point. Plaintiffs
justify the omission and their accrual of the interest by relying
on Dairy Distributors, Inc. v. Local 976, 12 Utah 2d 85, 396 Pac
2d 47 (1964) and S15-1-4 U.C.A. to argue the merits of their claim.
They also try to explain what must have been intended by the
inclusion of the figure $2,180 for interest, and the language "from
6

?Afi

the date hereof".

They explain that it must have meant from a

period before the judgment entered until the date of the judgment.
They specifically say "the date hereof' must mean the date of the
Complaint. That's probably true, but the fact remains the judgment
is deficient.

It does not allow accrual of post judgment interest.

The judgment has nev€?r been amended.
THE VERY WORDS
What the judgment says is consistent with the prayer in the
complaint which only asks for "interest additional at the rate of
12% per annum unt i1 judgment" ; and is consistent with the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law which only provided for "accrued
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from date hereof until paid
in the amount of $2,130" (Record pages 2, 37, & 3 8 ) . The judgment
itself has the same identical language.

It simply grants interest

of a limited amount, but all the Complaint asked for, and does not
provide for interest to accrue after judgment.
Since the judgment does not provide for interest to accrue,
Plaintiffs had to.rely on the Dairy Distributors case and U.C.A.
§15-1-4 to try and argue that interest can accrue after judgment.
Even though the Appeals Court never got to the merits of these
arguments, discussion is appropriate.

The distinction in Dairy

Distributors is that there a clerk erred and did not fill in the
blanks provided in the judgment form for interest after judgment.
The reasons that case cannot control this case are: (1) there were
no blanks to fill in; (2) there was no inadvertance by the clerk;
and, (3) the court n€>ver made a finding that interest can accrue
after judgment.

Nor was it logical the court should have allowed

interest to accrue, because the Complaint, for whatever reason,
failed to ask for it.
Similarly, solely

because

Dairy

Distributors

was a clerk

error, §15-1-4 U.C.A. could be applied to allow interest to accrue
on the Dairy Distributors judgment.
that way here.
Any

However, it can't be applied

Section 15-1-4 U.C.A. says that:
judgment

rendered

on a

lawful

contract
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shall conform thereto and shal L bear the
interest agreed upon by the parties, which
shal 1 be specified in the judgment; other
judgments shall bear interest at the rate of
12% per annum, (Emphasis added).
As can be seen, the judgment did not provide what it had to
provide in order to give the Plaintiffs what they now ask for.
This oversight by Plaintiffs' counsel and failure to amend by the
Plaintiffs must be applied to their detriment. The Defendants are
entitled to the benefit of the pleadings and the statute. The
Plaintiffs have not shown any authority to the contrary.
Particularly, the Plamtiffs have failed to show any authority or
justification for an attempt to amend a judgment by filing a writ
of execution in an amount other the amount provided for in the
original judgment.
Any renewal judgment must be limited to the specific language
of the original judgment, defective as it may have been, because
it was not amended.
WHAT ABOUT AMENDING THE JUDGMENT?
A long list of Utah decisions dating from 1895 squarely
support the position that the only basis for changing the amount
of money allowed by a judgment is for the judgment itself to be
amended. Richards v„ Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 Pac.2d 143
(1970), is often referred to for the distinction between judicial
and clerical errors. The court must remember that the problem with
the judgment in Civil No. 17630 was not a clerical one from having
wrongly recorded a judgment as entered. It was intentional or it
was at most a judicial error. That does not mean the judge erred,
but that there was an error by someone in renderring the judgment
actually entered
It wasn't a last minute error in this case,
because the judgment conformed to the wording in the original
pleadings. Richards held that a judicial error can only be cured
by a timely motion for a new trial, amended findings, appeal, or
a new action. Here, tne error wholly belongs to the Plaintiffs and

8
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their counsel , and the judgment entered does not provide for postjudgment interest.

Any writs of execution are in conflict with the

judgment, and since the judgment is still contested, must be read
as subordinate to the judgment.

They certainly cannot amend the

judgment.
Moreover, the court does not have jurisdiction to unilaterally
change the judgment even if it wants to prefer the Plaintiffs.

In

Benson v. Anderson, 14 Utah 334, 47 Pac. 142 (1896) the Supreme
Court said that judicial tribunals may not exercise revisionary
power over a judgment after it has passed away from the judge.
There, an effort

to change a judgment six months after

entered was considered

In Frost , et al . \ .

too late.

it was
District

Court , et al . , 96 Utah 106, 83 Pac.2d 737 (1938) the Supreme Court
said " . . .

after the time for appeal has expired, the court has

no power to modify a judgment in a substantial or material respect.
This is well settled law."

Since there was neither an appeal of

the judgment, nor a timely modification attempted, it certainly
cannot be changed now that the Plaintiffs wish to renew it.
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AMOUNT OF PLAINTIFFS1 BID
PLUS EQUITABLE OFFSETS AS CREDITS AGAINST THE
JUDGMENT, WHATEVER IT IS.
The
allowed

parties

dispute

whether

additional

toward.s the judgment, whatever

credits

should

oe

it is. Depending on tne

total amount, the judgment may have been paid.

Plaintiffs admitted

that they have bid amounts which have not been credited on tne
judgment. December 3, 1986 Defendants bid the sum of $20,000, plus
costs, against the judgment.

Plaintiffs refused to credit this

because they do not think they are obligated to credit their bid.
Plaintiffs1

bid was an irrevocable oi-fer.

Rule 69(e)(4),

U.R.C.P. says that the failure of a purchaser to pay the bid is
contempt of court. Plaintiffs admitted to making the bid, and now
claim

that

Rule

69(g)(2)

U.R.C.P.

excuses

them

from payment.

Actually, Rule 69(g)(2) U.R.C.P. only allows the purcl^aser to oe
exempt from his bid if there are irregularities in the proceedings
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of the sale or the property sold was not suDject to execution and
sale.

Moreover, Rule 69(g) (2) U.R.C.P. is only to give third party

purchasers at a sale either a judgment against a creditor or a
judgment against a debtor if the third party purchaser does not end
up with the property bid for.

It does not address the question of

what happens if the Plaintiffs themselves bid for the property,
but regret the bid later.
In oral argument, Plaintiffs said that the Defendants alleged
irregularity.

They offered to provide evidence of this.

not provide the evidence in their Memorandum.

They did

The Defendants have

not argued irregularities in the sale or an/thing else sufficient
to allow the Plaintiffs to be excused

from the requirement

that

they credit the bid. What Defendants did was to argue before the
sale that there should be no execution sale because Defendants had
no equity in the property, notwithstanding, Plaintiffs went ahead.
They cannot now say they should not have to pay.

Rule 69(e)(4)

U.R.C.P. provides:
Every bid shall be deemed an irrevocable
offer; and if the purchaser refuses to pay the
amount bid by him for the property struck off
to him at a sale under execution, the officer
may again sell the property at any time to the
highest bidder, and if any loss is occasioned
thereby, the party refusing
to pay, in
addition to being liable on such bid, is
guil.ty of a contempt of court and may be
punished
accordingly.
When a purchaser
refuses to pay, the officer may also, in his
discretion, thereafter reject any other bid of
such person. (Emphasis added.)
The Plaintiffs
irregularities
property

in

should

have
the

not

neither

sale.

have

They

been

Plaintiffs is not likely now.

admitted
have

sold.

nor alleged
not

Such

alleged
an

specific
that

allegation

the
by

After all, one of the issues in the

Amended Counterclaim is whether they wrongfully proceeded to sell
the property.
acknowledge
Nevertheless,

Perhaps Plaintiffs regret

that
they

Defendants
sold

all

had
of

10

no

the bid because

equity

Defendants'

in

the

right,

they

property.
title
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and

interest, and

bid

a certain

amount

for

it, and

they must

be

compelled to enter a satisfaction of judgment for the amount b*d.
This must be done before there can be determination made of what
is owed on any possible renewal judgment.

While it is true that

Defendants opposed the sale, after the saie they did not allege
irregularities or anf basis for Plaintiffs to now claim their bid
is not binding on them.

Plaintiffs were represented by counsel and

insisted on the sale; and even if they gee nothing for the bid,
they are obligated to credit the judgment with the amount bid.
Randall v. Valley Title, 681 Pac. 2d 219

In

(Utah, 1984) the Utah

Supreme Court required a creditor bidding at a sale to credit his
judgment and discharge the claim to the extent of the bid.
April 24, 1987, this court required the Plaintiffs to enter
a partial satisfaction for the $20,000, pius costs of sale bid.
This has never been done, and is apparently a disputed material
question of fact.

Such a requirement

went beyond

the court's

Memorandum Decision of December^12, 1986 in Civil No. 17630 where
the court told the Plaintiffs that as to any amounts Plaintiffs
acknowledge receipt of that are not shown as partial satisfactions,
that these should be acknowledged in the dockett book.

Where the

Plaintiffs have acknowledged they made the bid and have not entered
the partial satisfaction, it is also apparent that the bid should
be credited to the judgment. If it is not, there is certainly a
material issue of fact to be resolved before any summary judgment
can be seriously considered

by any court that has reviewed the

pleadings.
The Order entered April 24, 1987 provides in the Findings of
Fact:
9.
Plaintiffs have
not
filed
partial
satisfaction of judgment required after the
December 3. 1986, sheriff's sale, where
$20,000 wa3 paid by the Plaintiffs toward the
judgment.

The Conclusions of Law in the same Order provided:

11
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7.
Plaintiffs are required to first enterpart lal satisfaction of judgment from the sale
of one Defendant's interest in property from
December 3, 1986.
From the foregoing, the court granted the Defendants1 motion
to quash and struck v*ith prejudice the subpoenas duces tecum the
Plaintiffs tried to get the court to enforce.
EQUITABLE OFFSET FOR STOCKING PROPERTY
The court has received affidavits from Von Stocking setting
fortWthe basis for an equitable claim against
their counsel against

the Plaintiffs and

the value of this judgment for the equity

taken from Mr. Stocking and his wife by the Plaintiffs. August 29,
1983, the attorney for the Plaintiffs wrote a letter, previously
entered with the pleading dated April 20, 1987. The letter written
by Mr. George Daines admitted

that Von Stocking's property was

worth between $45,000 and $60,000. The letter attested to the fact
that some of the equity in that property should go to offset the
judgment

that

Plaintiffs'

own

the

Plaintiffs

admission

in

now
the

seek

to

letter,

renew.

the

property was between $11,808.06 and $26,808.06.

Even

equity

in

by
that

A material issue

of fact exists as to the amount, if any, of this equity that should
be

credited

support
valid

against

the

the conclusion
claims

Referencing

against

judgment.

that
the

Mr. Stocking's

affidavits

the issues in the Counterclaim
Plaintiffs

and

their

are

attorneys.

the subject matter of Von Stocking's property being

credited to this judgment, the letter from Mr. Daines, dated August
29, 1983, says in part:
Norm Barber and I have examined the Von
Stocking home and believe that its worth would
probably be somewhere in the range of $45,000
to $60,000 (first paragraph).
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Anticipating that this (sic) is going to take
several weeks to determine what the appraisal
of that home is and the likelihood that the
home is insufficient to pay the full amount of
the judgment, I think it is advisable that we
continue with the Supplemental Order that was
started this week. (Third paragraph.)
Read together with the affidavits of Mr. Stocking, it is clear
that an equitable offset is owed to the Plaintiffs for this
property, which the Plaintiffs acquired for $33,191.94 on November
4, 1983.
The difference between $33,191.94 and $45,000 is
$11,808.06, and between $33,191.94 and $60,000 is $26,808.06.
Either amount makes <= material difference to what could be owed on
a renewal judgment, if any.
LEGAL ISSUES OPPOSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Besides the material fact questions discussed in detail
heretofore, there are numerous legal questions which have been
raised by the affirmative defenses, but not briefed by Plaintiffs
in their motion. Defendants refer the court to prior pleadings
filed in this action, including Defendants1 Motion to Strike, filed
in August, 1987 and the Memorandum and Reply Memorandum in support
thereof. See also the memorandums supporting Defendants' in their
Motion to Dismiss and Strike, filed on or about April 20, 1987 and
May 8, 1987. . While some of the matters are beyond the partial
summary judgment motions here, the legal questions addressed in the
affirmative defenses by the Defendants still stand.
Plaintiffs acuse Defendants of wrongfully filing an Amended
Counterclaim and a Third Party Complaint seeking damages not only
against Plaintiffs, but also their counsel.
These pleadings,
however, were not filed until after the Plaintiffs first filed an
Amended Complaint which added the so-called Second and Third
Causes of Action. That brought the pleadings well beyond a mere
rubber stamp renewal of the judgment. Even though this was all
done previous to the Appeals Court decision in February of 1988,
the Appeals Court decision did not address the legal issues or
13

merits of this case, and all of these legal questions still exist.
The Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint are
justified because the Plaintiffs failed to credit bids and enter
equitable offsets to this judgment that their own letters or
orders of this court require. Where they have knowingly failed
and refused to deal fairly, Defendants are entitled to bring a
Counterclaim and seek the damages prayed for. If in the past the
court has failed to recognize the validity of the Defendants'
claim, particularly that the initial judgment cannot be expanded
merely by liberal drafting of writs and loose reading of pleadings,
the court can still correct the Plaintiffs. It must restrict them
to a renewal of only the actual judgment, once all the material
facts have been resolved.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have repeatedly admitted they are applying post
judgment interest. The legal availability of that right has been
shown by this pleading and prior arguments to not exist. It is
time the court addressed this issue thoroughly, because it has not
been addressed on the merits heretofore. The pleadings made on
behalf of Defendants have not been frivolous, are made in good
faith, and are consistent with what the Supreme Court and the
statutes of this State have provided.
It also recognizes the
limitations of the Plaintiffs' initial pleadings.
Defendants
request this court restrict the Plaintiffs to those pleadings.
The Plaintiffs have not provided any authority as to why they
should not credit the $20,000, plus cost of sale bid. They have
not provided any authority or justification why they should not
make an equitable offset from Mr. Stocking's equity. They have
provided no authority for how a writ of execution on a judgment can
somehow amend the judgment to the advantage of the Plaintiffs when
they later seek to renew it. They have not provided a list of
undisputed facts which they claim are undisputed.
Numerous
material facts exist. There are also substantial legal questions

14
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which foreclose the granting of any of the motions for summary
judgment or the other motions before this court.
At some point in time, Defendants are entitled to have argued
and presented the questions of post judgment interest. This has
never come before this court or the Appeals Court and needs to be
thoroughly addressed by this court at this time.
The court should reject the motions for partial summary
judgment and the motion for sanctions. The court should also
consider dismissal of the renewal judgment effort because it
clearly goes beyond the scope allowed by the initial judgment.
Defendants argued in open court that if the renewal effort was
merely an effort to rubber stamp the prior judgment that there
would be less defense, once the credits and offsets were resolved.
Defendants have demonstrated a sufficient basis to show that the
original judgment may already have been satisfied. The court could
only go ahead on what damages the Defendants are entitled to for
excess recovery by the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have tried to expand
this effort beyond all legal reason or justification.
Thenefforts are not equitable and not justifiable. The court should
take whatever steps are necessary to restrict any possible renewal
judgment to the limits allowed by the underlying judgment. The
court cannot correct prior mistakes in that underlying judgment,
and is itself bound by the errors of counsel made on behalf of
Plaintiffs.
Each of the affirmative defenses discussed herein or referred
to was not resolved by the Appeals Court decision of February 12,
1988. That decision limited itself solely to the question of the
timeliness of an appeal from the underlying judgment. It did not
address the merits of the questions raised herein, but limited
itself solely to the timeliness issue. The factual issues before
this court include: What is the amount of the prior judgment? Has
that judgment been paid? Should there be equitable offsets against
the judgment? Are the Plaintiffs required to honor the bids they
have made?
What amount, if any, should be renewed?
The

1Q
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Plaintiffs' fraud or misrepresentation in seeking to enforce this
3uagment i,s an issue raised by the original Counterclaim and Third
Party Complaint. Legal issues that exist in this court include the
jurisdiction of this court to enter a judgment against the
partnership or general partners where the partnership is in
bankruptcy. Also, whether a judgment can be renewed against joint
obligors where Von Stocking may have been released by negotations
between himself and George Daines. Whether the Plaintiffs can seek
additional attorney's fees is an issue. The statute of limitations
has been raised as a defense to 'all efforts to expand from the
literal terms of the judgment. Factually, except for the questions
of amount of judgment and payment, a rubber stamp renewal of the
previous judgment's exact language, with all its failings could be
proper.
However, these material issues of fact and the legal
issues that oppose Plaintiffs restrict entry of any partial
judgment at this time. The motions should all be rejected.
Dated this
day of August, 1988.

kr^^iM<y
/ I / hu
®yft
Raymond N. Malouf
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
/ -7*'

I hereby-, cert if y that on the / / day of August, 1988, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM, OPPOSING PENDING MOTIONS, Civil No. 25616,
was mailed postage prepaid to the following:
N. George Daines, Esq.
DAINES & KANE
108 North Main
Logan, Utah 84321
Secretary
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Paymond N. Malouf/bh #2067
Attorney for Defendants and
Third Party Plaintiffs
150 East 200 North. Suite D
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: 801/752-9380
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR CACHE COUNTY, UTAH

NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS
TO PROPOSED FINDINGS
AND JUDGMENTS AND
REQUEST FOR FINAL
RULING

Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP, et al . ,
Defendants and Third Party
Plaintiffs
vs.
N. GEORGE DAINES and
DAINES & KANE,

Civil No. 25616
Third Party Counterclaim
Defendants

COME NOW the Defendants and give notice of their objections
to the proposed Findings and Judgments being held by the Court for
consideration

after

September

12.

pursuant to Rule of Practice 2.9.

These objections are given
They pertain to the proposed

Findings and Judgments entered as a result of the August 22, 1938.
Memorandum Decision issued by this Court. That Memorandum Decision
pertained to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
(1) the first Cause of Action and initial Counterclaim and (2) the
Amended counterclaim and Third Party Complaint.

The Court granted

'dumber _ _ _ _ _ _ _
i
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partial summary judgment on the first Cause of Action, the initial
Counterclaim and the Amended Counterclaim.

Defendants want the

benefit of Rule 54(b) . U.R.C.P., and request that any order entered
be certified as a f .nal order.
The objections are as follows:
1.

THE PROPOSED FINDINGS AND JUDGMENTS ATTEMPT TO EXFAND

JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS FROM A JOINT JUDGMENT TO A JOINT
AND SEVERAL JUDGMENT.

The original Judgment

on April 18, 1979,

said:
It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed
that the Plaintiffs have recovered judgment
against the Defendants in the amount due on a
promissory note in the amount of $15,000 plus
accrued interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from date hereof until paid in the amount of
$2,180, attorney fees in the amount of $4,000
and Court costs in the amount of $31.30.
Any renewal judgment should be limited to the specific language,
considering particularly that it (1) says nothing about joint and
several liability and (2) only allows $2,180 of interest which was
consistent with the Complaint that specifically asked for interest
at 12% until judgment.
getting a new date.

The renewal judgment

is only changed by

A renewal judgment is not an amended judgment.

The only variations

that

should

be permitted

by the Court

are

adjustments for payments or credits.
Neither the original Judgment nor the Complaint used the words
"jointly

and

severally".

judgment to insert
did not exist

It

is

impermissible

for

a

renewal

the language "jointly and severally" where it

in the original Judgment.

2

The original Complaint

did not allege joint and several liability, and statutes provided
liability could only be joint*
The Complaint to renew the Judgment never alleged joint and
several liability, either.

The relevant section of the Utah Code,

Section 48-1-12, makes a distinction between joint liability and
joint and several 1 iabil ity. Any renewal judgment may not make the
Defendants jointly and severally liable where the prior judgment
did not.

This would be an impermissible modification of the prior

Judgment, an amendement

unsupported

by fact, law or pleadings.

Conclusion of Law No., 6 and the Partial Summary Judgment must be
changed to remove all statements about joint and several liability.
As will

be shown

in Point

No. 4, the form

should

be

further

modified because of this issue.
2.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE MISCALCULATED THE AMOUNT DUE. The total

of the sums represented by the initial Judgment is $21,211.30. Of
that, $2,180 is interest.
only.

The

Court

calculating

more

Judgment.

Even

Interest is allowed in that total sum

has made
interest
if that

an

interlocutory

is not

ruling

a modification

is so, the form of

of

here

that

the

first

the Judgment

has

interest calculated on interest and is thus in the wrong amount for
March 25, 1987.

The form then proceeds to calculate interest on

the total amount after that date.

This amounts to again charging

interest on interest, which has not been allowed by this Court.
Also, in considering

the $866.47 offset, since that amount

was

considered paid December 31, 1982, interest should be calculated
on that figure from 1982 to determine the amount to be subtracted
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from the total.
In addition, proposed Finding of Fact No. 6 and Conclusion of
Law

No.

7

refer

to

a

later

determination

of

the

effect

Plaintiffs' $20,000, plus costs, bid made December 3, 1986.

of
The

alleged costs of the renewal complaint probably include the cosi;s
of

that

bid.

No cost

affidavit

has

been

submitted.

It

is

inappropriate for any partial judgment to enter for a total amount *
where about half the total, the offset for the bid, is reserved.
The total sum of any partial Judgment should be reduced by the
amount

of

the costs o£

$20,000 plus

December 3, 1986.

the Sheriff's

sale as of

Requiring the Plaintiffs to do this now would

be completely consistent with this Court's April 24, 1987 ruling
in Civil No. 17630 requiring

the Plaintiffs to enter a partial

satisfaction for the 320,000 plus the costs of the sale.

That has

never

proposed

been

done,

and

it

is

pleadings to not do it: now.
now, before partial

contemptuous

for

these

Requiring that this reduction be made

judgment

is entered

is consistent

with the

Court's prior ruling and proper under the circumstances.

This was

an issue which was previously decided, and the Court should require
the Plaintiffs to follow its prior ruling.
3.

THE DEFENDANTS

NEED TO BE

IDENTIFIED PROPERLY.

The

Complaint to renew the Judgment named the partnership and the three
alleged general partners of The Emporium Partnership. Of the three
partners named, Don A. White, Jr., has never appeared.
clearly lacks personal jurisdiction over him.
to this action.

The Court

He is not a party

Therefore, he cannot be a party to the Partial

4

Summary

Judgment.

Therefore,

the

Judgment

against "the Defendants", using that term.

cannot

be entered

It must be entered only

against the Defendants who are actually parties to the lawsuit, and
except Don White, if any Judgment is to be entered at all.
4.

THE COURT CAN NO LONGER GET JURISDICTION ON MR. WHITE,

SO "JOINT LIABILITY" CAN NO LONGER EXIST, OR THE JUDGMENT MUST BE
FURTHER REDUCED.

Don White was not even served.

The Complaint to

renew the Judgment was filed March 27. 1987, some 17 months prior
to the entry of the Court's August 22, 1988, Memorandum Decision
allowing partial summary judgment.

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)

requires that the Summons must be served within one year of the
filing of the Complaint or the action is deemed to be dismissed.
However, where some of the Defendants were served, the others may
be served or appear at anytime before trial.

If the Court is going

to grant partial summary judgment on the first Cause of Action,
then there never will be anything
about.

Therefore,

the summary

for Don White to be in trial
judgment

proceeding

has

to be

considered all. the trial he could have had if he had been a party.
He was not, and it is too late for him to be served.
action cannot

now be brought

against

him

because

A separate
it would

commenced beyond eight years after the original Judgment.
Don

White

is out

of

the case

because

Plaintiff and the decision of the Court
This action ot

of

Thus,

the actions of

to grant

judgment

be

the
now.

the Plaintiff should be considered equivalent to a

release of a co-obligor, and the results should be governed by Utah
Code Section 15-4-5.

That Section provides that
5

if an obligee

(Barbers) releases an obligor

(White) without

reserving

rights

against co-obligors (Stocking, Malouf, The Emporium) but knows the
obligor released
the

obligee's

satisfied

(White) did not pay his share of the debt, then

(Barbers')

claim

against

a co-obligor

shall

be

to the amount which the obligee knew or had reason to

know that the discharged obligor was bound to pay.

If the obligee

didn't know the obligor hasn't paid what he's supposed to pay, the
claim against the co-obligor still has to be reduced by the amount
of the fractional share released.
The

foregoing

means

that

Don White's

share

of

the dett,

whatever it was, should be subtracted from the Judgment awarded in
the First Cause of Action.

Heretofore, Plaintiffs alleged each of

the Defendants owed one third.

This was disputed

in the prior

action, where it was argued that ex-Defendant Don White owed more
than one third.

Even giving the Plaintiffs the benefit of their

argument, the total debt and proposed Judgment should te offset by
at

least

1/3 because one joint obligor has been released.

before entry of

the partial

Judgment

a hearing

Or,

must be had to

determine the amount of reduction for what his share was.
This argument
liability.
rather

obligors.

and several"

Because this Judgment is a joint liability judgment,

than

liability

relates to the issue of "joint

a

on

joint
the

and

whole

several

sum

In fact, because

several, a new

Judgment

cannot

liability
be

had

this judgment

should

not enter

judgment,
against

several

the

other

never was joint and
at all.

There

is a

difference between joint liability and joint and several liability.
6

Th« previous* reference to U.C.A. Section 46~i-i2 ia a beginning
distinction.

In the prior action, this issue was collaterally

approached by both parties in an effort to allow collection only
of proper shares from each defendant.
to see

whether

argument,

there can

even

Here the distinction is used

be a

there was disagreement.

judgment.

In

the prior

However, applying

only

the

Plaintiffs1 own argument, it is at least correct that a difference
between "joint liability" and "joint and several liability" is that
in a joint and several liability situation one can proceed against
one party in the legal action without joining the other parties.
On

the other

Plaintiff

hand,

where

there

is only

joint

liability,

the

is required to proceed against all of the parties (see

Mr. Daines1 pleading in Civil No. 17630 dated September 4, 1986,
page 3 ) .

Since Plaintiffs did not proceed against all parties,

they should not get judgment against any.
Certainly it is too late to change the original Judgment from
joint liability to joint and several liability.
has said the original judgment is fixed.)

(The Court itself

In this case, joint and

several liability was neither pleaded nor granted.

Therefore, the

Judgment may only be joint, and Don White had to be joined as a
party in order for there to be renewal judgment.
there can be no Judgment entered.

Since he was not,

Prior rulings of this Court do

not address the question of whether a judgment

can be entered

against some, but not all of the Defendants, but only address the
question

of

whether

the

Plaintiffs

individually against joint Defendants.

could

proceed

to

collect

The Court allowed them to,

227

but that judgment has expired.
against

all

joint

obligors.

Now Plaintiffs chose net to proceed
Accordingly,

Judgment

cannot

be

^fltftfc-sd fi#w b««AU«to there waa never joint and several liability.
It is too late for there to be joint liability, because Don White
was released by Plaintiffs.
Sufficient reasons have been shown to show why there should
be

no partial

Judgment

judgment

entered.

forecloses a renewal

The

nature

of

judgment

unless

the

renewed against all of the Defendants.

the

original

Judgment

is

It can't be because one of

the joint obligors is not a party to the action.

Alternatively,

and only if this argument is rejected. Defendants submit that the
judgment must be reduced by Don White's share and the Findings and
Conclusions must be restricted to only provide judgment against the
two Defendants who are actually parties to the action.
6.
ISSUES.

THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING DID NOT DEAL WITH SUBSTANTIVE
It addressed only timeliness.

Therefore references in

Finding of Fact No. 7 and Conclusion of Law No. 8 should not refer
to that decision.
7.
FINDINGS.

The Memorandum Decision did not refer to it.

THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES IS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROPER
The proposed form of Findings and the Judgment

refer

to the $3,000 for attorney fees awarded as a penalty for seeking
remedies after issues have been settled, and repeating arguments
"although

tne wordLng

may

pleadings

asking

attorneys'

for

be different".
fees

on

Yet, there were no
the

partial

summary

judgment. The Motions for Partial Summary Judgment did not include
a request for attorneys' fees.

Plaintiffs suggested this issue be

8
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deferred.

No fee affidavits were submitted.

to justify a finding
U.C.A.

Section

There was no evidence

for attorneys' fees in any amount,

78-27-56,

the Court

can

only

award

Urder

reasonable

attorneys1 fees to a prevailing party if the Court determines that
an action
brought

or defense of

or

findings.

asserted

the action was without

in good

faith.

The

Court

merit
made

and

not

no such

The Court ought to be able to justify the amount of its

award, and have made findings supporting

it.

Instead, the Court

found the Plaintiffs were burdened by more legal fees to answer
matters previously adjudicated.

However, there was no basis to

find Plaintiffs were burdened with attorneys1 fees.
assumption.

The

case

may

be

with

Plaintiffs1

It is only

attorney

on a

contingency fee arrangement.
Where is the Court's analysis?

If requests of Defendants uere

previously decided, a fact disputed by Defendants, why couldn't the
Memorandum Decision refer to what they were and where they had teen
decided?

Defendants had just submitted a detailed list of disputed

facts and leg^l arguments about the amount of judgment and offsets.
To expect a reasoned decision is reasonable and not asserted in
bad faith.
the

For example, the Appeals Court said the timeliness of

issues raised

was the reason

claims in the appeal.

Defendants'

Somehow Plaintiff thinks that resolves the

post judgment interest issue.
said

it was rejecting

Yet, nowhere has the Appeals Court

that the language of the original Judgment

was amended by

issuance of a Writ not in conformity with the judgment's language.
Since the prior judgment was allegedly not paid, writ language is

9
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moot. Moreover, this Court has never addressed the question of how
the judgment language, referred to verbatim in the first paragraph
of these objections, has ever been stretched to provide for postDefendants1 brief pointed out where Plaintiffs

judgment interest.
admitted

the judgment

language had problems.

Assuming arguendo

the Court has ruled on that issue, it could only have done so in
the context of execution writs which have never been satisfied.
Since the writs were not satisfied any effort to renew the judgment
should refer to the prior Judgment itself, not the writs.
1987, in a Memorandum

Decision

the Court

judgment wasn't a modification.

said

Hay 18,

interest

Where was the analysis?

on the
There

hasn't ever been one. The only basis to say that the post-judgment
interest question
judgment.

has been resolved

Writs

do

not

amend

is to say a writ

judgments.

This

amends a

Court,

the

Plaintiffs and the Defendants have all said it is too late to amend
the original Judgment.

The Court should make an analysis of the

language and Complaint from the prior judgment and explain itself
clearly at some point.

If it has, to find contempt

it should be

able to point to a violation of a clear previous order.

Where has

the Court ruled on the post judgment interest issue?
Another
offsets

for

major
Von

argument

Stocking's

raised
home

by

and

Defendants
for

the

bid

was

that

of

of 320,000.

Defendants argued the ruling requiring that the $20,000 be credited
before Plaintiffs proceeded.

There are no findings to justLfy

penalizing Defendants for arguing the bid must be credited before
a Judgment is entered.

Where is the explanation the bid was not

an irrevocable offer?

The Court required crediting the bid in its

order.

Plaintiffs should be in contempt for not doing it.

is

analysis

the

that

this

argument

is

not

well

Where

taken?

The

equitable argument for Mr. Stocking's offer is only redundant if
the Court considers that

it is an issue also raised

suit, Stocking vs. Barber.

in anotner

In granting partial summary judgment

in this action, the Court must be reserving Mr. Stocking's claim
against Barbers in the other action.

Where is the analysis to

explain why a factual issue there is not also a factual issue here?
Defendants tried to relate the two actions.
No penalty of the nature imposed by the Court is supportable
by the pleadings.
Where

there

No basis for the amount of the award was shown.

is insufficient

attorneys' fees, their

evidence of

award

must

the reasonableness of

be vacated.

See

Associated

Industrial Development, Inc. vs. Jewkes, 701 P.2d 486 (Utah 1984).
The

Memorandum

Decision

Defendants are entitled
Court

cannot

support

to a hearing

makes. . The Court

should

specific

findings.

to refute assumptions the

not enter contempt

findings or

judgment in any form.
The

form

improperly

adds

the

name Malouf

Findings No. 1 and 5, and Conclusions 1 and 5.

Law

Offices in

The Court used the

word "he" in referring to Defendants1 counsel's alleged contempt,
and

any

findings or

individual

referred

judgment
to.

should

be

Plaintiffs

limited
are

not

solely

to the

entitled

to

gratuitously insert the name of the law firm.
8.

DEFENDANTS' COUNSEL HAS BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS.

11
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If the

Court is to make a finding of contempt, the Court is obligated to
follow the procedures in U.C.A. Sections 78-32-3 and support it by
an affidavit; Section 78-32-10 and allow a hearing on the issue;
and Section 78-32-11 and make sure the hearing determines actual
loss or injury.
The
contempt

undersigned

believes

the Utah

Statutes on

this civil

issue have been ignored, and the Court had insufficient

information

to make

its decision.

violated by Defendants.

No prior rulings have been

No findings or conclusions justify entry

of a Judgment for contempt.
9.

THIS MATTER SHOULD BE CERTIFIED AS FINAL ORDER.

Pursuant

to U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) if the Court enters any partial
judgment against

summary

the Defendants in this case or on the contempt

issue, the undersigned respectfully requests that the Court certify
any order actually entered as a final judgment for this part of the
case, under Rule 54(b).
an immediate appeal,,

Defendants request this so they may file

Multiple parties are involved, but the other

parties still* involved are not subject to the First Cause of Action
or the contempt proceeding.
DATED this Av- day of September, 1988.

A" ^;///{< iklrM^xcf
Raymond N. Malouf

/
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the /^"^ day of Septenber. 1988. a
true and correct
PROPOSED

FINDINGS

copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS TO
AND

JUDGMENTS, Civil

No. 25616, was

mailed

postage prepaid to the following:
N. George Daines
DAINES & KANE
108 North Main Street, Suite 201
Logan, Utah 84321

^AxO^>—
bcULc^^-^U^Secretary
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N. George Daines - 0803
Attorney for Plaintiffs
DAINES & KANE
108 North Main, Suite 200
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone:
(801) 753-4403

13
AU:-.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE

NORMAN BARBER and HELEN
BARBER, husband and wife,

*
*

RESPONSE TO OBJECTIVES

*
*

Civil No.

Plaintiffs,
vs •
THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP
et a l . ,
Defendants and
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs •
N. GEORGE DAINES and
DAINES & KANE,

25616

*
*
•

Third Party and
Counterclaim Defendants. *

COME

NOW

the

Plaintiffs'

and

respond

to

Defendants'

objections as follows:
1.

Joint Liability:

The form of the judgment tendered now

requests joint liability only.
2.

Amount

Due:

The

amount

due

is

correct

and

has

repeatedly been held correct by the court.
3.
all

the

Defendants':
Defendants'

Attorney Malouf entered an appearance for
with

his

Amended

Answer

and

Counterclaim.

All Defendants' are therefore before the court.
4.

Award of Attorneys Fees:

The attorneys fees awarded are

based upon Rule Sanctions they are not based upon the request set
Number , „T. -,;,.:...;, ^
; u T , ;,.

SEP I 31388

-:7>

2
forth in the Complaint.

Given that the court is proceeding on

the basis of sanctions it is free to decide sanctions on its own
basis.

The court i^ not is not basing its sanctions on any proof

of attorney hours or time involved.

The order presented has been

corrected to cl^xify that situation.
WHEREFORE Plaintiffs' pray that the court deny Defendants'
remaining objective and enter the order as amended.
DATED this

^

day of September, 1988.

DAINES & KANE
/

A
J

/

A /
/

.,.

X

-.. :
,,.-*.,

t

• II

-

H

I

M

.

I

.1

.

1

,-l

N. George Daines

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the , {;
mailed

day of September, 1988, I

a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO

OBJECTIONS to tne following:
Raymond N. Malouf, Jr.
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, UT 84321

^

»

h

.At

,

.\ tfn,

f

W

I

km - i . ii.

/

Secretary
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Raymond N. Malouf/md (#2067)
MALOUF LAW OFFICES
Third Party Plaintiffs
150 East 200 North, Suite D
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone (801) 752-9380
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN
BARBER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS
TO SECOND PROPOSED
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENTS,
AND
REQUEST FOR FINAL RULING

THE EMPORIUM PARTNERSHIP,
et al.
Defendants and Third
Party Plaintiffs
vs.
N. GEORGE DAINES and
DAINES &. KANE,
Third Party Counterclaim
Defendants.

Civil No. 25616

COME NOW the Defendants to this action and give notice of
their objections to the Second Proposed Findings and Judgments
mailed September 16, 1988. Plaintiffs made some small changes to
the proposed forms from nearly identical pleadings previously
offered.
Tjie court already received Defendants' Notice of
Objections to those proposed findings and judgments.
The
objections, dated September 12, 1988, are still applicable to the
Second Proposed Findings and Judgments. Rather than repeat the
arguments, Defendants incorporate those objections by reference
here, and further respond to the short response of the Plaintiffs
as follows:
1.
The second proposed form of the findings and judgment
replaced the words "joint and several" with "joint", evidencing
Plaintiffs1 acceptance of Defendants' argument that, since the
original judgment did not plead or allow judgment to be "joint and

1
CD

1
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several", neither should this one. However, even joint liability
does not exist because Don A. White, Jr. was not made a party and
joined in the suit. This is explained fully on pages 3 through 8
of the September 12, 1988 Notice of Objections. Plaintiffs say the
Amended Answer was on Don's behalf too, but that is net correct.
Why it is not correct is explained in point 3 herein.
2.
The amount due is no more correct than it was before.
The same figures were again used. Plaintiff has not justified
them.
The court has not "repeatedly" held this amount to be
correct. What the court has repeatedly done, over Defendants1
objections, is refuse to quash writs of execution on the old and
prior judgment in amounts in excess of what that judgment allowed.
That judgment has expired.
The renewal judgment form must be
limited to the actual language of the first judgment, no* writs.
If the court enters the proposed form of the judgment, it will be
allowing interest on interest.
It will also not be properiy
crediting the one offset Defendants admit, the $866.47, paid
December 1, 1982. The proposed judgment still includes no offset
for the Plaintiffs1 bid of $20,000, plus costs. That issue the
Plaintiffs propose to resolve by having the court decide it at a
later date. Obviously, if it needs to be decided at a later date,
there are disputed questions of fact and law which have not been
resolved. Summary judgment should not enter if there are disputed
issues to warrant a trial. Bennion v. Amass 28 Utah 2d 216, 500
P.2d 512 (1972). The form presented by the Plaintiffs should not
be used for a renewal judgment.
3.
It is absolutely untrue that an appearance for the
Defendant Don A. White, Jr. was made or intended by the Amended
Answer and Counterclaim. Mr. White was never before the court, as
is shown by the history of the appearances and the pleadings on
this subject:
a.
The Complaint was filed March 27, 1987;
b.
Raymond N. Malouf filed a Motion to Dismiss and to
Strike on his own behalf about April 20, 1987;

2
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c.

May 4, 1987, Von K. Stocking's appearance by counsel

was accepted by the court ;
d.

May 8.

1987, an entry

or appearance for Von K.

Stocking was made in which he joined in Mr. Malouf's motion;
e.

On the same date, May 8,

1987, "The

Defendants

appearing herein" filed a Reply in Support of Defendants1 Motion
to Dismiss and to Strike.

The reterence to Defendants obviously

could only be to the two Defendants who had appeared;
f.

An Answer and Counterclaim on behalf of Von Stocking

and Ray Malouf was filed about July 23, 1987.

The Answer began in

this fashion:
COME NOW Defendants Von K. Stocking and
Raymond N. Malouf, Jr., the only Defendants
who are parties to this action, and reserving
the right to answer for Don A. White, Jr., if
and when he becomes a party, answer the
allegations of the Complaint as follows:
Among the defenses enumerated in the Answer was the Ninth Defense,
which alleged Plaintiffs had waived or compromised

their claim

against

by

each

of

the answering

Defendants, either

agreement to release, operation of law, or latches.

specific

There is and

was no evidence that a Summons had issued to be served on Don A.
White, Jr, or that Don became a party.
g.

Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint about July

23, 1987, more than 3 months after the Complaint was filed.

The

lead paragraph said Plaintiffs re-stated their original Complaint
as the First Cause of Action.

They also added additional parties

as Defendants to a Second and Third Cause of Action. Those parties
were separately served with Summons, unlike Don White.

One of

those additional parties was Logan Savings and Loan Association.
h.

The Amended Answer and Counterclaim was filed about

September 23, 1987, after some motions.

The lead paragraph and

answer to the First Cause of Action read as follows:

3
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COME NOW Defendants herein, with the
exception of Logan Savings and Loan, which is
not represented by the undersigned, and Answer
the Amended Complaint, Counterclaim and claim
as follows:
ANSWER TO FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Defendants incorporate by reference, as
if fully set forth herein, the Answer and
Counterclaim filed July 23, 1987 , together
with each of the First, Second , Thlrd , Fourth ,
Seventh,
Fifth,
Sixth,
Ninth
Eig hth and

Defenses set forth therein •
The original Answer and Counterclaim, which specifically excluded
Don A. White, Jr. (item "f" above) was preserved.
Obviously,
answering on behalf of all Defendants herein except Lcgan Savings
and Loan was not the same as an entry of appearance for Don A.
White, who had not been served. The "Defendants herein'1 did not
include Don A. White. He was only a potential Defendant to the
First Cause of Action. The original Answer and Counterclaim was
not filed on behalf of Don A. White. It specifically made mention
to the fact that he was not a party, and counsel reserved the right
answer for him when he became a party, if ever.
The Amended
Complaint did nothing to make him any more a party than he already
was. Neither did the Amended Answer. Plaintiffs were on notice
from July 23, 1987, at least, that Don White had not been made a
party. If they wanted him included, they would have to serve him.
Plaintiffs have not shown how Don White is a party in this action.
The Amended Answer to the First Cause of Action incorporates
language which excludes him by name. He is not a party in this
action because he has not been served, no entry of appearance was
made on his behalf, and no answer was made on his behalf.
Therefore, all of the objections discussed on pages 3 through
8 in the September 12, 1988 Notice of Objections are still valid.
The judgment is not against Don White. Because the judgment is
only joint and not joint and several, and no effort was made to
join Don White as a party, Plaintiffs waived their claim, elected

4
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not to proceed against all obligors, and are not entitled to have
the judgment entered now.
4.
The attorney's fees proposed have not been justified.
Plaintiffs have made some changes in the proposed form of the
judgment.
They leave the reference to contempt in, but add
references to sanctions, sayx*iig the award is being male pursuant
to Rule 11. The problem with this is two-fold: First, nowhere in
the August 22, 1988, Memorandum Decision is reference made to Rule
11 sanctions, The only reference is to contempt. The objections
already submitted show how the form of the findings and conclusions
and judgment cannot be justified by Utah statutes on contempt.
Apparently the Plaintiffs agreed with this, because they have
gratuitously tried to solve the problem by references to Rule 11.
Secondly, Rule 11 itself only allows sanctions if "a pleading,
motion or other paper is signed in violation of the Rule".
However, the court made no findings that any pleadings were in
violation of the Rules. Moreover, the sanctions which are allowed
by Rule 11 include only reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of whatever pleading was involved, and only allow a
reasonable attorney fee. The decision made by the court was not
supported by any facts or findings about the reasonableness of
expenses or attorney's fees.
The objections prev.ously made
September 12, 1988, on pages 8 through 12 are all still very
correctly taken. No argument against them has been made. The fact
remains the court made its decision on insufficient information and
the proposed form of findings and conclusions and judgments should
not be entered.
If the court has made repeated findings in the past on the
issues the Plaintiffs think are so very clear, the Plaintiff ought
to be able to specifically refer to the analysis the court made.
Plaintiffs have not provided a reference to any analysis to show
how a prior judgment, which has expired, can be amended now by
writs on the prior julgment , which have also expired. There is also
no reference to any analysis to show why the court's April 24, 1987
5

ruling, (requiring Plaintiffs to enter a partial satisfaction for
the bid of $20,000, plus costs), should not be followed before a
judgment is entered. Where is that analysis? If the matter has
been repeatedly adjudicated, and if the Plaintiffs have complied
with that, why is the Plaintiff unable to cite the date and name
of decisions to show all or even some of the "adjudications" and
to show the reasoning used by the court? The answer is that the
court was asked by Plaintiffs to accept statements by the
Plaintiffs about conclusions which were not true. Plaintiffs lack
evidence that the reasoning has been done in the past. In fact,
it had not.
The proposed findings and conclusions, even as
changed, still are subject to the objections previously filed and
should not be entered.
REQUEST FOR "FINAL RULING"
5.
If the court enters any partial summary judgment against
the Defendants in this case or on the so called contempt (which the
Plaintiffs refer to as sanctions), the Defendants who are parties
respectfully request that the court certify all orders actually
entered as final judgments for this part of the case under Rule
54(b). This request is made so Defendants may file an immediate
appeal.
Even though multiple parties are involved, the other
parties still involved are not subject to the First Cause of Action
or the contempt proceeding.
Dated this ty(yday

of September, 1988.

Raymond N. Malouf
CERTIFICATE OF^gJVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^
day of September/, 1988, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Objections to
Second Proposed Findings and Judgments, And Request for Final
Ruling, Civil No. 25616, was mailed, postage prepaid to the
following:
N. George Daines, Esq.
Daines & Kane
108 North Main
<L #
* _A
Logan, Utah 84321
/A L^+~ A ^ o ^ t ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^
Secretary
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